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PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON THE DOD COMPUTER SECURITY INITIAT--ETC(U)
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JUL 1 3 1981

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DIRECTORATE FOR PREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND SECURITY REVIEW (OASD - PA) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SECOND SEMINAR
ON THE

DOD COMPUTER SECURITY

INITIATIVE PROGRAM

(2nd)

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND DTIC ELECTE JUL 24 1981

JANUARY 15-17, 19864

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

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
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ABOUT THE SEMINAR

This is the second in a series of seminars to acquaint computer system developers and users with the status of "trusted" ADP system developments within the Department of Defense and current planning for the integrity evaluation of commercial implementations of similar systems. This seminar will go into more detail both on the technical experiences of the DoD research efforts in this area and the implications of trusted systems on the use of computers.

Following the first day of topics of general interest the seminar will divide into two parallel sessions. The technical session, intended for operating system developers and sophisticated computer science technical experts, will provide a detailed analysis of the Trusted Computing Base concept which is the emerging generalized basis upon which high integrity operating systems may be evaluated, followed by discussions by the principal designers of the major DoD trusted system developments relating their systems to the Trusted Computing Base Concept. The non-technical session will provide indepth discussion of policy issues as they apply to multilevel secure computer systems, an analysis of applications of such systems within the DoD and beyond, and a not-so-technical review of the Trusted Computing Base concepts.

There will be extensive question and answer periods during both parallel sessions and audience interaction is encouraged.

The Trusted Computing Base concept being introduced at this seminar is a first draft specification against which the integrity of computer systems may be evaluated. This draft specification is the result of much interaction within the DoD community and is being introduced here to obtain reactions from industry and other users. This draft specification is only a beginning and is expected to change significantly as a result of interactions with industry and government.

 * A "trusted" ADP system is one which employs sufficient hardware and software integrity measures to allow its use for simultaneously processing multiple levels of classified and/or sensitive information.

AROUT THE DOD COMPUTER SECURITY INITIATIVE

The Department of Defense (DoD) Computer Security Initiative was established in 1978 by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command, and Control and Intelligence to achieve the widespread availability of "trusted" ADP systems for use within the DoD. Widespread availability implies the use of commercially developed trusted ADP systems whenever possible. Recent DoD research activities are demonstrating that trusted ADP systems can be developed and successfully employed in sensitive information handling environments. In addition to these demonstration systems, a technically sound and consistent evaluation procedure must be established for determining the environments for which a particular trusted system is uitable.

The Computer Security Initiative is attempting to foster the development of trusted ADP systems through technology transfer efforts and to define reasonable ADP system evaluation procedures to be applied to both government and commercially developed trusted ADP systems. This seminar is the second in a series which constitute an essential element in the Initiative's Technology Transfer Program.

The Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology, through its Computer Security and Risk Management Standards program, seeks new technology to satisfy Federal ADP security requirements. The Institute then promulgates acceptable and cost effective technology in Federal Information Processing Standards and Guidelines. The Institute is pleased to assist the Department of Defense in transferring the interim results of its research being conducted under the Computer Security Initiative.

PROGRAM

Second Seminar on the Department of Defense Computer Security Initiative

National Bureau of Standards Gaithersburg, Maryland

January 15, 1980

The state of the s

Red Auditorium

9:30 am

"The Impact of Computer Security in the Intelligence Community"

Dr. John Koehler

Deputy Director for Central Intelligence for Resource Management

"The Impact of Computer Security in the Department of Defense"

Dr. Irwin Lebow Chief Scientist

Defense Communications Agency

"The Impact of Computer Security in the Federal Government"

Mr. James Burrows
Director, Institute for Computer Science and
Technology

National Bureau of Standards

BREAK

"The Impact of Computer Security in the Private Sector"

Mr. Ed Jacks General Motors Corporation

"Status of the DoD Computer Security Initiative"

Mr. Stephen T. Walker Chairman, DoD Computer Security Technical Consortium

1:00 pm LUNCH

January 15, 1980 (Continued)

2:00 pm

"Computer Security Impacts on Near Term Systems"

Mr. Clark Weissman

System Development Corporation

"Computer Security Impacts on Future System Architectures"

Mr. Ed Burke MITRE Corporation

BREAK

A "discussion" of what the computer manufacturers would like/should expect to hear from government users about trusted computer systems

Dr. Theodore M.P. Lee UNIVAC Corporation

Mr. James P. Anderson James P. Anderson Company

4:30 pm

ADJOURN

January 16-17, 1980

TWO PARALLEL SESSIONS

SESSION I

Gneral Session - Red Auditorium

January 16, 1980

9:15 am

"Policy Issues Relating to Computer Security"

Session Chairman: Robert Campbell

Advanced Information Management, Inc.

Mr. Cecil Phillips

Chairman, Computer Security Subcommittee

DCI Security Committee

Mr. Eugene Epperly

Counterintelligence & Security Policy Directorate

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Pentagon

Mr. Robert Campbell

Advanced Information Management, Inc.

Mr. Philip R. Manuel

Phillip R. Manuel and Associates

Dr. Stockton Gaines RAND Corporation

1:00 pm

LUNCH

January 16, 1980 (Continued)

2:00 pm "Use

"User Requirements and Applications"

Session Chairman: Dr. Stockton Gaines

RAND Corporation

Mr. Larry Bernosky

WWMCCS System Engineering Office

LtCol Cerny

Federal Republic of Germany Air Force

BREAK

Dr. Tom Berson SYTEK Corporation

Mr. Mervyn Stuckey

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

4:00 pm

ADJOURN

January 17, 1980

SESSION I

9:15 am

"User Requirements and Applications" (continued)

Dr. Von Der Brueck

IABG, Germany

Mr. John Rehbehn

Social Security Administration

Mr. William Nugent Library of Congress

Mr. Howard Crumb

Federal Reserve Bank of New York

BREAK

"Trusted Computing Base Concepts"

Mr. Peter Tasker MITRE Corporation

1:00 pm

LUNCH

2:00 pm

GENERAL DISCUSSION and WRAPUP

Mr. Stephen T. Walker

January 16 - 17

THE RESERVE TO THE PARTY OF THE

Green Auditorium

SESSION II

Technical Session on Trusted Computing Base Design

This session, intended for operating system developers and sophisticated computer science technical experts, will present the proposed Trusted Computing Base (TCB) concept, an internal protection mechanism for high-integrity, general-purpose computer systems. The most important issues and tradeoffs in the design of a TCB for a general-purpose minicomputer timesharing system will be discussed in detail. A technical background in computer science will be assumed.

The first day will consist of a series of presentations by Mr. John P.L. Woodward and Ms. Grace H. Nibaldi from the MITRE Corporation. First, the concept of a Trusted Computing Base will be defined in detail, and the two categories of TCB functions, software interface functions and user interface functions will be discussed. Then each of these functional areas will be discussed individually, with examples drawn from past and present TCB developments.

At the end of the presentations, members of the audience will be asked to identify design decisions they have faced in an operating system design or similar effort to determine how these decisions relate to the choices that must be made in TCB design. The audience will be encouraged to write their thoughts down for possible discussion on the second day.

The second day will consist of a panel discussion by the developers of the following trusted operation systems: \cdot

Kernelized Secure Operating System (KSOS-11)
Dr. McCauley, Ford Aerospace and Computer Corporation

Kernelized Secure Operating System (KSOS-6) Mr. Bonneau, Honeywell Corporation

UCLA Data Secure UNIX
Dr. Popek, University of California at Los Angeles

Kernelized VM-370 (KVM)
Mr. Schaefer, System Development Corporation

The developers will describe their TCB's and discuss the design issues they encountered and the tradeoffs they made in their designs. Following this, a question, answer, and general discussion session will be held.

Extensive audience comments and questions are expected and encouraged.

Welcome and Opening Words

Stephen T. Walker

Chairman, DoD Computer Security Technical Consortium

Welcome to NBS and the Second Seminar on the DoD Computer Security Initiative.

My name is Stephen T. Walker and I am Chairman of the Computer Security Technical Consortium which is responsible for the activities of the Initiative.

The goal of the Initiative is to achieve widespread availability of the trusted computer systems.

As your handout indicates, we define a "trusted" system as one with sufficient hardware and software integrity measures to allow simultaneous processing of multiple levels of sensitive information.

That is a rather complicated definition that simply means we can rely on the computer itself to protect information from unauthorized use or modification or even more simply stated to make the computer work the way we want it to.

By widespread we meant generally available to a large customer base, not special purpose.

This is a complex problem, a subset of the overall computer security problem (which includes physical, administration, personnel security) one which hasn't received much attention until recently, largely because it was felt by many to be too difficult to solve.

Trusted computers are the subject of this seminar but before we go any further, it is important to note that a solution to this problem does not diminish the need for physical and administration security measures though it may in some cases ease these measures for remote users at least.

Many computer users especially those outside of the Department of Defense have said (and undoubtedly will continue to say) our physical security measures are so lax that we couldn't use a trusted computer if we had one. Many have used this situation as an excuse not to worry about the integrity inside their computers.

Indeed, many facilities do not have reasonable physical and administrative measures today. But there is a very important point here which must be understood. If a computer user today wishes to take appropriate physical and administrative security measures to protect his system (as many already do), the technology needed to do this is readily available and well understood. There are plenty of places to go for advice and help.

If, however, a user wishes to install a computer in which he does not have to treat all information and all users at the same sensitivity level, he doesn't have many options today. We are trying to change that situation.

I maintain that any computer facility processing information that is of any value at all, be it a large central system or a network of small systems or something in between, will eventually come up against the need for integrity within the computer system itself. We in the Department of Defense have been hampered by the lack of internal integrity within computers for some time, as many of the upcoming speakers will testify. But others, dealing with sensitive information outside of the national security classified world have also encountered this problem, and many of them will speak in the next three days.

One major premise, then, of the computer security initiative is that there is a widespread and growing need for computers with high levels of integrity within the Department of Defense, within the Federal Government, and within the private sector. The first major objective of the seminar is to make that widespread need very clear.

We hope this portion of the seminar will motivate the computer manufacturers to get involved in building high integrity systems to satisfy the full spectrum of needs of their customer base.

The solution to this system integrity problem will be difficult and will take time to accomplish on a broad scale. We in the DoD have been working on technical solutions for some years and we believe that some early solutions to the problem are now becoming available.

The techniques needed to develop a trusted computer system involve a strict adherence to good system development practices plus a strong dose of formal specification and verification both of the design and the implementation of a system. The stronger the successful dose of this specification and verification process the greater the confidence that can be placed on the system. These techniques are derived from and closely linked to the system development techniques evolving in the major computer science research centers around the country. We are not looking for radical changes in the state-of-the-art in system development. Unfortunately, most systems currently in development or being marketed by the manufacturers do not represent anything close to the state-of-the-art in system development and therefore a major shift will be required by many of the manufacturers, in effect catching up with the state-of-the-art, before trusted computers will become generally available.

A second major premise of the computer security initiative then is that the technology needed to develop trusted computer systems exists today.

The second major objective of this seminar is to describe in detail the experiences we have had in developing these systems. We hope this portion of the seminar will make clear what we feel are important steps needed to build high integrity systems and therefore make it easier for the manufacturers to develop such systems.

In reviewing the preregistered attendee list, I was again impressed, as with the first seminar which we held last July, with the broad spectrum of interests represented in the audience. I will give you a breakdown of who you are a little later, but I was reminded, as I thought of all the different perspectives here, of the familiar story which bears repeating, of the blind men who encountered an elephant for the first time and were asked to describe what an elephant is, based on their limited experiences. One, who encountered the elephant's leg insisted that an elephant is a tree because it is round and tall and had a rough skin. Another who encountered the flank insisted that an elephant must be a wall because it was tall and wide and flat. A third, who ran into the tail, insisted it must be a rope with a tassel on the end, while the fourth, feeling the trunk, was certain that an elephant must be a hose with the two holes in the end. We've all heard this story before but I feel it is particularly appropriate in this context because of the wide variety of backgrounds which we all represent. It is important as we begin these three days that each one of us realize that whatever our own perspective on the computer security problem, we are limited in our understanding by the experiences we have had. As we listen to the speakers, we should try hard to understand the perspective of the speaker and in that way broaden our understanding of the total computer security problem.

As indicated in Dr. Dineen's keynote address at the July Seminar, printed in your program, the Department of Defense views the problem of achieving a high degree of integrity in computer systems as very important to our future information handling needs. The DoD has in the past and will continue in the future to build special purpose systems to satisfy specific vital DoD needs, but our need for trusted computer systems goes well beyond our ability to build specialized DoD systems. Furthermore many of the reasons we need trusted systems, for protecting sensitive information be it classified data, personnel files, financial or logistic records, are not at all unlike the needs of the rest of the government and the private sector. We feel the best way to solve our needs in this area is to encourage the computer manufacturers to develop trusted systems so that all of us — DoD, government and private sector users — can make full and effective use of the results. In this way all our needs can be satisfied in the most general manner for the least expense to any of us.

Just getting the manufacturers to develop trusted systems isn't quite enough though. We will talk later in the seminar about the evolution of a process for evaluating the integrity of computer systems to determine the environments and applications for which they are suitable. What we will have to say about this is necessarily preliminary and not formalized in any sense. We realize that having some form of evaluation process readily available is essential to the acceptability of trusted computer systems and I can assure you we are hard at work trying to establish the proper and consistent procedures for evaluating computer systems in a way that will benefit all interested parties.

With all this as background then, let us begin.

"The Impact of Computer Security in the Intelligence Community"

Dr. John Koehler Deputy Director for Central Intelligence for Resource Management

Outline of talk given at DoD Computer Security Conference - January 15, 1980.

1. Introductory Remarks:

- a. Greetings from DCI
- b. Congratulations and thanks to sponsors DoD and NBS
- c. DCI staff and all elements of the Intelligence Community cooperating with DoD Computer Security Initiative because of its importance to future progress in intelligence

2. The fundamental importance of computers

- a. The business of intelligence is information processing
- b. Time critical nature of intelligence information
- c. Time constraints, especially in I&W and for support to military operations have become progressively narrower
- Increasing demands on the Intelligence Community are apparent
 - * The international environment is increasingly complex. We have spent great efforts to support treaty negotiations and monitoring; concurrently, the conflict and threat of conflict in peripheral areas require greater attention.
 - * As with Defense, real resources going to the Intelligence Community have generally declined over the last decade.
 - * Faced with this situation, there would have been no way in which the Intelligence Community could have continued to have fulfilled the expanding requirements levied upon it without a heavy reliance on increasingly complex and competent data processing and communications systems.

- Computers, because of the historical pattern of their development, while helping to solve the Intelligence Community's problems have posed substantial new problems of their own--
 - * The Intelligence Community always faces a dilemma: because our sources are fragile, the information needs to be closely held, locked up, protected. But the purpose of gathering and producing intelligence is to help make better decisions. That requires data to be processed quickly and information disseminated quickly and broadly.
 - * The historical pattern of development of computer systems has made choosing among the two objectives of security and dissemination especially difficult.
 - * The Von Neumann concept of the digital computer, implementing the computer's internal executive functions through programs executed in the same manner as applications programs, has made the present day computer highly vulnerable to sophisticated attack.
 - * The relatively unstructured development of today's extremely large and complex operating systems has further exacerbated the problem.
 - * The vulnerability which this has led to in today's computer systems, coupled with the concentration in one place of large masses of highly sensitive classified information, have posed problems with which it has proved extremely difficult to cope and which steadily increase in magnitude.
- This is not to say that the Intelligence Community's present day information processing and handling systems pose an undue security hazard.
 - * Faced with a lack of trusted software with which to implement security controls, we have had to rely heavily on physical security for systems to which all access is denied except to those cleared to the highest level of classification of any of the material present in any particular system.
 - * To enforce such a security policy has, however, required considerable expensive duplication of resources, has placed a severe strain on security clearance procedures, and has restricted access to information more than we desire.
 - * As we strive to improve the efficiency with which the Intelligence Community executes its mission by taking advantage of the concept of distributed data bases and interactive real-time access to the expanding volumes of information which new techniques of internetting and high speed bulk transfer of data make possible, we can foresee the time when present solutions to the security problem will no longer be adequate.

- 5. For the foregoing reasons, the DCI and his staff elements immediately concerned with the problem have taken an active part in supporting and encouraging the DoD Computer Security Initiative Program.
- 6. As Dr. Dineen noted in his keynote address to the first of these seminars, "The DoD cannot afford, just for the sake of having trusted computer systems, to develop its own general purpose hardware and software systems."
 - * If the DoD, with all its resources cannot afford to do so, it goes without saying that the Intelligence Community cannot afford to do so either.
 - * In the infancy of computer technology, because of the unavailability of commercial systems and the importance of the capabilities of the electronic computer to the Intelligence business, the Intelligence Community did just that.
 - * Now, however, the magnitude, complexity and cost of today's generalized systems and their widespread availability in the commercial market militates against the development by the Intelligence Community of any but the most specialized intelligence processing systems.
 - * Therefore, we, along with the DoD, must rely on and encourage the development of trusted systems by the industry.
 - * To the extent that industry does meet the challenge of the security problem and produce systems which are demonstrably more secure, the Intelligence Community will provide a ready market for such products.
- 7. We recognize that as significant a portion of the intelligence and defense budgets as data processing and telecommunications are, the size of this market alone cannot totally justify the expenditure of the resources required to develop and market trusted software systems.
 - * However, we are convinced that the problems of computer security are in no way limited to the Intelligence Community or the Department of Defense alone. They happen to be more critical in our areas of concern and therefore we are the most cognizant of them.

- * As computers assume more and more decision making functions and as more and more financial transactions are initiated and executed by computers without human intervention, making obsolete traditional control mechanisms and audit functions, the problems of computer security will gain greater and greater importance and attention in government in all its functions and at all levels, national, state, and local. Nor will business, particularly the financial community, lag far behind this growing trend.
- 8. Thus, it is to the great mutual self-interest of ourselves and the data processing industry that we exert the utmost effort to work together to build on progress which has been made in this area by the DoD Computer Security initiative.
 - * Just as the Intelligence Community cooperated with industry and other elements of the Federal government in developing the Data Encryption Standard in the field of communications security, the Intelligence Community encourages and stands ready to assist in any way that it can in the development of improved computer security in the commercial field.

"THE IMPACT OF COMPUTER SECURITY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE"

OUTLINE

- THE DOD COMPUTER SECURITY CONTEXT
 - • NATIONAL LEVEL COMMAND AND CONTROL
 - • DCA RESPONSIBILITIES
- DEFINITION OF THE COMPUTER SECURITY PROBLEM
- OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS RESULTING FROM CURRENT APPROACHES TO SECURITY
- EVOLUTION OF WWMCCS COMPUTER CONNECTIVITY
- LESSONS LEARNED
- CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Irwin Lebow Chief Scientist Defense Communications Agency

MAJOR DCA RESPONSIBILITIES

SUBJECT

- WORLD-WIDE MILITARY COMMAND & CONTROL SYSTEM (WWMCCS)
 - NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND SYSTEM (NMCS)
 - ●● STANDARD ADP SYSTEMS
 - MINIMUM ESSENTIAL EMERGENCY
 COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK (MEECN)
- DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
- MILITARY SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

DCA RESPONSIBILITY

ARCHITECTURE & SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

DETAILED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND ADP SUPPORT

ARCHITECTURE, SYSTEMS ENGI-NEERING & COMMON SUPPORT

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

MANAGEMENT, ARCHITECTURE, SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

ARCHITECTURE

WWMCCS STANDARD ADP SYSTEMS

CURRENT SYSTEM

35 SITES (CONUS, PACIFIC, EUROPE)

STANDARD HARDWARE

H6000 MAINFRAME
DN355 COMMUNICATIONS CONTROLLER
VISUAL INFO. PROJECTION TERMINALS

STANDARD SOFTWARE

GCOS SYSTEM SOFTWARE
CERTAIN APPLICATIONS SOFTWARE

NETWORKING WWMCCS COMPUTERS

CURRENTLY VIA DEDICATED WWMCCS INTERCOMPUTER NETWORK (WIN) POST 1981 VIA COMMON USER AUTODIN II

 DEFINITION OF ALTERNATIVES FOR MAJOR UPGRADE NOW UNDERWAY

EVOLUTION OF DCS DATA SYSTEM

- CURRENTLY AUTODIN I
- 1980 1985 AUTODIN I/AUTODIN II
 - • AUTODIN II PACKET SWITCHING BACKBONE
 - • AUTODIN I MESSAGE SERVICE "HOSTS"
- POST 1985 AUTODIN II

The second of the second of

- • AUTODIN I "HOSTS" PHASED OUT
- •• MESSAGE SERVICE (AND OTHER SERVICES)
 PROVIDED ELSEWHERE

OPPOSING FORCES IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE DCS

- DESIRE FOR MORE EFFECTIVE, EXTENSIVE INFORMATION SHARING AND EXCHANGE
- FEAR OF COMPROMISE OF SENSITIVE DATA

THE COMPUTER SECURITY PROBLEM

TO PROTECT USER INFORMATION ON SHARED COMPUTER SYSTEMS

"PROTECT USER INFORMATION"

- PREVENT DATA COMPROMISE
- PREVENT DENIAL OF SERVICE
- GUARANTEE DATA INTEGRITY

"SHARED COMPUTER SYSTEMS"

- HOSTS
- HOST FRONT END DEVICES
- TEXT MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEMS
- TERMINAL ACCESS CONTROLLERS
- SWITCHING NODES
- GATEWAYS ETC

ASPECTS OF THE COMPUTER SECURITY PROBLEM

• AUTHENTICATION PROBLEM:

PREVENTING PENETRATION BY UNAUTHORIZED USERS

MULTILEVEL SECURITY PROBLEM:

PREVENTING MISUSE BY AUTHORIZED USERS

APPROACHES TO AUTHENTICATION

IDENTIFY A USER BY

- WHAT HE IS
- WHAT HE KNOWS
- WHAT HE HAS

APPROACHES TO MULTILEVEL SECURITY

- LOGICALLY SEPARATE USERS: KERNEL TECHNOLOGY
- DISGUISE DATA: END-TO-END ENCRYPTION

WHY IS COMPUTER SECURITY A PROBLEM?

- SENSITIVE/CLASSIFIED DATA STORED ONLINE
- MULTILEVEL SECURITY IS A DIFFICULT TECHNICAL PROBLEM
- SEÇÚRITY DEMANDS ARE INCREASING
- CURRENT APPROACHES ARE EXPENSIVE, INADEQUATE

CURRENT APPROACHES STRESS PHYSICAL CONTROL

- PHYSICAL CONTROL OF ACCESS AREAS
- DEDICATED (REPLICATED) COMPUTER SYSTEMS
- PERIODS PROCESSING
- SYSTEM HIGH CLEARANCES

SECURITY PROBLEM AT HO FORCES COMMAND (FORSCOM)

H6000 DN 355

MUST SUPPORT CONNECTION TO


(S) (S) · · · (S)

>40 SECRET TERMINALS THROUGHOUT CONUS

JCS, USREDCOM, DA, LANTCOM, . . .

WWMCCS COMPUTERS OPERATING AT TOP SECRET


TERMINALS, PERIODS PROCESS



DRAWBACKS OF FORSCOM SOLUTION

- COST TO UPGRADE SECRET FACILITIES TO TOP SECRET
 - • EXTENSIVE PERSONNEL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS
 - • MORE CUMBERSOME ADMINISTRATIVE, OPERATING PROCEDURES
- OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS
 - • NO SERVICE DURING COLOR CHANGES
 - • INTERCONNECTIVITY RESTRICTED TO SPECIFIC PERIODS


SECURITY PROBLEM AT MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND (MAC)



MUST SUPPORT CONNECTION TO




MAC SOLUTION: REPLICATE SYSTEMS



DRAWBACKS OF MAC SOLUTION

- COST TO REPLICATE MAINFRAMES
 - • REPLICATED PURCHASE, MAINTENANCE COST
 - REPLICATED OPERATING EXPENSES
- OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS
 - •• TOP SECRET SYSTEM MUST ACCESS UNCLASSIFIED DATA BASES MANUALLY PROCEDURE INCONVENIENT, DATA NOT CURRENT
 - •• COMPUTER RESOURCE CANNOT BE ASSIGNED DYNAMICALLY


EVOLUTION OF WWMCCS COMPUTER CONNECTIVITY



COMPUTER SECURITY RISK IS A FUNCTION OF:


- COMPUTING ENVIRONMENT
 (SPAN OF PHYSICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL)
- DEGREE OF USER FREEDOM
 (SPAN OF LOGICAL CONTROL)

TWO DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY RISK




ISOLATED WWMCCS SITES WITH LOCAL TERMINALS

- O "SHARING" AMONG LOCAL USERS
- PHYSICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL COMPLETE
- REPLICATED SYSTEMS
- SYSTEM HIGH CLEARANCES



ISOLATED WWMCCS SITES WITH REMOTE TERMINALS


- "SHARING" AMONG LOCAL USERS, REMOTE USERS ON DEDICATED LINES
- LINK ENCRYPTION ON COMM LINES
- PHYSICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL DISPERSED
- REPLICATED SYSTEMS
- SYSTEM HIGH CLEARANCES



AUTODIN I

- INITIAL OPERATION 1963
- MESSAGE SWITCHING STORE-AND-FORWARD NETWORK
 - 9 U. S., 9 OVERSEAS SWITCHES
 - ●●≤ 9600 BAUD TRUNKS
- 2250 SUBSCRIBER TERMINATIONS
 - • MILITARY AGENCIES
 - • INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
 - • CIVILIAN AGENCIES
 - ●● NO DIAL-UP ACCESS
- PROVIDES WRITTEN RECORD COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
 - BATCH-STYLE SERVICE
 - • FORMAL MESSAGE FORMATS

U.S. AUTODIN I



AUTODIN I SECURITY

- MULTILEVEL SECURE BY FIAT
 - PHYSICAL SEPARATION OF USERS (R/Y)
 - • REDUNDANT SOFTWARE CHECKS
 - PEOPLE IN LOOP
 - •• PHYSICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF SWITCHES
 - EXTENSIVE MESSAGE JOURNALLING
 - •• LINK ENCRYPTION
 - •• RESTRICTED USER/NETWORK INTERFACE, I. E., NO USER PROGRAMMING IN SWITCH


WWMCCS COMPUTER INTERCONNECTION VIA AUTODIN I

- PHYSICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL GEOGRAPHICALLY DISPERSED, INCOMPLETE
 - • WWMCCS SITES GEOGRAPHICALLY DISPERSED
 - • NON-WWMCCS SUBSCRIBERS BEYOND WWMCCS CONTROL
- NO DATA SHARING IN COMPUTER SENSE VIA AUTODIN I
 - •• RECORD TRAFFIC PASSED AMONG WWMCCS SITES, OTHER SUBSCRIBERS
 - •• NO INTERACTIVE USER PROGRAMMING VIA AUTODIN !

NETWORK (WIN)

- INITIAL OPERATION AS PWIN 1974
- PACKET SWITCHING NETWORK BASED ON ARPANET TECHNOLOGY
 - PACKET SWITCHING BY IMPS
 - ●●50 KB/S TRUNKS
- NETWORK DEDICATED TO WWMCCS SUBSCRIBERS
 - • CURRENTLY NINE HOST SUBSCRIBERS
 - ●●ADDITIONAL 11 HOSTS PLANNED BY FEBRUARY 1980
 - NO DIAL-UP ACCESS
- PROVIDES COMPUTER-TO-COMPUTER INFORMATION EXCHANGE
 - ◆ INTERACTIVE OPERATION
 - NCP, TELNET, TELECONFERENCING, FTP PROTOCOLS

1980 - WWMCCS INTERCOMPUTER NETWORK (WIN)



WIN SECURITY

NOT MULTILEVEL SECURE

SYSTEM HIGH (TS) FOR ALL HOSTS

PHYSICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALL SWITCHES,

ACCESS AREAS

LINK ENCRYPTION

WWMCCS INTERCONNECTION VIA WIN

- PHYSICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL GEOGRAPHICALLY DISPERSED, COMPLETE
 - • WWMCCS SITES GEOGRAPHICALLY DISPERSED
 - •• SUBNET DEDICATED TO WWMCCS COMMUNITY
 - •• ACCESS AREAS CONTROLLED (NO DIAL-UP ACCESS)
- ALL INTERCONNECTED SITES OPERATE SYSTEM HIGH AT TS
- DATA SHARING AMONG INTERCONNECTED SITES

AUTODIN II

- INITIAL OPERATION 1980
- PACKET SWITCHING NETWORK
 - ●● 4 PSN's INITIALLY: EXPANDABLE TO 8
 - ●● PSN's ARE MULTIPLE PDP 11/70's
 - ●● 56 KB/S TRUNKS
- COMMON USER DOD NETWORK
 - ●● MILITARY AGENCIES
 - INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
 - DOD RELATED ACTIVITIES
 - ● DIAL-UP ACCESS PROVIDED
- PROVIDES COMPUTER-TO-COMPUTER INFORMATION EXCHANGE
 - ●● INTERACTIVE SERVICE
 - TCP, THP PROTOCOLS; LAYERED FOR EVOLUTIONARY GROWTH

AUTODIN II SECURITY

MULTILEVEL SECURE

- KERNEL TECHNOLOGY IN PSN'S
 - FORMAL VERIFICATION OF TOP LEVEL SPECIFICATION
 - FACILITATED BY RESTRICTED USER/NETWORK INTERFACE, I.E., NO USER PROGRAMMING IN PSN'S
- PHYSICAL/ADMINSTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALL PSN'S
- LINK ENCRYPTION


VIA AUTODIN II

- PHYSICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL GEOGRAPHICALLY DISPERSED, INCOMPLETE
 - • WWMCCS SITES GEOGRAPHICALLY DISPERSED
 - NON-WWMCCS SUBSCRIBERS BEYOND WWMCCS CONTROL
 - • DIAL-UP ACCESS PROVIDED
- AUTODIN II PROVIDES MLS DATA EXCHANGE SITES NOT MLS
- DATA SHARING AMONG WWMCCS SITES, OTHER SUBSCRIBERS

LESSONS LEARNED

NO.1 OUR APPLICATIONS "EYES" ARE BIGGER THAN OUR SECURITY TECHNOLOGY "STOMACHS"

- ENORMOUS ADVANCES IN COMPUTER HARDWARE HAVE OCCURRED
- MODEST BUT SIGNIFICANT ADVANCES IN COMPUTER SOFTWARE HAVE OCCURRED
- THESE ADVANCES SPAWNED REQUIREMENTS FOR SOPHISTICATED APPLICATIONS
- THESE APPLICATIONS HAVE LED TO GREATER SECURITY BURDENS
- SECURITY TECHNOLOGY HAS LAGGED



NO. 2. SOFTWARE, NOT HARDWARE, DOMINATES LIFE CYCLE COST

- SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT COST (QUICK DESIGN, QUICK CODING, TEST, FIX, TEST, FIX, . . .)
- SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE COST (SOFTWARE CHANGE, TEST, FIX, TEST, FIX, . . .)
- SOFTWARE DOCUMENTATION COST (INCOMPLETE, INACCURATE, OUT-OF-DATE SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS)
- SOFTWARE CONVERSION COST (DATA AND PROCEDURE)

NO. 3. SECURE SOFTWARE MAY BE MORE EXPENSIVE STILL

- INCREASED DESIGN COST
- ADDITIONAL COST OF VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
- INCREASED MAINTENANCE COST FOR RE-VERIFICATION, RE-CERTIFICATION
- PERFORMANCE PENALTY OF UNKNOWN MAGNITUDE

LESSONS LEARNED

NO. 4. SOFTWARE INVESTMENT MUST BE PRESERVED OVER CHANGES IN HARDWARE, REQUIREMENTS

- A. MINIMIZE HARDWARE DEPENDENCIES
- •• SPECIFY SYSTEM BY FUNCTION, NOT HARDWARE CHARACTERISTICS
- •• MINIMIZE ASSUMPTIONS MADE IN SOFTWARE ABOUT HARDWARE CHARACTERISTICS
- •• EVALUATE IMPACT BEFORE OPTIMIZING SOFTWARE FOR PARTICULAR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION
- • USE UBIQUITOUS HIGHER ORDER LANGUAGE(S)

NO. 4. SOFTWARE INVESTMENT MUST BE PRESERVED OVER CHANGES IN HARDWARE, REQUIREMENTS

- B. SIMPLIFY SOFTWARE
- •• PROGRAM FOR CLARITY, EASY MAINTENANCE, EASY TRANSPORT-ABILITY (NOT DEVELOPMENT SPEED, EXECUTION SPEED, ETC.)
- •• SUBSTITUTE HARDWARE FOR SOFTWARE COMPLEXITY WHERE FEASIBLE (BUY MORE MEMORY, FASTER PROCESSOR, ETC.)
- •• AUGMENT WITH OTHER APPROACHES WHICH LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF SECURITY RELATED SOFTWARE (e. g., ENCRYPTION)

LESSONS LEARNED

NO. 4. SOFTWARE INVESTMENT MUST BE PRESERVED OVER CHANGES IN HARDWARE, REQUIREMENTS

- O.C. RATIONALIZE, CONTROL SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
 - • TOP-DOWN DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION
 - USE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT TOOLS
 - • EMPHASIZE CLEAR, COMPLETE, CURRENT DOCUMENTATION

NO. 5. CAPITALIZE ON COMMERCIAL HARDWARE DEVELOPMENTS

- USE OFF-THE-SHELF HARDWARE WHENEVER FEASIBLE (NOT CUSTOM DESIGNED, SPECIAL PURPOSE GEAR)
- EMPHASIZE (AND PAY FOR) MORE TRANSPORTABLE SOFTWARE

CONCLUSIONS

- DEMAND IS INCREASING FOR MORE ADP SUPPORT FOR THE WWMCCS VIA NETWORKING
- MULTILEVEL SECURITY CANNOT BE RETROFITTED INTO THE CURRENT GENERATION OF WWMCCS ADP
- PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF WWMCCS ADP ARE EXCITING, BUT SECURITY IS APT TO BE THE MAJOR TECHNOLOGICAL LIMITATION

SPECIFIC WWMCCS TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES

- MORE RELIABLE AUTHENTICATION METHODS
- MULTILEVEL SECURITY (FOR HOSTS, AMHS, ...)
- DISCRETIONARY (NEED TO KNOW) SECURITY AT EFFECTIVE LEVEL OF GRANULARITY
- PROTECTION AGAINST DENIAL OF SERVICE
- END-TO-END NETWORK SECURITY
- ALL THE ABOVE AT MODEST COST

Impact of Computer Security in the Federal Government

J. H. Burrows
Director
Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology
National Bureau of Standards

Introduction

As a co-sponsor and host of this Seminar on Computer Security, I would like to welcome you to the National Bureau of Standards. As Steve said, before coming to the Bureau as Director of its Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology in May of last year, I spent seven years in the Department of Defense working in many areas in which computers played an important, if not crucial role. While there, I became more interested in the computer security problem in general and the Computer Security Initiative in Trusted Computer Systems in particular. I am very pleased that I am able to participate in this seminar, both because of my personal experience and interest, but also because of the official role that we at NBS are playing in computer security.

I want to spend the next few minutes telling you about our perception of the need for computer security within the Federal Government but not necessarily within the I had then to Defense. We have just heard two excellent presentations on the need for such security within the intelligence and communications arms of DoD. In the next two and one-half days, you will hear a great deal on the technology of computer security and also specific requirements for this security. Rather than dwelling on the technology or repeating the general platitudes of computer security, I want to walk through a case example which we at NBS find very intriguing, not only because of its obvious need for the technology to be discussed at this seminar, but also because of the multitude of reasons why this technology may have difficulty being accepted. Before I begin that walk, I would like to outline our perspective of a trusted system.

According to the brochure announcing this seminar, a "trusted" ADP system is one which employs sufficient hardware and software integrity measures to allow its use for simultaneously processing multiple levels of classified and/or sensitive information. This personification of a machine requires some evaluation. A "trustee" in a prison is "trusted" not to break out of prison. I hope this is not the proper analogy to a trusted computer. A "trustee" in a real estate loan transaction is a "trusted" third party who knows and explicitly carries out the policies and procedures that were specified in the transaction agreement between the two primary parties. The trustee is required by law to automatically carry out these procedures when triggered by a specific event. I believe this is the analogy we seek when personifying a "trusted" computer. The suppliers of data and the users of the data are the two primary parties in our example. The computer is the third party It must, however, be programmed with the policies and procedures of protection and control desired by the primary parties. My view is that the Department of Defense has a "leg up" on the rest of the Federal Government because of the written existence of these policies and procedures regarding classified information. The technology of the DoD trusted system will be applicable but the first requirement for computer security outside DoD is for the development of a new set of policies and procedures to be implemented in

the trusted system. This is no trivial task. In the extremely simple area of classified information (not involving money or property) and a single unified goal, DoD struggled for over five years to come up with their written policy and have yet to close on the parameters of a certification policy acceptable to all of DoD.

Case Example of Computer Security Requirements

I am sure you all are aware of the existence of the Environmental Protection Agency. I am not sure if you know of their very broad role as dictated by Congress and EPA's establishing Presidential order. I have chosen to use EPA as an example of the need for computer security in the Federal Government and to outline the multitude of conflicting data processing security requirements. EPA has informally requested the assistance of NBS in specifying reasonable security provisions which can best satisfy these requirements. For this reason, I am able to outline some of the problems as seen by EPA in this area.

EPA was established by Presidential Order in 1970. At that time, 15 environmental control programs were unified in a single regulatory agency. EPA is charged with mounting an integrated, coordinated attack on the environmental problems of air and water pollution, solid waste management, pesticides, radiation, noise and toxic substances. Since its establishment, Congress has added to this list of responsibilities. EPA is specifically required to set standards for the limits of pollution, enforce compliance with these limits and monitor the progress of reducing pollution even if below the established limits.

Organizationally, EPA consists of six primary offices reporting to an Agency Administrator. Best known are the Office of Water and Hazardous Materials, Office of Air and Waste Management, and the Office of Toxic Substances. Thirteen different major Congressional Acts govern the actions of just these three offices. Some examples of their regulatory responsibilities will serve to demonstrate their need for complete and accurate data and trusted data processing capabilities.

- o EPA is required to conduct research on all aspects of water pollution and control dumping of all pollutants (including radioactive waste) into all navigable waters. Any U.S. citizen has the right to take <u>legal action</u> against a water polluter.
- o EPA is required to set safe drinking water regulations and enforce those regulations if each state does not or cannot. Again, any citizen has the expressed right to bring civil suit against any public water system or any Federal agency (including EPA) in violation.
- o EPA is required to set air quality standards for all air pollutants and assisting states in meeting those standards. Citizens are specifically authorized to take necessary <u>legal actions</u> against private or Government officials failing to meet provisions of the Clean Act.
- o EPA is required to develop programs for testing, monitoring and regulating chemical substances and pesticides. Manufacturers must register with EPA all insecticides, herbicides and fungicides intended for sale in the U.S. and notify EPA at least 90 days before the manufacture of any chemical intended for commercial purposes.

o EPA is required to collect, maintain, protect and process accurate and complete data in support of these activities.

EPA estimates that 35 billion characters of data will be maintained in the data bases of its two computer centers - one in North Carolina and one in Washington - in 1980 with a fivefold increase expected in 1990. A completely new computer facility is being designed to support all the activities of EPA. Presently intended for first operation in the mid 80's, the system will be designed according to the goals of OMB Circular A-109 to be useful and cost-effective for a life cycle of 10-15 years.

Some interesting security, integrity and privacy issues which ${\tt EPA}$ must address include:

- (1) Manufacturers must submit extensive reports to EPA on a regular basis. EPA plans to allow the manufacturers to supply the data in automated form (tape or disk) in order to save the cost of reentering the data into its computer when the data is already in a computer. One consideration is to allow direct access to EPA's data bases by the manufacturer in order to improve the timeliness of data. If this is allowed, how can access be restricted to only that data previously submitted by that manufacturer?
- (2) Each of the 50 states has many rights and responsibilities under the various acts coordinated by EPA. Great competition exists among states and their legislators for Federal dollars. What data should states be allowed to access? As many funding initiatives are based on states' programs, what controls can be placed on this data from Congressional and public interest inquiries?
- (3) Members of the scientific community have had great interest in using data maintained by EPA. In one instance in North Carolina, technical consultants and world-famous employees refused to use picture badges issued for automated door locks which controlled access to the research laboratories. How will scientists used to having access to scientific informaton react to access controls uniformly enforced by the "trusted" ADP system?
- (4) An EPA spokesman estimated that there are now 40 lawsuits by manufacturers filed against EPA seeking less stringent environmental controls and 35 lawsuits by public interest groups filed against EPA seeking more stringent environmental controls. Attorneys from both sides commonly use the data bases maintained by EPA to support their side of such cases. Attorneys for both sides now resort to attacking the integrity of EPA's data bases and data processing (including timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of the data) when their case is in jeopardy. How can the integrity of data and data processing be substantiated in a court case?

EPA's data processing and security requirements were particularly interesting to me because they demonstrated that a trusted and provable secure computer system was needed outside both DoD and money handling agencies such as IRS, Treasury, Social Security and the Federal Reserve System. Unauthorized disclosure of classified information and financial fraud are both understood problems which have legal histories and penalties. The Privacy Act of 1974 provides penalties for the intentional disclosure of personal information. The

draft "Federal Computer Systems Protection Act of 1979," introduced by Senator Ribicoff as S.240, makes it a crime to use, for fraudulent or other illegal purposes, any computer owned or operated by the United States. The bill provides a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison and/or \$50,000 fine for willful and unauthorized accesses or attempts to access a computer network for the purpose of altering or obtaining programs and data. Without the passage of this law, however, EPA has no legal basis to enforce access controls imposed on the very sensitive data supplied by manufacturers, states, cities, and private organizations. Yet their most important role is to maintain accurate and up-to-date data and be capable of validating its integrity, securely processing it for various applications, and assuring its suppliers that the data has only been used for its intended purposes. The computer must become the "trustee" in this environment and a "trusted" system is necessary according to the security requirements of EPA.

NBS Computer Security Role

NBS has the responsibility of developing Federal Information Processing Standards to improve the utilization of computers in the Federal Government. Historically, these standards have included the ASCII character standard, the Cobol language standard, magnetic tape standards and computer-peripheral interface standards. Now, the Office of Management and Budget has given NBS responsibility for developing computer security standards and guidelines in Transmittal Memorandum 1 of OMB Circular A-71. I would like to spend a few minutes outlining our computer security program and how we are responding to added impetus to our security program.

ICST first established a computer security program in 1972 which has:

- (1) Issued six Federal Information Processing Standards or Guidelines devoted to computer security.
- (2) Published numerous technical articles and special publications in computer security technology.
- (3) Worked with the American National Standards Institute in developing voluntary ANSI standards in security of communications and financial transactions.
- (4) Established a five year program to issue Federal standards in the following computer security areas:
 - o Risk Analysis

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- o Contingency Planning
- o Security Auditing
- o Personal Identification
- o Network Security
- o Data Encryption
- o Applications Program Development

During the first seminar in this series, Dr. Willis Ware of the Rand Corporation, in his keynote address, challenged ICST to "step out smartly in specifying the performance requirements of a secure operating system plus the administrative, procedural and physical environments in which it is embedded." Willis stated that "within the Civil Government Sector, only ICST has a chance of handling the computer security problem." Willis did not say how small that chance was. In support of ICST, Willis did subsequently request OMB to provide us reasonable resources to meet this challenge. To date, we have received no additional resources in this area. In addition, let me outline what I perceive as a set of necessary conditions for anyone to meet his challenge.

- (1) A uniform master structure for policies for the protection of data within all computer systems of the Federal Government must be established.
 - (2) The technology for trusted systems must be researched and developed.
- (3) A willingness to design, build and maintain "trusted" computer systems must be made by private industry when the technology becomes available.
- (4) A commitment for the procurement and use of "trusted" computer systems (when they become available) must be made by all Federal ADP organizations when security is needed and physical protection does not suffice.
- (5) A standard for the functional requirements of a trusted system must be developed and issued.
- (6) A validation service which tests commercial implementations of the trusted system against the standard must be established.
- (7) Procurement regulations which make the procurement of trusted systems simple must be issued.

Dr. Ware called for NBS to follow the same road in developing a trusted computer system standard that was followed by NBS in developing a Data Encryption Standard. This we will do. We requested the assistance of industry and NSA in specifying and evaluating the technology for the Data Encryption Standard. I hereby request the similar assistance of industry and DoD to research, implement, test and evaluate the technology of a "trusted" operating system. NBS can then begin the drafting and coordinating of a Federal Information Processing Standard. We can also initiate a cooperative effort with DoD in establishing a validation service and with GSA in modifying the procurement regulations to make it easy for a Federal agency to obtain a trusted system.

The ultimate impact of computer security in the Federal Government cannot be estimated at this time. Even the scope of computer security has not been completely specified. Impact will have both positive and negative

aspects. Processing reliability will definitely be improved because of security provisions. Data integrity will definitely be improved, perhaps to the point where courts can be convinced of its correctness. Trust of the suppliers and users of data will be improved when the computer becomes a true "trustee." However, costs will be incurred. People will become frustrated when they can no longer access the computer system like they could before. Programmers became frustrated (for a short while) when they were barred from the computer room. Money must be spent — both for initial and operational costs. The acceptability of a trusted computer system will be based on these factors.

NBS is pleased to provide a forum for DoD to discuss its computer security initiative with you. We will also be happy to "step out smartly" in support of computer security technology and promulgating reasonable and effective standards in this area as the technology becomes available.

COMPUTER SECURITY INTEREST IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

by

Edwin L. Jacks

General Motors Information Systems and Communication Activity

Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen. When Dr. Steve Walker invited me to speak on the "Computer Security Interest in the Private Sector", it gave me a welcomed chance to relate our viewpoint on computer security in GM to the computer security viewpoint as expressed by the Department of Defense Computer Security Initiative Program.

While the title to my talk is "Computer Security Interest in the Private Sector", much of my speech will be on the computer security activities within GM. Based on the internal interest now being shown by many companies on the subject and discussions I have had with data processing managers of other companies, our interests are, I believe, similar.

Computer systems have become a basic resource used in the operation of a business. The exception today is the non-use of computers in a business function - not the use of computers. Their basic utility has been clearly proven. Their penetration is into every aspect of business. As reported by The Diebold Group, Inc., expenditures for information systems have been approximately 1% of the sales revenues for large companies, as a national average, for the last 10 years. In GM, one would be hard-pressed to find an aspect of the business not using computers. The reasons for using computers are diverse: they may be economic - a means to reduce operating cost; or business effectiveness - a means to better operate the business. The private sector is using computers to aid design, engineering, and manufacturing of its products; to aid the ordering, marketing, and distribution of its products; to aid in the accounting, purchasing, and invoicing processes; and to aid in the personnel and legal activities of its business.

The end effect is an extensive business dependency on computer systems.

That dependency has led the private sector into having a basic concern about the security of computerized business systems. From a strictly technical viewpoint, the only thing that can happen to data is the unauthorized disclosure, modification, destruction, or delay.

The private sector concern, however, is with the consequences of security failure - for example, loss of production, loss of assets, loss of confidentiality, and loss of customer service.

Information System Security

As I understand the DOD initiative, its objective is "... the widespread availability of trusted computer systems." Those are systems with sufficient hardware and software integrity measures to allow their use for simultaneously processing multiple levels of classified or sensitive information. The broad business concern is the prevention of failure for any reason of the information system portion of a business system. From a DP management viewpoint in the private sector, the security objective is to provide business managers with trusted information systems. One definition that we have used in GM is that, "Security is knowing your business procedures, being confident of their operational effectiveness, and being sure they are in place."

This definition places a positive emphasis on security. It emphasizes the need for the business manager to understand the computerized portions of his business systems. At the same time, it places a responsibility on the system developer to communicate clearly with the business manager and to accurately implement systems. The operational effectiveness requirement points up the need for business managers to evaluate how well a system meets business objectives. It identifies his responsibility and accountability for a system. And, finally, the "being sure the systems are in place", addresses issues of auditability and integrity.

We believe that if the business manager clearly understands the computer procedures being used, can measure their operational effectiveness, and is sure they are in place, then we will indeed have trusted business systems.

Now, as this audience knows well, from the rigorous mathematical viewpoint, the development of trusted computer systems is at the front edge of computer technology. However, thousands of information systems are working, and working well and are, in a practical business sense, trusted.

If this is the case, then how does the DOD initiative fit into the private sector information systems security interest? To address that point, the presentation will first cover various background aspects of the security activities within GM; second, discuss a formulation of security as maintaining, under adverse conditions, three independent parameters: availability, integrity, and confidentiality; third, discuss design concepts for secure systems - in particular, responsibility assignment, security continuity, separation of incompatible functions, and minimization of failure impact; and, finally, relate the preceding items to the DOD initiative. In particular, we find trusted computer system concepts necessary but not sufficient for the private sector information system security.

Security - A Pragmatic Approach

GM is a decentralized organization with major data centers in almost every division and in several staff functions. The Data Processing Manager at each of these centers has a specific responsibility for information systems security. In that most of these centers have evolved from the Financial operations in GM, they have a long history of careful control and handling of data. Their security initiatives are both long standing and pragmatic. They install those procedures and practices which economically protect their information systems.

The focus point for a data processing installation's security is the Information System Security Officer - an ISSO. Corporate policy requires each data processing installation to have an ISSO. He - or she, as the case may be - is the one responsible for administering an on-going security program in the installation.

That program would include physical security, operational controls, and disaster recovery plans. The operating system would be expected to have integrity at least equivalent to IBM's MVS system. Any support software required must not violate or be detrimental to the system integrity. A resource access control program with individual identification and password authentication would be in use with the operating system.

The process of program specification and development would be under careful control. Controls would include review and approval of program specification by the application manager. If appropriate, divisional audit people would also review the specification. Particular attention would be paid to the processes of final testing and promotion to production. Tight - and auditable - controls would be in place to ensure that the tested and authorized programs for production are in production. Controls would be in place to ensure that the development programmer could not change the production program source or object code file. In addition, either sample or one hundred percent inspections (depending on the sensitivity of the program would be in place to verify the correctness of the program relative to the application specifications.

And finally, within each division, GM has internal auditors to provide assurance that information system security procedures are in place.

Security Initiative - A Staff Stimulant

In addition to the divisional data processing security activity in GM, there are vigorous security activities in the GM Coroporate Audit Staff and the GM Information Systems and Communication Activity. The Audit Staff has a data processing

audit group that consists of experienced data processing operations, systems development, and operating systems personnel. These people, with audit thoroughness and data processing expertise, audit the divisional security activities. In addition, they aggressively follow the state-of-the-security-art to ensure that divisions are using economically effective means to improve security.

The Security group within the GM Information System and Communication Activity serves several functions.

One is consulting with divisions on their overall security programs. Another is reviewing the security of various computer hardware and software products. A third is coordinating the security program activities of the divisional Information System Security Officers. A final function is the understanding and development of security concepts to support GM's short and long term needs for data security.

Security Objectives

In working with divisions, we at the staff level get clearly challenged by the problems faced by the divisional Data Processing Managers in designing their security system. For instance, obviously sensitive and critical data should be handled in a secure fashion. However, in GM and most private sector companies, the words 'sensitive' and 'critical' are informally defined as classifications of data. Often those informal definitions pre-date the computer age. The formal classification of data requires identification of formal procedures for handling each class of data, a requirement for individual clearance for a given class of data, and the assignment of the classification to each data element. Little utility is seen in the private sector for this formal approach to classification. In studying the classification of data issue, John Maier of my staff, working with divisional ISSOs, was forced to ask, "What are we trying to accomplish with classification?"

Our prime interest was to establish standard classes for both information systems and data. This was to be done so that we could say that a given application is of a given class and hence should be handled with the rules for that class.

Now what would the rules for a class be? Who has clearance to see the data? In GM we, in general, don't clear people; we trust them and give them responsibilities so that, at best, clearance has to do with need to know.

Would a rule have to do with timeliness of data and, for instance, after a disaster, allowable recovery time?

The study found no practical economic and effective classification scheme. However, a very positive result occurred: it became clear that, for a given system, three independent security objectives should be specified. Those objectives were identified as:

Availability - a system's readiness for use; a system's ability to receive, to process, and to send information in a timely and effective manner; a system's ability to recovery from unwanted events.

Integrity - a system's soundness; a system's accuracy, its correctness, and its completeness.

Confidentiality - a system's closeness; a system's control over the access, visibility, and dissemination of information.

The process of establishing availability, integrity, and confidentiality requirements was found to relate to some general questions.

- 1. Who uses this information resource?
- 2. How is it used?

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- 3. Where is it sent?
- 4. Is this information resource primarily of a financial, manufacturing, engineering, sales, marketing, personnel, or logist cal nature?
- 5. Are there legal requirements for the processing, storage, and communication of this information?
- 6. Is there existing GM policy which governs the way this information is processed, stored, and communicated?

The particular concerns of <u>availability</u> can be identified by examining consequences of loss or delay; for example:

- 1. What would be the consequences of not having this information or processing resource?
- 2. What would be the consequences of delay of this information?
- 3. How long can you "get by" without it?
- 4. How current must it be?

- 5. Where must it be available?
- 6. Are there alternative means of processing or are there alternative sources of the information?
- 7. How long must it be accessible?
- 8. How quickly must it be accessible in usable form?

The concerns for $\underline{integrity}$ can be identified by examining consequences of incorrectness, such as:

- Does this application account for a business operation? What would the consequences be if this accounting was incorrect?
- Does this application direct a business operation? What would be the consequences if this operation was directed incorrectly?
- 3. Does this application specify or control the manner in which a process is performed? What would be the consequences if this specification was incorrect?
- 4. Does this application predict future environments or events? What would the consequences be of incorrect prediction?
- 5. Does this information resource specify the design or engineering of products? What would the consequences be of incorrect product specification?
- 6. Does this application contain business transactions which should not be performed by a single individual?
- Could manipulation of this resource result in personal gain?

The concerns of <u>confidentiality</u> can be identified by examining consequences of improper disclosure. For instance:

- Could improper disclosure of this information resource result in a breach of personal privacy?
- 2. Could this information be considered "inside material"?
- 3. Could an individual personally profit from knowledge of this information?
- 4. Could an individual personally profit from improper disclosure of this information?

- 5. Who has a legitimate business "need-to-know" this information?
- 6. Could GM's competition benefit from knowledge of this information?
- 7. Which information in the system could produce undesirable consequences if disclosed to:
 - a) other departments?
 - b) other divisions?
 - c) the Corporation at large?
 - d) the public at large?

From answers to these questions comes specific information on the requirements for availability, integrity, and confidentiality, as well as the consequences of not maintaining the stipulated requirements. This information provides a security objective for a given application.

You will note that most data classification schemes tend only to address the need for various levels of confidentiality. The work on secure computer systems is essentially an effort to provide confidentiality by having proven design and implementation integrity. From an application standpoint, the availability and integrity objectives are only partially improved by the secure computer system work.

Rather than formally classifying data, then, our objective is to provide for each application an appropriate level of availability, integrity, and confidentiality.

Security Design Concepts

In addition to being concerned about clear security objectives, we have been concerned about the design process for secure systems. In that our security objectives do not relate to a formal data classification structure or security model, we must in some manner see the security objectives do get incorporated into systems. Furthermore, the security objectives for a system need to be combined with the system's functional objectives in a manner which achieves the security objectives with minimum change to the system functional objectives. It would also be desirable for the design process for secure systems to fit in with current good system design practices.

Systems can be organized in many different ways to meet functional objectives. For example, systems may be organized so that the transactions being handled by the systems are handled in minimum time; they may be organized for minimum inter-connections between system components; or, they may be organized to obtain high performance by the people that are part of the system.

The design process usually arrives at a system organization and function which is a compromise between objectives. Security objectives are often seen as being in conflict with the functional objectives for a system. The conflict may be best handled early in the design process by deciding on the availability, integrity and confidentiality objectives and then integrating those objectives into the overall design consideration for a system, and into the design of each component of a system. The components may well be complex disparate elements: people, programs, and hardware. Even with the extensive differences between elements, are there design principles, particularly relevant to security, which may be used to guide the design process? Four principles to consider are:

First, Responsibility Assignment: the security function must be specified for each and every component of a system.

Second, <u>Security Continuity</u>: the interface between components of a system must be identified and must be consistent with the security function of each component.

Third, <u>Separation</u> of <u>Incompatible Functions</u>: system functions should be placed in separate components of the system if those functions, when performed separately, may serve as a check or control on each other and, when performed together, can cause system security failure if the component fails.

Fourth, <u>Minimization of Failure Impact</u>: given alternative satisfactory system designs, select the system organization which minimizes the detrimental impact on the system when a component fails.

The above design concepts for security inter-relate the identification of security functions for each component, the interfaces between components, and the overall organization of a system.

The first two design principles, responsibility assignment and security continuity, are important because they address the unique characteristic of security as a distributed property of a system, and yet a property in which any component or collection of components of a system may cause the total system to not meet explicit stated security objectives. The third principle, separation of incompatible functions, recognizes that component failure may occur, and that, if possible, the system functions should be designed to prevent individual component failures from causing system failures. The probability of any given component

failing, as well as the consequences of failure, may be used to determine to what extent functions need to be separated. The fourth principle, minimization of failure impact, is a combination of Murphy's Law, "When things can go wrong they will go wrong," and a decision theory viewpoint of, "When selecting among alternative satisfactory courses of action, select the one which will minimize your maximum regret when things go wrong."

Do Today's Systems Measure Up?

Data processing security has pragmatically evolved during the last 10 to 15 years. It did not come from carefully thought out security objectives, nor from carefully applied system security design principles. However, the security measures in use today can be measured against those objectives and principles. In doing that, it becomes clear that there are weaknesses. Commercially available computer systems today only in part support the building of secure information systems. The security objective of maintaining availability, integrity, and confidentiality under adverse conditions are not inherent in most commercial systems; and the design principles of responsibility assignment, security continuity, separation of function, and minimization of failure impact were, in general, not used in building most commercial systems.

For example, how can you mix large and small computers in a system and have functional responsibility assignments if there is no integrity in the computer operating systems? How can you achieve continuity of responsibility in a computer system when the operating systems, data communication systems, data base system, and program library system have independent approaches to access control? The problems are well-known to this audience.

I would like to close by noting that the definition of security I used earlier in the talk is in many ways parallel to aspects of the Computer Security initiative program. The first part was "knowing your business procedures."

As you are well aware, the process of constructing trusted computer systems starts by focusing on a schema for construction of computer systems which have proveable properties. In effect, that permits a system design team to say, "What we believe our system does is exactly what it does." Under those conditions you will truly 'know your system'.

The second part of the definition was "being confident of their (the procedures) operational effectiveness." The performance and efficiency of the schemas for producing proveable systems is still unknown. But, more importantly, will the procedures being developed satisfy the security objectives of availability, integrity, and confidentiality? With the focus on confidentiality, has availability been compromised? At this time

I believe the answer is unknown.

Finally, the last part of the security definition was ". . being sure they (the procedures) are in place."

In this regard, the proveability that a desired system property is in a system will be a big step forward; and, of course, having a trusted computer system as the base for an application system is necessary for trusted information systems.

As I indicated at the beginning, businesses depend extensively on computer systems. That dependency will be viewed as almost insignificant when compared to the business dependency ten years from now. New, large systems will be evolving that will be pervasive throughout business organizations. For those systems to be secure business systems, the concepts of trusted computer systems being developed in the Department of Defense Computer Security Initiative Program are clearly needed.

Acknowledgement

Many of the ideas contained in this paper have evolved from the excellent working relationship between the GM Information Systems and Communication Activity Staff (GMISCA) and GM Divisional Information System Security Officers (ISSOs). In particular, the contributions of John Wiest of GM Assembly Division, and of John Maier and Ashby Woolf of GMISCA are acknowledged.

01/24/80

STATUS OF THE DOD COMPUTER SECURITY INITIATIVE

STEPHEN T. WALKER
CHAIRMAN
DOD COMPUTER SECURITY
TECHNICAL CONSORTIUM

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

COMPUTER SECURITY

PATAI

AVAILABILITY OF TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS

COMPUTER SECURITY EVOLUTION

1968 – 1973 "TIGER TEAM" PENETRATIONS

AF/ESD STUDY — REFERENCE MONITOR CONCEPT

1972

KERNEL ON 11/45, APPLIED CONCEPT TO MULTICS ESD/MITRE DEVELOPED PROTOTYPE SECURITY 1973 - 1975

DESIGN

F-3

UCLA DEVELOPED SECURITY KERNEL FOR A VIRTUAL 1974 - 1975

MACHINE MONITOR ON 11/45

ARPA COMPUTER SECURITY WORKING GROUP FORMED

1975

COMPUTER SECURITY EVOLUTION

BELL LABS UNIX OPERATING SYSTEM DEVELOPED - WIDELY USED 1971 - 1975

UCLA AND MITRE BEGAN IMPLEMENTING SECURE UNIX PROTOTYPES 1976

SDC BEGAN DEVELOPMENT OF KERNELIZED VERSION OF IBM VM370 OPERATING SYSTEM (KVM) 1976

PRODUCTION VERSION OF SECURE UNIX OPERATING SYSTEM INITIATED (KSOS) 1977


DOD COMPUTER SECURITY TECHNICAL CONSORTIUM 1978

1978 DOD COMPUTER SECURITY INITIATIVE

COMPUTER SECURITY EVOLUTION

ESD/MITRE

1973



=

KERNELIZED SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM (KSOS) "SECURE UNIX "

- UCLA AND MITRE SECURE UNIX PROTOTYPES 1976 - 1977

COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT, TWO DESIGN PHASE CONTRACTS TRW, FORD AEROSPACE & COMMUNICATIONS CORP. **AUG 1977**

- IMPLEMENTATION PHASE CONTRACT: FORD AEROSPACE **MAY 1978**

MAY 1980 - ALPA TEST SITES

AUG 1980 — BETA TEST SITES


LATE 1980 — AVAILABLE AS SUPPORTED PRODUCT

*BELL SYSTEM TRADE/SERVICE MARK


KERNELIZED VM370

- CERTIFIABLY SECURE VERSION OF 18M VM370 OPERATING SYSTEM
- GUARANTEE SEPARATION OF VIRTUAL MACHINES PROVIDED BY VM370
- 3 YEAR EFFORT, BEGUN IN 1976
- INITIAL DEMONSTRATION OCTOBER 1979
- ALPHA TEST SITES SPRING 1980
- AVAILABLE AS SUPPORTED PRODUCT FALL 1980
- WORK PERFORMED BY SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

APPROVAL FOR DOD USE



APPROVAL FOR DOD USE



FOR USE OF ADP PROCESSING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

EVALUATED FRODUCTS LIST

CLASS	TECHNICAL	EXARPLES	POSSIBLE ENVIRORMENTS
-	ı	MOST COMMERCIAL SYSTEMS	DEDICATED MODE
~	FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION REASONABLE PENETRATION RESULTS	"MATURE" "ENMARCED" OPERATING SYSTEM	BENIGH, NEED TO KNOW Environments
~ ;	REASONABLE MODERN PROGRAMMING TECHNIQUES LIMITED SYSTEM INTEGRITY MEASURES	MULTICS	AF DATA SERVICE CENTER TS-S
•	FORMAL DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS SYSTEM INTEGRITY MEASURES		NO USER PROGRAMMING TS-S-C
S	PROVER DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS VERFIABLE IMPLEMENTATION LIMITED COVERT PATH PROVISIONS	KSOS KVM	LIMITED USER PROGRAMMING TS.S.C
•	VERIFIED IMPLEMENTATION AUTOMATED TEST GENERATION EXTENDED COVERT PATH PROVISIONS REASONABLE DENIAL OF SERVICE PROVISIONS		full user programming TS.S.C

F-10

COMPUTER SECURITY INITIATIVE

i	·					. 1				1984
		REVIEW AND ENHANCEMENT		FORMAL	INDUSTRY	SUBMITTED	SYSTEMS		"EVALUATED PRODUCTS LIST"	1982
EDUCATION PHASE	PUBLIC SEMINARS/WORKSHOPS	SPECIFICATION PHASE DRAFT DOD COORD. INDUSTRY COORD.	EVALUATION PHASE	INFORMAL	KS0S - 11	KVM	KS0S - 8	UNIVAC		1980
_:	;	=	Ħ							1978

COMPUTER SECURITY (COMPSEC) IMPACTS ON NEAR TERM SYSTEMS

BY
CLARK WEISSMAN
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

PRESENTED AT
SECOND SEMINAR ON DOD COMPUTER SECURITY
INITIATIVE PROGRAM
15-17 JANUARY 1980, NBS GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND

System Development Corporation

A DECADE OF COMPSEC TECHNOLOGY FUELS GROWTH IN 1980'S

TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN:

- 1. COMPSEC POLICY
 - INFORMAL DOCTRINE & REGULATIONS
 - FORMAL MATH MODELS
- 2. PROTECTION MECHANISMS
 - COMPSEC REQUIREMENTS
 - ARCHITECTURALLY TRUSTED APPROACHES
- 3. COMPSEC PRODUCT ASSURANCE
 - CONFORMITY OF PRODUCT → SPEC → POLICY
 - CREDIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

System Development Corporation

COMPSEC POLICY IS THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGY

- 1. INFORMAL DOCTRINE, REGULATIONS, STANDARDS
 - DOD 5200.28 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR ADPS
 - AFR 300.8 ADPS SECURITY POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES
 - COMPSEC PROGRAM OFFICE
 - DESIGNATED APPROVING AUTHORITY (DAA)
 - SYSTEM SECURITY OFFICER (SSO)
 - CLASSIFIED MODES OF OPERATION
 - AFR 300.13 PERSONAL DATA (PRIVACY) IN ADPS
 - DCID 1-16 COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE DATA
 - OMB A71 THREAT & RISK ASSESSMENT IN ADPS
 - NBS DES UNCLASSIFIED DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD


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COMPSEC POLICY IS THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGY (CONT'D)

- 2. FORMAL COMPSEC POLICY MODELS
 - SECURITY CONDITION WEISSMAN '69 FJCC
 - ACCESS MATRIX GRAHAM & P. DENNING '72 SJCC
 - T.H. CONFINEMENT LAMPSON '73 CACM
 - *- PROPERTY BELL & LAPADULA '73/'74 MITRE
 - INFO FLOW D. DENNING '76 CACM
 - SPECIAL, INA JO FORMAL SPECIFICATION MITRE, SRI, SDC, FACC - PRESENT
 - APPLICATION-SPECIFIC POLICIES FUTURE 1985

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ARCHITECTURALLY TRUSTED APPROACHES FOR SECURITY ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS



CHARACTERISTICS OF ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

- 1. PERIODS PROCESSING (P.P.)
 - BASICALLY SINGLE APPLICATION ("COLOR") PER PERIOD
 - LABOR INTENSIVE, SLOW COLOR CHANGE
 - BREAKS OPERATIONS CONTINUITY
 - USUALLY UNSHARED UNDERUTILIZED CPU
 - NO RISK, NO RUNTIME OVERHEAD
 - CURRENT PRACTICE
- 2. JOB STREAM SEPARATOR (JSS) AND CRYPTO SWITCH
 - AUTOMATIC, FAST COLOR CHANGE TECHNOLOGY INTENSIVE
 - TRUSTED PROCESSOR REQUIRED
 - FUTURE DEVELOPMENT IN PROCESS

CHARACTERISTICS OF ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS (CONT'D)

- 3. SECURE NETWORKS-END-TO-END ENCRYPTION (E3)
 - MULTI-LEVEL NETWORK
 - TRUSTED DEVICES AND PROCESSORS NEED TO BE DEVELOPED
 - NBS-DES AVAILABLE
 - TRUSTED E³ PROTOCOLS NEED TO BE DEVELOPED
 - E3 IS A TRUSTWORTHY TECHNOLOGY
 - COST EFFECTIVE TECHNOLOGY
 - USEFUL FOR AUTHENTICATION AND ACCESS CONTROL
 - FUTURE DEVELOPMENT IN PROCESS
- 4. SECURE SUBSYSTEMS (S3)
 - LIMITED USE, TRANSACTION DMS (TDMS)
 - TRUSTED, MULTI-LEVEL TDMS
 - UNTRUSTED OS
 - ONLY TDMS USERS ON OS
 - FUTURE DEVELOPMENT IN PROCESS

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CHARACTERISTICS OF ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS (CONT'D)

- 5. SECURITY-KERNEL BASED OS
 - FLAW-BY-FLAW REPAIRED OS UNTRUSTWORTHY
 - TRUSTED, MULTI-LEVEL OS WITH KERNEL
 - KERNEL ENFORCES SECURITY POLICY
 - TAMPER PROOF KERNEL
 - KERNEL ALWAYS INVOKED
 - MULTICS AVAILABLE, KVM AND KSOS 1980
- 6. CAPABILITY-BASED SECURITY
 - TRUSTED, MULTI-LEVEL OS
 - SECURITY POLICY ENFORCED BY HARDWARE "TAGS", AND SOFTWARE HIERARCHY
 - FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

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PREDICTABLE IMPACTS BY 1985

- 1. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF COMPSEC TECHNOLOGY
 - . INCREASING & KNOWLEDGEABLE MARKET DEMAND
 - INTEGRATED COMPSEC REQUIREMENTS
 - FOUNDATIONS OF A PRODUCT APPROVAL MECHANISM
 - 2. BURGEONING MARKET FOR TRUSTED PRODUCTS AND APPLICATIONS
 - STIMULATED BY AVAILABLE
 - SECURE OS (KSOS/KVM)
 - VERIFICATION TOOLS (SPECIAL, INA JO, GYPSY)
 - SPECTRUM OF FEASIBLE TRUSTED COMPSEC PRODUCTS
 - . MARKET RETARDANTS MAY LIMIT GROWTH
 - 3. FOUNDATIONS OF A FORMAL SOFTWARE ENGINEERING METHODOLOGY
 - TRUSTED S/W METHODOLOGY R&D APPLICABLE TO GENERAL S/W **COST & RELIABILITY**
 - BASED ON SYSTEMATIC, RIGOROUS, MATHEMATICALLY FORMAL **PROCESS**
 - USES INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT WITH TOOLS TO **ENFORCE METHOD COMPLIANCE**

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INCREASING & KNOWLEDGEABLE COMPSEC MARKET DEMAND

- 1. DOD DRAFTING AND RELEASING GOOD COMPSEC PROCUREMENTS
 - C31 - KSOS, PSOS, OASIS, WWMCCS, ICCS, KAIS

 - SACDIN, AUTODIN II. ENCRYPTION PROGRAMS, PLI, BCR

 - SCF UPGRADE, SPACE SHUTTLE, SPADOC
 - LOGISTICS
 MAC ROC 5-76
- 2. FED AND INDUSTRY BUYING
 - NBS
 - RISK ASSESSMENT (R/A) STANDARDS **GSA**
 - ENCRYPTION STANDARDS (DES. 1126, 1127) • SSA, HEW
 - FRAUD DETECTION
 - PRIVACY PROTECTION
 - BANKING
 - FED RESERVE EXPERIMENT
 - SACC EFTS BANK EFTS
 - INDUSTRY
 - R/A
 - ACCESS CONTROL (PIN BOX)
 FRAUD DETECTION

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INTEGRATED COMPUTER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CAN BE SEGMENTED BY FUNCTION

- 1. DATA CAPTURE AND DISPLAY
 - . SUBJECT-OBJECT IDENTIFICATION/LABELS
 - AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORIZATION
 - PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL
- 2. DATA TRANSMISSION
 - . MSG-BASED TRAFFIC WITH CONTROL AND TEXT FIELDS
 - ERROR AND TAMPERING DETECTION PROTOCOLS
 - . ENCRYPTION OF MSG TEXT END-TO-END
 - . AUTOMATIC ENCRYPTION KEY MANAGEMENT
- 3. DATA STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL
 - . DATA SECURITY LARFLS
 - ITEM-LEVEL GRANULARITY
 - ACCESS CONTROL AND LOGGING OS AND DMS
 - REASONABLENESS ENFORCEMENT (SEMANTIC, LIMITS, TIME)

System Development Componition

INTEGRATED COMPUTER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CAN BE SEGMENTED BY FUNCTION (CONT'D)


- 4. DATA PROCESSING AND CONTROL
 - DEDICATED USE NO OPERATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT
 - . MIX SENSITIVE DATA ONLY ON "TRUSTED" SYSTEM
 - . ACCESS AND AUDIT CONTROL MECHANISM (ACM)
 - ACM MUST PROVIDE SELF PROTECTION FOR TRUST
 - ISSO DMS
 - APPLICATIONS MUST SUPPORT HIGHER LEVEL SECURITY PROTOCOLS
- 5. FACILITY AND OPERATIONS
 - PHYSICAL PERIMETER/EQUIPMENT ACCESS CONTROL
 - . TRUSTED PERSONNEL AND PROCEDURES, ISSO
 - HW AND SW CONFIGURATION CONTROL
 - . ISSO MANAGED DATABASE OF SECURITY PROFILES
 - ENFORCED OWNER REVIEW OF AUDIT LOGS

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
FOUNDATIONS OF A PRODUCT APPROVAL MECHANISM

- 1. CURRENT DOD POLICY ADMITS MLS ADPS
- 2. DESIGNATED APPROVING AUTHORITY (DAA) ACCREDITS EACH ADPS
- 3. DAA'S SUPPORTED BY COMPSEC TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATION, A MAJOR FOCUS OF DOD COMPSEC INITIATIVE
- 4. CERTIFICATION BASED ON CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF ADPS TRUST, EVIDENCE COLLECTED OVER SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE
- 5. EVIDENCE CREDIBILITY ENHANCED BY
 - SERIOUSLY WRITTEN PROCUREMENT RFP WITH COMPSEC-BASED EVALUATION CRITERIA
 - KNOWLEDGEABLE PROPOSAL USING COMPSEC DEVELOPMENT METHODS
 - COMPSEC DEVELOPMENT METHODS BASED ON FORMAL H/W & S/W ENGINEERING
 - SECURE SYSTEM OPERATION
- 6. APPROVED PRODUCTS LIST
 - MARKET SELECTS FROM ALREADY APPROVED PRODUCTS
 - MANUFACTURER BUILDS & SUBMITS PRODUCT FOR DAA CERTIFICATION

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SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE SECURITY OPPORTUNITIES



SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE SECURITY OPPORTUNITIES (CONT'D)

OPPORTUNITY LIFE CYCLE PHASES **EMPLOY SECURITY ENGINEERING FOR ADP** SECURITY CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT **EMPLOY SPECIAL SOFTWARE METHODOLOGY** REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION TO PRODUCE TRUSTED SOFTWARE **REVIEW VENDOR PROTECTION FEATURES** SYSTEM RFP CONSIDER SECURE SUBSYSTEMS SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT • REVIEW THREAT/RISK/COUNTERMEASURES SYSTEM IOC • PERFORM PENETRATION ANALYSIS SYSTEM FOC • REVIEW COMPLIANCE CONSIDER SECURE SUBSYSTEMS AND ENHANCE MENT SECURE DISTRIBUTED SUBSYSTEMS REVIEW COMPLIANCE, CERTIFICATION, AND RECERTIFICATION **ENFORCE SECURE CONFIGURATION CONTROL**

PREDICTABLE IMPACTS BY 1985

- 1. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF COMPSEC TECHNOLOGY
 - . INCREASING & KNOWLEDGEABLE MARKET DEMAND
 - INTEGRATED COMPSEC REQUIREMENTS
 - FOUNDATIONS OF A PRODUCT APPROVAL MECHANISM
- 2. BURGEONING MARKET FOR TRUSTED PRODUCTS AND APPLICATIONS
 - . STIMULATED BY AVAILABLE
 - SECURE OS (KSOS/KVM)
 - VERIFICATION TOOLS (SPECIAL, INA JO, GYPSY)
 - SPECTRUM OF FEASIBLE TRUSTED COMPSEC PRODUCTS
 - MARKET RETARDANTS MAY LIMIT GROWTH
 - 3. FOUNDATIONS OF A FORMAL SOFTWARE ENGINEERING METHODOLOGY
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SPECTRUM OF FEASIBLE TRUSTED COMPSEC PRODUCTS

- 1. KSOS/KVM ENHANCEMENTS
 - PERFORMANCE TUNING & IMPROVEMENTS (E.G., KVM 1.5)
 - FUNCTION ADDITIONS/CHANGES (E.G., KVM 2)
 - NEW HARDWARE BASE (E.G., KSOS/SCOMP)
- 2. TRUSTED STANDALONE PRODUCTS (NO KERNEL O\$)
 - CRYPTO DEVICES
 - LINE MULTIPLEXING
 - MSG MUX/SWITCH
 - MSG FIELD (E.G., PIN. \$, CRC) ENCRYPTION
 - MSG GATEWAY (E.G., PIN REENCRYPTOR)
 - END TO END ENCRYPTION
 - MLS TERMINAL
 - ENCRYPTION CONTROL (I.E., KEYS, MSG FIELDS, PROTOCOLS)
 - TRUSTED DISPLAY/COMMANDS (E.G., RELEASE APPROVAL)
 - CONCURRENT LEVELS (E.G., SPLIT SCREEN & CHAR STREAM)
 - LOCAL ID AUTHENTICATION
 - LOCAL DATA TYPE ENFORCEMENT (E.G., LIMITS, LABELS, LOGIC)
 - JOB STREAM SEPARATOR
 - MLS PROCESSOR CONTROLS LARGER P.P. RESOURCE

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SPECTRUM OF FEASIBLE TRUSTED **COMPSEC PRODUCTS (CONT'D)**

- 3. APPLICATIONS EXTENSIONS (KSOS/KVM)
 - . S/W UTILITIES
 - CLEAR MEMORY
 - LINK/LOADER

 - EDITOR TRANSLATORS
 - DBUG
 - TEXT FORMATTING
 - . SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION
 - LOGIN AUDIT

 - ACCOUNTING
 SECURITY PROFILE MAINTENANCE
 RESTART & RECOVERY

 - SECURE DMS
 MLS OBJECTS
 FINE GRANULARITY
 USER VIEW

 - USER VIEW
 ELECTRONIC MAIL/MSG
 DATA TYPE CHECKER/ENFORCER
 - . SECURE NET DEVICES
 - SNFE

 - GATEWAY MUX/CONCENTRATOR

 - SANITIZER

 - TRUSTED S/W LIGRARIES
 APPLICATION ALGORITHMS
 USER INTERFACES

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MARKET RETARDANTS MAY LIMIT GROWTH

- 1. TRUSTWORTHY DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT
 - MASTER COPY CONTROL
 - CONFIGURATION CONTROL
 - LIFE CYCLE MAINTENANCE
 - METHODS & TOOLS
- 2. TRUSTED COPY DISTRIBUTION
 - TAMPER PROOFED COPIES
 - ROM
 - ENCRYPTION
 - CRC/ECC SCHEMES
- 3. INDUSTRY VS GOVERNMENT CONTROL
 - CLASSIFICATION
 - . APPROVAL METHODS/PRODUCTS
 - STANDARDS
 - PRODUCTION ECONOMICS

PREDICTABLE IMPACTS BY 1985

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- System Development Corp

SYSTEMATIC, RIGOROUS, MATHEMATICALLY **FORMAL PROCESS**

- 1. PROCESS STEPS FOLLOW IMPLICATION CHAIN
 - . CODE HOL SPEC MODEL POLICY
 - CORRESPONDENCE (I.E., →) VALIDATED BY VERIFICATION PROOF
- 2. STEPS FORMALLY STATED IN PRECISE LANGUAGE
 - POLICY
 - DIRECTIVE 5200.28 IS DOD STANDARD
 - . MODEL (TLS)
 - FORMALIZE ACCESS CONTROL POLICY AS CORRECTNESS
 CRITERIA (INVARIANTS)
 SUBJECT PROCESSES, MLS OBJECTS
 INITIAL STATE DESCRIPTION

 - ALLOWABLE (SECURE) STATE TRANSITIONS - CORRESPONDENCE TO POLICY BY INFORMAL REVIEW
 - SPEC
 - FORMALLY STATED IN RIGOROUS PREDICATE CALCULUS, NON-PROCEDURAL LANGUAGES (E.G., SPECIAL, INA JO, GYPSY)
 - TOP AND REFINED LEVELS OF ABSTRACT SPECS
 - VERIFY SECURITY CORRECT BEHAVIOR SPEC TO MODEL
 - SUCCESS AT MITRE, SDC, I.P. SHARP, FACC
 - HOL
 - SECURITY-RELEVANT PARTS (E.G., KERNEL) OF SYSTEM
 - PROCEDURAL LANGUAGE AMENABLE TO VERIFICATION (PASCAL, MODULA, EUCLID, GYPSY, ADA)
 - HOL-SPEC MAPPING VERIFIED
 - EXPERIENCE LIMITED BUT INCREASING WITH TOOL MATURITY
 - · CODE & H/W
 - ACTUAL EXECUTING PROCESSES
 - VERY LITTLE VERIFICATION ACTIVITY TO DATE HARD AND COSTLY R&D
 - COMPILER AND S/W TESTING FOR CORRESPONDENCE

TOOL ENFORCEMENT KEY TO METHODOLOGY SUCCESS

- 2. ALL FOLLOW TOP DOWN APPROACH OF STEPWISE DESIGN REFINEMENT
- 3 SPEC/HOL MODULES ANALYZED BY TOOLS FOR SECURITY CONDITIONS YIELDING PROPERTIES/ASSERTIONS TO BE PROVED (THEOREMS)
 - . STATE VARIABLES LEGALLY (SECURELY) SET/USED
 - . STATE TRANSITIONS RESULT IN SECURE END STATE
 - SPEC PROCESSOR OR HOL VCG TOOLS
- 4. THEOREM PROVERS VERY EFFECTIVE
 - . AUTOMATIC AND INTERACTIVE TPs IN ACTIVE USE
 - . PROOFS LONG & DETAILED, BUT NOT DEEP
 - TP MECHANIZES PROOF BOOKKEEPING, AVOIDS MISTAKES, OVERSIGHTS
 - TP FORMATS HUMAN READABLE STEPS TO PROOF, OR TO POINTS OF FAILURE
 - . PROOF/FAILURE INTERACTIVE DESIGN PROCESS
- 5 OTHER TOOLS
 - FLOW ANALYZER
 - EXAMINES SOURCE CODE DATA FLOW CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY LEVEL

 - CONFIGURATION CONTROL
 MAINTAINS SPECIHOL SOURCE FILES STATUS AND DEPENDENCIES LINKED FOR IRE) PROOF
 - TEST CASE GENERATORS
 - USES HOL ASSERTIONS TO AID IN TESTING CODE

 - DOCUMENT CONTROL
 SOURCE TEXT, PROOF, ENGLISH DESCRIPTIONS

PREDICTED IMPACTS **ARE NOT SPECULATIVE**

- 1. INSTITUTIONALIZATION NOW IN PROGRESS
 - . NBS, OMB, GSA, SSA,
 - . DOD SECURITY INITIATIVE CONSORTIUM
 - GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
 - . INDUSTRY PROCUREMENT INVESTMENTS
- 2. MARKET INCREASING
 - A DOZEN OR MORE PROGRAMS IN PROGRESS AT SDC
- 3. FORMAL DEVELOPMENT METHODS ARE WORKING
 - . EXPERIENCE MOUNTING IN S'W RELIABILITY AND REDUCED TESTING
 - . IMPROVED DOCUMENTATION OF DESIGN
 - . SUPERIOR PROGRESS REVIEWS BASED ON RIGOROUS SPECS AND PROOF EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS
 - . IOOLS ARE WORKING AND BECOMING AVAILABLE
- 4. SECURITY PROGRAM STIMULATING MORE COMPSEC R&D
 - . NEW COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE (PSOS)
 - . DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING
 - . BROADER POLICIES/MODELS
 - RELIABILITY
 - PERFORMANCE
 - DENIAL SERVICE
 - PROTOCOLS
 - . S/W ENGINEERING METHODS & TOOLS

"Computer Security Impacts on Future System Architecture"

Mr. Edmund Burke
The MITRE Corporation

Computer Security Technology

Future Directions, Future Needs

Outline

- COMPUTER SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY
 - HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE DIRECTIONS
 - FUTURE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES
- COMPUTER SECURITY DIRECTIONS
 - COMPUTERS
 - NETWORKS
- NEEDED TECHNICAL STIMULI

Computer Hardware


- GROWTH IS EXPLOSIVE
- COST/PERFORMANCE DROPPING BY ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE
- VLSI PROMISES-SMALLER, FASTER, CHEAPER

Computer Software

- SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT STILL AN ART
 - CURRENT TECHNIQUES ARE CODIFIED COMMON SENSE
- SOUND ENGINEERING BASIS STILL SOUGHT

• ACADEMIC COMMUNITY PURSUING FORMAL TECHNIQUES

Distributed Capabilities



Emerging Systems Architecture

- PERSONAL COMPUTERS
- LARGE SCALE UTILITIES
- COMMON CARRIERS FOR COMPUTERIZED TRAFFIC

Personal Computers

• O/S AND APPLICATIONS "TUNED" TO A SINGLE USER

PET, TRS-80 - TOO SMALL

OS, MULTICS — TOO BIG

UNIX ® - ABOUT RIGHT

® UNIX IS A TRADE/SERVICE MARK OF THE BELL SYSTEM

Personal Computers

APPLICATIONS

ELECTRONIC MAIL

WORD PROCESSING

PERSONAL FILES


AGENT FOR ACCESS TO COMPUTER UTILITY

Large Computer Utilities

- INFORMATION SERVICES
- DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
- COMPUTATIONAL CAPABILITIES

Current State of Computer Security

- SECURE SOFTWARE SYSTEMS EMERGING
 - MANUFACTURERS BEGINNING TO MARKET PRODUCTS
- INTEGRATION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SECURITY NEEDED
 - NO COMMON CARRIER OFFERS MUCH
- SOFTWARE ENGINEERING (& VERIFICATION) TECHNOLOGY



Needed Developments

- INTEGRATED COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SECURITY
 - SECURITY FEATURES AVAILABLE FROM COMMON CARRIERS
 - WIDER RANGE OF SECURITY EFFECTIVENESS FROM MANUFACTURERS

Needed Developments

- UNIFORM ACCESS CONTROL POLICY
 - CONSISTENT SET OF SENSITIVITY LEVELS
 - PROVISION FOR ORGANIZATIONAL PREROGATIVES
 - LEGAL STRUCTURE

Needed Developments

- FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL ENGINEERING DISIPLINES
 - DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION VERIFICATION OF CRITICAL SOFTWARE COMPONENTS
 - EXTENSION TO CRITICAL HARDWARE COMPONENTS

Summary

- NEW HARDWARE DEVELOPMENTS CHANGING SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES
- CHEAPER DATA COMMUNICATIONS PERMITTING DISTRIBUTION OF COMPUTERS
- INTEGRATED SECURITY CONTROLS NEEDED FOR HETEROGENEOUS HOSTS ON INTERCONNECTED NETWORKS
- FORMALISMS NEEDED TO PROVIDE ASSURANCE OF SYSTEM SECURITY

WHAT EVERY VENDOR ALWAYS WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT GOVERNMENT COMPUTER USERS' SECURITY NEEDS (but was afraid to ask)

Dr. Ted M. P. Lee, Sperry-Univac Jim Anderson, James P. Anderson, Inc

[This is written as a questionnaire to be answered by a suitably representative sample of government computer customers. The focus is mostly on future systems wherein a need for true multi-level security might appear, but it is also intended to elicit an indication of the current state of affairs wherein security problems are wishfully ignored, limited, or avoided by administrative, personnel, or physical security measures. It is recognized that most installations are a mix of applications and problems, so that a single answer will generally not suffice. Note that the questions will for the most part also apply to non-government users. The questions have been obtained from an informal canvassing of several vendors by T. M. P. Lee.]

[The answers have been prepared by J. P. Anderson and are an attempt at an objective look at the whole issue of computer security and how it is handled in DoD and other parts of the Government.]

[Editor's note: the answers represent the views of J. P. Anderson and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or of the U. S. Government.]

1. Customer Background

1.1: Awareness

Does the customer know what he's talking about?

Answer: It depends. In some Government units, there is considerable knowledge, and much of that is available to the managment of those units (e.g. Intelligence Community Agencies, some parts of DoD, etc.) In other parts of Government activities (e.g. the civilian agencies), there is only the vaguest appreciation of the problem, and little of the solutions.

1.2: Point of Contact

. .

Who is the right person at each agency, department, division, etc. to ask these questions of?

Answer: There is no SINGLE point of contact in each Agency. You will get a better perspective on the needs by talking with the Data Processing people than with the security people. However, the vendors must talk to the ultimate customer in order to fully appreciate the requirements. In many agencies, the Data Processing people will buy and operate computers for an operating branch/activity with the substantive application. In these cases, DP is an 'agent' for the ultimate customer.

1.3: Decision Maker

Who makes the purchasing decisions?

What does he know or care about trusted computer systems?

Answer: In general, some form of official or unofficial committee. The committee members in general have little or no great concern for/about trusted computer systems.

1.4: Purchasing Criteria

- a) What criteria are used for purchase decisions?
- b) Are there any written standards (viz-a-viz security)?
- c) Where do the criteria come from -- internal? user groups? law/regulation? gut feel?
- d) How firm and precise are the criteria? Can I see them? How will they change?

Answer: a) and b) It depends on the agency, however, compatibility with existing applications/software, other hardware units etc. is often the key criteria. Security 'standards' exist in part, but in many cases, they are a recitation of 'nice features' rather than a functional set of security requirements based on the intended use of a system.

As an expample, it might be reasonable for an agency to specify that a computer has sufficient mechanism to isolate/control transaction users, to include at a minimum a user-identification/authentication mechanism, and system software to utilize the mechanism, and to mantain it. The specification could reasonably describe how the resultant system is expected to be used; that the system should have sufficient internal mechanism to support the building of a 'secure' transaction system, etc. The specification may also state that the system does NOT have to provide control against 'malicious programmers', since all of the customers programmers are or will be cleared. (It is a gross understatement that such specifications are not commonplace)

- c) The purchasing criteria (security and otherwise) come first from internal sources (e.g. DP shop)), leavened by regulations that everyone is generally aware of (e.g. DOD 5200.28, DCID 1/16, etc.). There is little or no 'gut feel'.
- d) The criteria are very firm and NOT very precise. In virtually every case, they can be seen. The regulations undergo more or less continuous change. the changes are SLOW, and evolutionary because of the inertia that has to be overcome in order to effect change. The source of the change is often economic.

In order to reduce cost or for some other economic reason, a proposal will be made to relax or modify a security 'rule'. This is then debated, sometimes endlessly and without resolution, but occasionally a change will emerge.

The regulations will evolve as it is possible to

- (1) Demonstrate that a mode of processing hitherto thought 'impossible' can be successfully supported with only minimum risk etc.
- (2) Show that the economics for making a change are favorable.

1.5: Intangibles

What intangible factors play a role in purchase decisions? -- e.g., newness for newness' sake, keeping up with the Joneses, gee-whiz technology?

Answer: There is nothing I can comment on regarding the intangibles. I would say that the intangibles regarding a vendor, and how he is perceived by a particular customer are VERY MUCH more important than any security questions and/or the like.

2. Data Processing Environment

2.1: Use

- a) What does the customer do with his computers?
- b) What is the use of the systems by percentage, i.e.:

communications systems data processing systems embedded control systems?

Answer: a) Everything. More and more users are interfacing to computers as transaction users.

b) What kind of systems? If the question is what is the expected use of trusted systems (by percentages), then as a guess:

> DP 50 - 70% Commo 30 - 20% Control 20 - 10%

2.2: Configurations

What kind of configurations are involved -- large/small? centralized/distributed? networks?

Who are his current vendors?

Answer: Everything, but:

- a) More networks
- b) From a), more distributed
- c) Large and small

2.3: Applications

What spectrum of applications are involved: query, limited function subsystems, data management, full-scale user programming?

Answer: As noted above, there is more fully developed systems (applications) in place, mostly based on interactive transactions by users. Batch is still used either as a hangover, or as the method of choice for such applications as payroll, etc. Even with batch systems, there is a some evidence that networks are being used to collect files, and disburse the results.

Full scale user programming is less frequent than was the case 10 years or so ago. Except in some 'scientific' shops, most programming is done in support of the development and or maintenence of transactional/interactive applications, where the bulk of the use of a system is concentrated.

2.4: Security Severity

What mix of data sensitivity and personnel trustworthiness would the customer like to be able to support?

Can a clearance/classification matrix be given?

Answer: A VERY Broad brush treatment of the topic..... NOT GOVT POLICY! (But a guess at what would satisfy if it were really available now).

Civil-Agencies: Privacy Act data, Agency proprietary data, and Uncleared people.

DoD-Low: Secret Confidential and Unclassified Data with users at all three levels simultaneously ('true' multilevel, low grade)

DoD-Medium: Top Secret, Secret data, with users cleared at
Top Secret and Secret levels ('true' multilevel
--- medium) (like AFDSC)

DoD-High: Top Secret, SCI, with users at TS (only) and TS(SCI) levels

3. User Security Policy

3.1: Perception

- a) What does "security" mean to the customer?
- b) Does he care enough about the problem to want the very best, or will #2 be good enough?

Answer: a) Varies with the type of customer. With most, it is secondary or tertiary consideration to questions of efficiency, functionality, compatibility and the like. Most customers DO NOT have a clear, thought-out notion of where security fits, or how much emphasis to give it. To most, security means badges and access controls at the entrance to computer rooms. To the extent that a threat is perceived, it is seen as an external threat.

b) No.

3.2: Importance

What is the relative (and ""absolute", if you can determine it) importance of the three faces of security -- integrity, availability, and confidentiality?

Answer:

	Relative	Absolute
Integrity	2	2
Availability Confidentiality	3 1	3

3.3: Threats

- a) What are the perceived threats to the aspects of security mentioned above and what is their relative importance (or seriousness)?
- b) Does the customer know or care about the malicious programmer threat?
- c) About covert channels and Trojan Horses?
- d) About subversion in the vendor's development and maintenance processes?

- Answer: a) EXTERNA.— MOST organizations are focused on the external threat to the exclusion of all others. They are incapable of thinking that one of their 'own' could be a black hat. Even when they choose to to think of it, their activities are based in the most part on an external threat except for the relatively simple physical/procedural aspects (controlling access to the computer center, etc.)
 - b) Because of the growing use of transactional systems, where users are NOT programmers, most people do NOT see the malicious programmer as a serious threat. There are very few places where 'general use' programming of systems is supported or needed by the operational arms of the agency (payroll, personnel, etc. etc.). Programmers, where needed are cleared to system high, and are not especially controlled.
 - c) Huh? Most people do not even acknowledge b). Channels are 'academic' finds. They are theoretically possible, but are not readily understood by the laiety partly because they are NOT considered an important threat since no one today would clear the receiver-agent high enough to get access to the transmitter, or the receiver-agent would already have full access from being a programmer or some such. This is not to say that the channels are not important, it is just that they defy general solution today.
 - d) See b) and c). NO. In general, do not see the threat as 'real'. It is in the same class as an airpiane dropping onto them. Possible, but not very likely.

3.4: Policy

Does the customer have a security policy that applies to $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right)$ his ADP operations?

Is it written down? Followed and enforced?

Answer: In most cases, yes; DOD 5200.28, or AF=====, or etc.
These policies are followed in the main because they deal
mostly with tangible things: locks, badges, checklists,
etc.

3.5: Access Criteria

Assuming Harry Smith (or Ivan Ivanovitch) asks to (read write, execute, ...) (file, program, record, ...) XYZ, what criteria would the customer like to use to grant or deny the request? (security labels, privacy requirements, "need-to-know" -- can anyone say what that means? -- access lists, ...)

Answer: It doesn't really work that way. First, Harry (Ivan) is/has to be employed by an Agency/ Contractor etc. His JOB must require use of a computer. His BOSS must approve (pay for) an account, etc. By the time he gets around to asking to Read, Write, Execute and so forth, he is already known to the organization, DP shop, etc. His access rights are derived from a) his job, b) his 'clearances'. After that, ALL methods of granting and controlling accesss are used; security levels (infrequently) privacy requirements (not very common in my experience. There is some, but not much), Need to Know (often involved, but rarely labeled), access lists (proably the most common). Access lists are becoming the wave of the future, ORCON as the ultimate in control.

3.6: Granularity

Down to what level of granularity of data (e.g., file, record, field) is it necessary or desirable to enforce the policy?

Answer: (Yes)##3

3.7: Role of System

- a) To what extent ought or must the ADP system (operating system) make or enforce the decision to grant an access request, or to what extent can that be handled outside the system without excessively limiting its usefulness?
- b) When do you expect to have enough confidence in the "security" system kernel that users may "turn off" other protective measures?
- Answer: a) Presently, systems are only marginally involved in enforcing access rights. They should be substantially involved in the future.
 - b) Perhaps never. I don't believe that it was EVER proposed that security kernel technology was an exclusive solution to the problem. One would still expect to have passwords to control access to the system, even with the SKT, one might expect passwords to control discretionary access (redundantly perhaps), Marking of files/output etc, while not a control, is a form of 'protective' measure that should/might be retained regardless of whether the system operated under an SKT or otherwise. The question assumes (as did several other questions in this series) that security is a tangible add-on rather than an integrated design approach.

3.8: Audit

What security audit records would the customer like to have kept?

What does he keep?

Is he prepared to process them?

(How would he like to process them?)

Answer: None special. Most capture illegal log-on attempts.

Most SECURITY audit data is weak or not very useful.

Most users KEEP none of the audit data, except a few places that pile up the operators and audit trail logs "in case" they ever have to do a damage assessment. To be really useful the processing should result in exception reports. Six side inches of listings are not very useful as audit data.

3.9: Special Requirements

What special technical requirements does the customer have that are not covered so far? (e.g., TEMPEST, marking, specific human interface protocols.)

Answer: TEMPEST. Most of the others are left out by and large.

4. Technical Security Policy

4.1: Certification

- a) What does "certification" mean?
- b) Will there ever be an institutionalized process with clear and visible standards of acceptance? When? Where?
- c) Who will have the final authority for the "certificate" of certification of the secure system software?
- d) How will the DoD go about certifying a system os as to be considered "trusted"?
- Answer: a) As a personal observation, it will mean that if security is involved in the ultimate application of the system, that buyers will have a hard time justifying the buying of uncertified systems.
 - b) Yes, by 1985 (+/-); in DoD and Intelligence communities, not likely in Civilian agencies by then because of the relatively short attention span of Congress, and others who started the Privacy Act moves.
 - c) The buyer. He is the FINAL authority or anything. even today, the individual system operator in the USAF could make his own independent judgment to run multi-level WITHOUT any further blessings or approval.
 - d) Pass.

4.2: Assurance Measures

- a) What tests/measures/evaluation criteria is the customer using, or would like to use, or will use, to assure himself that all the technical security enforcement measures in his system work as they are supposed to, in the face of the perceived threats?
- b) How much does he want to monitor and be involved with the vendor's design, development, and support procedures?
- c) Who will maintain the security SW kernel? Since DoD maintains/or pays to maintain significant amounts of SW for embedded computer systems and other stand-alone systems, why shouldn't the DoD plan to do the same for a special security package?

Answer: a) None -- Working with the system

- b) None. How much do most people want to be involved in the design and production of automobiles (altho since the Chrysler bail-out, maybe the will of the country is that everyone one wants such invlovment). In general, one wants someone (e.g. an FTC) making sure that the autos are safe at some speed, but NOT designing everthing into them.
- c) Could be anyone. Maybe a software house such as CSC/SDC etc. could/should be the one.

4.3: Standardization

- a) Is there any hope for a common direction to emerge across a "suitably" large segment of the market place? -- i.e., is there reason to expect the DoD, Intelligence Community, Federal Government as a whole, State and Local Government, Private Sector, and Foreign Public and Private Sectors to agree (sufficiently) on the nature and extent of the problem and on acceptable solutions?
- b) Will multi-level security start to become a mandatory requirement in future RFPs where necessary?
- c) Do you plan to specify trusted system requirements for the next generation WWMCCS-(WIS)?

Answer: a) There is already a number of 'common' directions: language standards, communications standards, etc. HOWEVER, most of these standards have been devised or heavily influenced by manufacturers in order to permit competition (or thwart dominence of the market by one). It is unlikely that all of the entities named will see much in common because of their responsibilities AND perceptions differ so widely.

- b) Yes
- c) Pass (I would so plan, .ut then, I am NOT WWMCCS etc.)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC F/6 9/2
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON THE DOD COMPUTER SECURITY INITIAT—ETC(U)
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4.4: Technology

- a) Do you have strong biases for one kind of security technology (mechanisms or architecture, hardware or software, development and verification procedures) versus another? Why?
- b) With the availability of the 32-bit super minis, will a requirement for 16-bit secure minis still be necessary?
- c) What is the government position on software vs. firmware security "fixes"?
- d) Do you plan to use ADA as the language for the security kernel? If not - why not?
- e) Will a computer system require "special features" in order to use the security kernel, i.e., something not in a manufacturer's standard product line?
- f) Do you expect the use of the security kernel to require changes to the application SW packages; e.g., very little to significant?
- Answer: a) Personal biases are: 1. For transaction systems—they are common, and THE way commputers have gone and will continue to go in the future. 2. For 'distributed' (network) systems as models of architectures that should be built.
 - b) With the availability of 64 bit large machines, will a requirement for 32 bit secure minis still be necessary? The question indicates a naive belief that the word size is the key issue. The question should be: Is there now, and will there continue to be a market for secure minis? Answer: Yes.
 - c) Beats me. I personally oppose ANY KIND of 'fix'. Rather, I would prefer to see the systems used in environments where reduced user functionality (e.g. transaction systems) limits the risk.
 - d) It has been suggested as far as I know, but there is no special (pun NOT intended) reason to do so. The question is somewhat irrelevant.
 - e) 'Special features' are the hall mark of basically a single manufacturer. Most others design into their systems the basic structures needed for the desired functionality, then implement the design in hardware, firmware, or software depending on the performance or other needs. In order to 'use' (implement) a security kernel a machine must aprehend in some fashion the concept of 'process'. In order to do this, it may use such hardware as 'descriptors', mapping registers, etc. Basically the hardware is used to provide efficient enforcement of access decisions (i.e. policy decisions) made by the operating system.

f) For some packages the introduction of a security kernel will require significant changes to the package. For example, it is possible that the package (i.e. an application) itself may be multi-level. If this is so, then parts of it may require change (or at least partitioning) in order to isolate the multilevel parts. On the other hand, in other environments, it may be sufficient to group like users of an application, and have as many 'copies' of the application as the security levels require.

4.5: Classification

- a) What aspects (how much) of a trusted system is going to need to be classified, to what level, and why? (inspection or alteration)
- b) How much of a trusted system needs to have been developed by cleared people in a cleared facility?
- Arrwer: a) None should be CLASSIFIED. Some systems may require the operational versions to be PROTECTED as classified (i.e. handled in trusted channels, etc.).
 - b) All of the 'trusted' parts. In most systems this is OK for the operating systems. There is still the trusted parts of applications built on trusted O.S. that need the protection of cleared people, etc.

4.6: Export

- a) What classes of systems developed and approved for DoD (or other government) applications can be marketed and sold to other users?
- b) Will there be any foreign export control problems?

Answer: a) None.

b) don't think we should export ANY reasonably high technology software or hardware. That is just shooting ourselves in the foot.

4.7: Credibility

- a) Why should we pay any attention to "trusted" operating systems (especially the current R&D prototypes) when the underlying hardware and microcode are getting more complicated and hence less trustworthy?
- b) Is the government not exposing a credibility gap by seeming to champion software security technology almost to the exclusion of hardware security problems and solutions? And by so far only producing "toy" or prototype systems?
- c) What is the status of end to end encryption efforts? If successful, do you see this method of achieving security pre-empting other efforts?

- Answer: a) Hardware and microcode complexity is indeed a problem, but one that can be attacked after the software problem has been solved. (I guess that is to say that the software problem looks easier at the outset). It is also true that hardware and microcode complexity makes manipulation possible by fewer people (who could be controlled by other means?) even if the manipulation may be practically undetectable.
 - b) There is not a credibility gap in terms of need. It is true that most of the efforts have been directed to software solutions. This was deliberate for several reasons. First, it was believed (and still is) that the software problem is 'easier', and more tractable. Second. There is/and was research underway in highly reliable systems that appeared to bear on the security problem at the time. Finally, it was recognized that 'solutions' that might involve changes to hardware were very unlikely to have any impact on the major manufacturers since they were for the most part frozen in their architectures. Therefore there isn't much room for new designs.

The fact that the solutions have to date been to 'toy' problems is in part a reflection of weak resolve. The Multics project nearly made it.

c) Getting there. Even if it meets the most wildly optimistic expectations, it will only complement other efforts. Secure communications (even end-to-end) is NO substitute for secure computers.

5. Economics

5.1: Value

- a) How much (assuming that can be given a reasonably precise meaning) security is the customer willing to pay for?
- b) How much is he willing to pay?
- c) How much of other things is he willing to sacrifice for security (e.g., performance, usability, integrated data bases, ...)
- d) Will government agencies tolerate the necessary degradation for certified security systems vs. non-kernelized systems?
- e) What impact do you expect to see (in terms of DP system degradation) when you use the security system kernel?
- f) Will the government pay the necessary delta for the security hardware needed in this type of system?

- Answer: a) Not too much. The problem is that he gets along without it by spending different kinds of dollars (e.g. O&M) on different things that do not bear the same scrutiny as do Procurement dollars.
 - c) and d) 'Performance' might be eroded up to 20-25% in some settings without penalty. In most however, no detectable performance penalty would be permitted. If 'degradation' is greater than 50% then the vendor(s) have failed.
 - e) Varies with the expected use of the system. Present versions of the SKT might vary from 25 to 100% depending on the hardware upon which it is built, and the application for the system.
 - f) Only if it is the Nile -- it won't pay the Mississippi. This question is a reflection that security is separable from good design, can be priced, and added on like racing stripes and wire wheels. (Where is the Necessary River?)

5.2: Conversion

How willing is the customer to go through a (minimal, moderate, extreme, replacement) conversion (hardware, software, or operational procedures) to achieve better security?

Answer: Probably none at all. The challange will be to provide improved security in an 'invisible' (performance/user impact) way. Clearly not possible in the large, but a goal worth shooting for.

5.3: Business Forecast

- a) Please forecast future procurements dependent on security
 -- \$ worth of systems at security level of difficulty X (category X in the "evaluated products list"), mode of use Y, environment Z? (with specific procurements and dates)
- b) Can you estimate the government market demand for secure systems for the next five years?
- c) What will be the first "big buy" that will require MLS? What will be the time frame for the first MLS buy?

Answer: a) ????punt

- b) At the end of 5 years (i.e. circa 1985 (+/-)), it is expected that trusted systems will be routinely required in all but single-function stand-alone systems. It is NOT expected that the Government will make a wholesale replacement of existing functioning systems. Once a secure system is seen to work, it will become 'standard'.
- c) Ask your marketing people. Now. As soon as it is available.

6. Competition

6.1: Questions

What are you (the customer) asking of my competition?

Answer: What is UNIVAC (Honeywell, Burroughs, NCR, IBM, DEC...etc...) doing?

6.2: Answers

What are they telling you?

Answer: That they (Anyone, not YOUR company) are working on the problem, but we (the competition) have the solution.

6.3: Guesses

What do you (the customer) think they are going to do? Why should I believe what you tell me?

Answer: Continue working on the problem, then follow IBM. That is what most manufacturers do.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMPUTER SECURITY INITIATIVE PROGRAM AND

CURRENT AND FUTURE COMPUTER SECURITY POLICIES

Presentation for the "Second Seminar on the Department of Defense Computer Security Initiative Program"

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INTRODUCTION

I am delighted to participate in these seminars because the objectives and efforts of the Computer Security Initiative Program are so closely related in theory and practice to the security policy responsibilities of the office I represent. Indeed, the initiative itself represents an activity many of us realize is long overdue, and it has collectively the potential to make a substantial contribution to a number of requirements in today's world, well beyond the area of protecting computer processed classified information.

It is both of these areas that I would like to explore today. As a point of departure, let me start with a textbook definition of a policy as simply a decision made in advance, that is, independent of a specific instance or particular situation. A security policy would involve some asset of value, some threat thereto, vulnerabilities and a resultant risk scenario, and finally a decision concerning relative allocation of resources for protection.

My primary focus will be upon current policy concepts and their framework, to apply these to the objective of the Computer Security Initiative and to apply these, in turn, to the broader environment established by recent OMB (Office of Management and Budget) computer security policies.

BACKGROUND

DoD Security Policy Function

As was indicated, the office I represent is primarily concerned with security policy; specifically we function as principal Department of Defense advisor on matters of security policy, which in turn includes among other things, sensitive information, property and facilities of the department world-wide. Our office, moreover, is also the executive management agent for industrial security policy matters for sixteen other Executive Branch departments and agencies in addition to the Department of Defense, a program which encompasses over 11,000 industrial facilities in the private sector and involves over a million personnel security clearances.

What is common in our program with any effort to secure computer-resident information and related ADP assets is the need for a multi-disciplinary perspective using diverse talents, a systematic and comprehensive analytic approach and ultimately the identification and selection among these tradeoffs (Figure 1), involving generally: security, cost, effectiveness and efficiency factors.

Nonetheless, in the context of this presentation, the primary security function with which we deal involves the formulation and establishment of overall security policy for the protection of classified information; that is, Federal Government information and material which, because it bears directly on the effectiveness of our national defense and the conduct of our foreign relations, must be subject to some constraints and protection.

Problem First Surfaces

Interestingly, the problem of computer security was first formally surfaced in the Office of the Secretary of Defense through the DoD Industrial Security Program. In April 1967, a memorandum sent to our office expressed concern for the development of security policy and guidance for evaluating the security posture of computer systems, particularly those in a time-shared mode, and further stressed anticipation of a growing use of computers by defense contractors.

Because of the technical facets of the problem, we solicited the assistance of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), who in June 1967 advised that the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) nad been assigned responsibility: to identify the technical aspects of the security problems in time-sharing computer operations, to consider alternative solutions and to make recommendations for a preferred solution. Following discussions involving people from the university and industrial communities, a task force was formed in October 1967 consisting of a steering group, a policy panel and a technical panel. The Task Force was chaired by Dr. Willis Ware who addressed the previous of these seminars.

Nature of the Problem

The perceived nature of the problem impacting security policy at that time is best summarized by the following extracts from an internal office memorandum.

Although the broad policy guidance of DoD Directive 5200.1 included adequate security guidance at this level for single-user ADP systems, it is inadequate insofar as the security needs posed by multi-level, time-sharing computer systems are concerned. Those time-sharing computer systems, in which many files of differing security classifications are processed simultaneously under the control of several terminal operators having differing security clearances and validated need-to-know, present a policy problem which is nowhere covered adequately by existing DoD Directives.

The Defense Science Board Task Force describes the problem in essentially the same way, in slightly different terms. The 'bottom line' was that remotely accessed resource-sharing systems introduced new complexities and issues, in turn not amenable to solution through the elementary safeguard of physical isolation [1].

The resultant Defense Science Board Report, entitled, "Security Controls for Computer Systems: Report of Defense Science Board Task Force on Computer Security," was published in 1970, and served as a primary input to the follow on effort to develop responsive DoD ADP security policies. This report was mentioned by Dr. Ware at the last seminar, and he has since taken the initiative in reprinting and making available copies of that report.

ADP security Task Force. A DoD Security Task Force was established under the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Security Policy) also in 1970. Its purpose was to identify, review and make necessary revisions to security policy directives in order to facilitate the utilization of advanced technology in automatic data processing systems. This charter, with the Defense Science Board report as input, shifted emphasis to the task of developing practical, realistic policy on a Departmentwide basis, a significant undertaking especially at that time.

DoD Directive 5200.28 and DoD 5200.28-M. Following substantial effort by a number of participants, the basic policy documents were written, coordinated, and approved. DoD Directive 5200.28, entitled "Security Requirements for Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems," was published in December 1972 and its companion "ADP Security Manual" in January 1973 /2,37.

I shall briefly review some of the outlines of the documents to convey the security philosophy embodied therein.

The policies contained in these documents are designed to provide realistic, cost-effective parameters for the implementation of secure systems, with specific recognition given to: limitations in the technical state-of-the-art; operational considerations, particularly mission accomplishment; the wide variations within the universe of DoD and contractor computer systems; and, the overall potential cost impact of the requirements. Key illustrative provisions include the following:

--That classified material contained in an ADP system shall be safeguarded by the continuous employment of protective features in the system's hardware and software design and configuration, and by other appropriate administrative, physical, personnel, and communications security controls.

--That the basic ADF system reliability and integrity features must be augmented to assure that systems which process, store, or use classified data and produce classified information will, with reasonable dependability, prevent: a. Deliberate or inadvertent access to classified material by unauthorized persons, and b. Unauthorized manipulation of the computer and its peripheral devices;

--That the <u>diversity and complexity</u> of existing ADP systems as well as their demonstrated technical security weaknesses must be <u>recognized</u> and that alternative solutions to ADP system security problems are, in part, dependent upon the individual characteristics of the ADP system, and its usage;

--That the <u>potential cost</u> of the ADP system <u>dictates</u> that security policy be judiciously implemented, carefully managed, regularly reviewed, and continuously monitored to assure the most effective and economical use of the ADP system and related resources of the Department of Defense and of its contractors.

Toward those ends, the Directive provides for the application of administrative, physical, and personnel security measures to protect ADP systems, and includes the explicit assignment of responsibility for the testing, evaluation, and approval of such systems and for appointment of a responsible ADP System Security Officer for each ADP system approved for the processing of classified information.

POLICY CONTEXT

Authorities

Of course, our program is in implementation of and must be consistent with requirements imposed by higher authorities. Congress has enacted a number of significant statutes relating to our security program. Furthermore, the President, acting in his capacity as Chief Executive and as Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces, has issued several Executive Orders imposing security responsibilities upon the Secretary of Defense, the most pertinent of which is E.O. 12065 (Figure 2) [47].

Particularly relevant to implementation of the order in the ADP environment is the information classification scheme; namely, that national security information or material shall be classified in one of three categories, Top Secret, Secret, or confidential and no other categories shall be used except as expressly provided by statute to the designations coupled with one of these three categories pertain to access restrictions only.

While the Executive Order focused primarily on the classification and declassification of national security material and improving the balance between the two competing principles of informing the public and preserving confidentiality, it also contains other pertinent, broad and generic security policy requirements, most of which present problematic judgments when applied to the ADP arena. For example, from Section 4:

- "No person may be given access to classified information unless that person has been determined to be trustworthy and unless access is necessary for the performance of official duties.
- All classified information and material shall be <u>marked</u> conspicuously to put users on notice of its current classification status and, if appropriate, to show any special distribution or reproduction restrictions authorized by this Order.
- Controls shall be established by each agency to ensure that classified information is used, processed, stored, reproduced, and transmitted only under conditions that will provide adequate protection and prevent access by unauthorized persons."

Organizational Implementation

As these requirements are implemented by formal issuances down the indicated organizational chains of command, they are elaborated upon and generally specified as appropriate to more limited organizations and environments. There are also built-in feedback mechanisms for the evaluation of lower-level implementations. For example, in OSD, all DoD Component implementations must be reviewed and certified as being consistent with the basic DoD issuance. Similarly, the Executive Order provides for an "Information Security Oversight Office" to assist the National Security Council in monitoring implementation of the Order. One of its functions is specifically to "oversee agency actions to ensure compliance with this Order and implementing directives . . ."

The EO does not address computers per se. Our implementation, the Information Security Program Regulation, DoD 5200.1-R, [5] doesn't either, except for paragraphs dealing with various media that may be associated with computer processing (e.g., punched cards, printouts, micro-forms). DoD Directive 5200.28 in essence represents our implementation of the EO insofar as the relatively unique problems posed by shared computer systems are concerned. The relationship between the two cannot be understated because much of the overall security guidance to be applied to the ADP environment is in 5200.1-R and is simply not duplicated in 5200.28. Therefore, in developing a system security plan, reference to both 5200.28 and 5200.1-R is required.

(Figure 3) Our ADP security program policies impact not only the DoD Components but also those ADP systems processing classified information among the 11,500 contractors in the Defense Industrial Security Program. As mentioned, this Program is administered by DoD on behalf of sixteen other Executive Branch Departments and Agencies, in addition to the DoD Components, and currently identified industrial general purpose ADP systems (about 700) represent a significant number of the total ADP systems subject to our ADP security policies.

"Other"/Special Access Programs (Figure 4)
So far the flow of implementation of policy is fairly straight forward.
But there is always an "other," and as shown, there are basically four sets of Special Access Programs that impact the Information of the fitty Program:

 $\underline{NATO}_{},$ where security procedures are based on International Treaty Requirements;

Requirements concerning access to and dissemination of Restricted Data and Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information;

Special Access Programs for <u>Foreign Intelligence</u> under the cognizance of the Director of Central Intelligence or the National Communications Security Committee; and,

Dod "Special Access Programs" as such.

Our policy in this area is to utilize the standard classification categories to limit access to classified information on a "need-to-know" basis to personnel who have been determined to be trustworthy pursuant to the EO & NSC Directive, so that there will be no need to resort to formal Special Access Programs. That is, to avoid requiring the extraordinary procedures and controls, such as formal access determinations, special briefings, reporting procedures, and recorded formal access lists associated with Special Access Programs.

For simplicity's sake, consider these four as potential sources of additional security requirements in various areas which must be considered in system security planning, requirements that can range from the simple to the very complex and expensive.

KEY POLICY PROVISIONS

Background

I want to briefly describe some of the key policy provisions and structure for several reasons: first of all, some of the researchers have been using as a point of departure, "old policy," that is, provisions that have been superseded. Secondly, the current framework will be relevant to any discussion of the fashion in which the output of the Computer Security Initiative Program can be applied to an environment where formal ADP security policies exist. Lastly, in covering key provisions, I shall also indicate other aspects of our overall program which relate to application of A-71.

Basic ADP Security Philosophy

In terms of security concepts, we do not view computer security as fundamentally different from the protection of other information and material. We do not orient on 100% security as feasible in this area -- even approaching that level is usually prohibitive in terms of cost or constraint. Our approach is to relatively secure by employing security barriers and measures in complementary combination (i.e., systematized "defense in-depth") so that the cost/risk of penetration exceeds the value or payoff of the penetration object, be it personal or classified information, nuclear material or monetary assets. This "work factor" approach involves identifying vulnerabilities (paths into the "system") and erecting barriers generating a "work factor," in terms of cost/risk, which exceeds the worth of the object(s) to be protected.

The end objective is an "acceptable level of risk determination" -- the professional security judgment that the security subsystem generates such a cost/risk work factor in a comprehensive, systematic and cost-effective way. We feel the process through which this determination is most effectively and validly made is the security analysis, test and evaluation process (Figure 5), wherein both vulnerabilities and countermeasures are systematically considered.

The computer security policy problem here is (Figure 6), there are no generally accepted standards, criteria or even valid guidelines for hardware/software security, yet this overall process is the basic tenet of our policy. By contrast there are relatively clearcut guidelines and minimum requirements in all the other security areas indicated. The end result is that the process cannot now be executed with sufficient confidence in terms of validity or reliability, let alone cost effectiveness.

It is precisely this problem to which I see the Computer Security Initiative responding. Let me first, however, outline the policy framework which I feel can effectively accommodate the Initiative Program concepts as they are evolving -- as will be briefed during this seminar.

Policy Objective

As a point of departure here is the collective end objective (Figure 7). The ADP system's collective security measures must, with reasonable dependability, prevent both:

- 1. access to classified material by unauthorized persons, and
- 2. unauthorized manipulation of the ADP system.

Although we are protecting information, in this arena the ADP system as such must be protected. The "why" of it has been suggested -- currently available systems are penetrable and complex [e.g., 6,7,8]. Most significantly, penetration need not be executed at the time unauthorized access to classified information is effected. Rather, a penetration may be effected at one time and remain undetected for long periods of time prior to exploitation.

ADP System Security Modes (Figure 8)

In seeking to accommodate the hardware/software security problem with the need to operate, the need to employ ADP system to accomplish or support a multitude of defense missions, a set of alternatives evolved which may be viewed simply as alternative paths that involve the sorts of tradeoffs I mentioned at the beginning. Although not stated as such on the slides, one key variable, in the terms of this seminar, is the relative degree of "trustedness" insofar as the hardware/software security component is concerned. The modes involve basic tradeoffs between conventional security measures on one hand and hardware/software measures on the other. Viewed as alternatives along a continuum, as one moves from left to right relative hardware/software security responsibility increases, along with relatively increasing risk and uncertainty. In parallel, relative degree of security cost and constraint tends to decrease. The selection of one of these modes for a system is, of course, largely dependent upon the specific system, its functional requirements, its users and its environment, as to which mode is the most cost-beneficial.

As a further specification (Figure 9), let me relate these modes to the two policy requirements for access to classified material. Before an individual may be granted access to classified information: 1. he must have been granted a security clearance; and, 2. his access must be necessary for the performance of his official duties (i.e., he must have a "Need-to-Know"). In the manual world, both clearance and Need-to-Know determinations are normally made by humans in a fairly straightforward way. In the automated environment, however, this can vary. Moving again from left to right, clearance and Need-to-Know are determined prior to system access in the Dedicated Mode. In the System High Mode, clearance is determined before access, but Need-to-Know is not. The double line indicates a significant change in hardware/software security role -- to the right of the lines, it becomes one of preventing outright security violations and compromises. Now let's look at some specifics.

The Dedicated Mode, (Figure 10) at the far left, is the most clearly approvable type of system simply because the key security functions I noted are formed by comfortable, well understood conventional security measures. By definition, everyone with access to such a system has a

clearance and a Need-to-Know for everything then in the system. The major protection burden is assumed by conventional personnel and physical security measures and techniques which isolate the system from unautho-rized personnel, pursuant to fairly clear policy requirements. Hardware/software security role is minimized as a result.

The Full Multi-Level Security Mode (Figure 11), is at the other extreme. There are some system users who have neither clearance nor Need-to-Know for material contained in the system at the time of their access. In this case, in direct contrast to the Dedicated Mode, both clearance and Need-to-Know are determined by the ADP system. The separation of users, their programs and files must be maintained by hardware/software security mechanisms under operating system control, because it's all in the computer and potentially accessible at the same time. In terms of tradeoffs, the direct security costs and associated constraints on system utilization are minimized (e.g., not all users with concurrent access need be cleared to the highest levels; remote terminal areas need not meet the physical security requirements of the central computer facility; cpu (central processing unit) time and system availability are not lost through sanitization procedures, and so on). But at the same time, hardware/software security responsibilities are now maximized. The major burden of key security functions falls upon hardware/software.

The "System High Mode" (Figure 12). The basic distinction between Dedicated and System High is the matter of Need-to-Know. In both cases, all users are cleared to the highest level. In the Dedicated Mode, Need-to-Know is determined before actual system access is afforded to users; in the System High Mode, it is determined by the ADP system during access. It is established and maintained by hardware/software. This mode is a more flexible, less constraining mode of operating an ADP system than the Dedicated Mode. But, election of this mode requires the development and implementation of hardware/software mechanisms to implement Need-to-Know.

The Controlled Mode (Figure 13) moves one step further along the continuum and crosses that significant double line. Neither individual clearance nor individual Need-to-Know are predetermined. But, in contrast to the Multi-Level Security Mode, the important difference is a set of explicit measures to reduce risk and vulnerability and to directly enhance or even bypass hardware/software security measures under operating system control.

Basically, the objective here is to provide a potentially approvable, interim alternative to the more restrictive Dedicated and System High Modes - a transition. But, one must take explicit steps, vice the Multi-Level Mode, to reduce relative risk and vulnerability, and, preferably in combination, other steps to augment the system hardware/ software security posture. Examples of risk reduction are limits on the range of clearance levels of users who have concurrent access (e.g., users of only two clearance levels). Actions that can concurrently reduce relative vulnerability include restrictions on users capabilities, such as providing query and response capability (Figure 14).

Application to Initiative Program Concepts

I think clearly the most important aspect of the foregoing is the rather clear potential linkage between modes, as a continuum of systems on the basis of relative required "trustedness," and efforts of this Computer Security Initiative Program, dealing with development of "trusted" ADP systems.

As this slide shows, (Figure 15) there is a clear correlation between the relative levels of protection that are evolving for purposes of evaluation and the continuum of modes. The left hand column will be treated in specifics by Grace Nibaldi and Peter Tasker $\sqrt{9}$, 107 -- the general point I want to make here is that there is a clear potential relationship between the Initiative Program's efforts and the provisions of existing policy. Application of those efforts to real world ADP systems through existing policy is therefore neither remote nor obscure.

The notion here is that one might tentatively select a target system security mode on the basis of inherent security capabilities in a system during the initial stages of the risk assessment (Figure 16). There would follow detailed identification and assessment of a host of variables, both technical and non-technical peculiar to the individual system, any of which, in a tradeoff context, might change the relative security posture of the system "up" or "down" in the right-hand column; that is, with regard to the system security mode ultimately proposed for formal approval by the Designated Approving Authority. Jack Adams has developed a framework for enumerating critical security considerations that can be applied to the middle "interface" column 117.

The significance of this linkage is now limited to those systems processing classified information in DoD and in industry; as I'll suggest in a moment, that significance may be much more profound, depending upon the policy framework that ultimately evolves with regard to the computer security requirements of Transmittal Memorandum No. 1 to OMB Circular A-71.

From the policy interaction, let me turn briefly to the procedural --how the expertise being developed within the Initiative Program might
interface with the folks in the field who are currently tasked, and have
been for some time, with evaluating and approving real world ADP systems.

As a point of departure, let me again refer to the general process that is a fundamental tenet of our policy (Figure 17). Recall that other than the "hardware/software" area indicated, criteria and requirements are relatively clear. Also given both resource limitations and the highly technical nature of the task, it appears most likely that formalized establishment of the Initiative Program's expertise will be at least initially centralized.

The technical expertise can be integrated into the test and evaluation process as shown here, by complementing the ongoing Component activities in the technical area. Recall that our policy explicitly delegates ADP system security approval authority to the DoD Components (and DLA for

contractor ADP systems). It is not our intention to change that -- the final approval must be on a system-by-system basis; that is, keyed to an individual system with its unique environment and functional requirements.

Though this is an old slide (Figure 18), it shows the place of technical advice, indicated in red, in the overall Component evaluation process. It also indicates our intent that the overall synthesis of the diverse parts of the analysis, together with the final decision to approve or not approve, lies with the appropriate Component Designated Approving Authority.

This overall notion might be kept in mind as I pursue the projection of classified arena concepts to a broader environment in ADP security.

A STRUCTURED CONCEPT FOR A-71 IMPLEMENTATION

Thus far, we have been discussing exclusively the policy framework for the protection of classified information in the ADP environment (Figure 19). As most of you are aware, the Office of Management and Budget promulgated much broader ADP security requirements in July 1978, specifically Transmittal Memorandum No. 1 to OMB Circular A-71, entitled "Security of the Federal Automated Information Systems" [12]. This is a truly omnibus policy in that it is concerned with more than information security per se and more threats than just unauthorized disclosure of national security information. A-71 establishes a number of responsibilities and imposes a number of requirements on Executive Branch agencies.

A-71 Responsibilities and Requirements

To consider this document and its potential relationship to the Computer Security Initiative Program, let's first briefly review the scope and content of the program. First, it covers all Federal data and applications processed by computer.

This new program requires each Executive Branch Agency to:

- Assign responsibility for the security of each computer installation operated by or on behalf of the agency to a management official knowledgeable in data processing and security;
- Establish personnel security policies for all Federal and contractor personnel involved in the design, operation, or maintenance of, or having access to data in, Federal computer systems;
- Establish a management control process to assure that appropriate administrative, physical and technical safeguards are incorporated into all new computer applications and significant modifications to existing applications (for applications deemed "sensitive," this includes: prior definition and approval of security specifications and the conduct, approval and certification of design reviews and application systems tests);
- Assure that appropriate security requirements are included in the specifications for the acquisition or operation of computer facilities or services;
- Conduct periodic risk analyses for each computer installation operated by or on behalf of the agency (at least every five years);
- Conduct independent periodic audits or evaluations and recertify the adequacy of the security safeguards of each operational sensitive application (at least every three years); and,
- Assure that appropriate contingency plans are developed and maintained to provide for continuity of operations should events occur

which prevent normal operations; periodically review and test these plans.

Also under the new program:

- The Department of Commerce will develop and issue computer system security standards and guidelines;
- The General Services Administration will issue policies and regulations for the physical security of computer rooms and assure that security requirements are included in agency procurements; and,
- The Civil Service Commission (now Office of Personnel Management) has established personnel security policies for Federal personnel associated with computer systems $\sqrt{137}$. (Their guidelines also imply applicability to contractors.)

DoD Implementation Approach

The approach we are pursuing in Defense is one of essentially applying to the A-71 requirements the ADP security policy framework that has evolved in the classified arena over approximately the past decade. Essentially, (Figure 20) we envision first categorization of data and applications on the basis of criteria analogous to those that exist for classified national security information. Secondly, ADP systems are primarily categorized in terms of the data/applications processed, and then specific systems security requirements are directly derived primarily on a system basis. Incorporated, of course, is the multidisciplinary, systematic approach to implementation that characterizes the classified arena. A third essential ingredient, directly relevant to the computer security initiative program, is utilization of the currently authorized system security modes discussed above.

Let me quickly review the data and application categories that we have proposed in the intended sequence. Recall in this regard that Dr. Burrows (Director, Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology, NBS) earlier here called for development of a uniform structure for protection.

Sensitivity Categories -- <u>Data & Applications</u> (Figure 21)

<u>ADP I, "Critical-Sensitive".</u> DoD data and applications stored or processed in, or communicated, displayed or disseminated by, an Automatic Data Processing (ADP) System shall be categorized as ADP I when one or more of the following criteria are met:

- Top Secret National Security Information -- The data or applications require protection in the interest of national security, and the classification designation is "Top Secret" (DoD Regulation 5200.1-R);
- <u>Mission Critical</u> -- The data or applications are such that the denial of use, loss, compromise, disablement or unauthorized alteration thereof could reasonably be expected to directly and gravely degrade or

jeopardize the capabilities of a Military Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Defense Agency or a Unified or Specified Command to timely and effective discharge of their primary functions (DoD Directive 5100.1) in support of DoD emergency and/or war plans;

- Life Critical -- The data or applications are such that the denial of use, loss, compromise, disablement or unauthorized alteration thereof could reasonably be expected to directly and gravely jeopardize human life;
- Automated Decisionmaking Systems -- Applications, not otherwise included in the foregoing, which issue checks, requisition supplies or perform similar assets control functions, based on programmed criteria with little human intervention, wherein the potential loss or exploitable monetary value of the assets handled could exceed \$10,000,000 per year.
- ADP II, "Noncritical-Sensitive". DoD data and applications, which do not meet any of the foregoing criteria for category ADP I, shall be categorized as ADP II when one or more of the following criteria are met:
- Secret or Confidential National Security Information -- The data or applications require protection in the interest of national security, and the classification designation is either "Secret" or "Confidential" DoD Regulation 5200.1-R);
- Mission Critical -- The data or applications are such that the denial of use, loss, compromise, disablement or unauthorized alteration thereof could reasonably be expected to degrade or jeopardize component command or major staff element capabilities to support timely and effective discharge of Military Department, OJCS, Defense Agency or U & S Command missions and functions;
- Privacy -- The data or applications involve personal information requiring protection pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974 (DoD Directive 3400.7);
- FOIA Exemptions -- The data or applications (unclassified) have been determined to be exempt from public disclosure, consistent with the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (Section VI, DoD Directive 5400.7);
- Automated Decisionmaking Systems -- Applications, not otherwise included in the foregoing, which issue checks, requisition supplies or perform similar assets control functions, based on programmed criteria with little human intervention, wherein the potential loss or exploitable monetary value of the assets handled could range between \$1,000,000 and \$10,000,000 per year.
- ADP III, "Nonsensitive". All other DoD data and applications which do not meet the criteria for categories ADP I or ADP II as set forth above.

Sensitivity Categories -- ADP Systems (Figure 22)

- ADP I, "Critical-Sensitive". ADP systems shall be categorized as ADP I when either of the following criteria is met:
- ADP I Data or Applications -- The ADP system stores or processes one or more sets of data or applications categorized as ADP I, "Critical-Sensitive," pursuant to the criteria herein; or,
- <u>Automated Decisionmaking Systems</u> -- The ADP system handles "automated decisionmaking systems" wherein the aggregate total potential loss or exploitable monetary value of assets handled collectively by the ADP system's automated decisonmaking systems applications could exceed \$10,000,000 per year.
- ADP II, "Noncritical-Sensitive". ADP systems, which do not meet any of the foregoing criteria for category ADP I, shall be categorized as ADP II when either of the following criteria is met:
- ADP II Data or Applications -- The ADP system stores or processes one or more sets of data or applications categorized as ADP I; or,
- Automated Decisionmaking Systems -- The ADP system handles "automated decisionmaking systems" wherein the aggregate total potential loss or exploitable monetary value of assets handled collectively by the ADP system's automated decisionmaking systems applications could fall between \$1,000,000 and \$10,000,000 per year.
- ADP III, "Nonsensitive". All other ADP systems processing DoD data or applications.

Sensitivity Categories -- Personnel Positions (Figure 23)

- ADP I, "Critical-Sensitive". Positions of personnel requiring access to ADP I DOD data or applications OR unescorted access to an ADP I ADP system(s).
- ADP II, "Noncritical-Sensitive". Positions of personnel requiring access to ADP II DoD data or applications OR unescorted access to an ADP II ADP system(s).
- ADP III, "Nonsensitive". Positions of all other personnel requiring access to DoD data or applications OR requiring unescorted access to an ADP system containing DoD data or applications.

Now when we link the foregoing to the system security mode concepts already presented, we have the capability to minimize personnel security clearances for systems, based, in the terms of this seminar, on the relative "trustedness" of the internal system security controls. For example:

Adjustments for Position Sensitivity Categories (Figure 24)

:

- 1. "Multilevel and Controlled Mode" Systems -- The positions of ADP System Users with access to systems already approved to operate in either the "Controlled Security Mode" or the "Multilevel Security Mode" pursuant to DoD Directive 5200.28 (or, for contractor ADP systems, DoD Manual 5220.22-M) shall be designated in the position sensitivity category commensurate with the most sensitive category of the DoD data or application(s) they will access under system constraints.
- 2. "Temporarily Dedicated" Systems -- The positions of personnel with access to ADP systems currently operating under procedures that effect temporary dedication to different sensitivity categories at different periods of time (also called "color changing" or "periods processing") shall be designated in the sensitivity category commensurate with the most sensitive category of DoD data or application(s) contained in the system during periods of each individual's access to the system. In remotely accessed systems, this will include remote terminal users wherein the remote terminal is disconnected during higher sensitivity category processing periods.
- 3. "Output Only" -- The positions of ADP System User personnel shall be designated in the position sensitivity category commensurate with the category of only the system output they actually receive when: (1) such personnel do not input to or otherwise directly interact with the system (i.e., no "hands on" or other direct input or inquiry capability), and (2) the output products are either reviewed prior to dissemination or otherwise determined to be properly identified as to content, intended recipient and sensitivity category (i.e., systems approved to implement this option pursuant to paragraph IV.C.5.b., DoD Directive 5200.28 or for contractor ADP systems, paragraph 108, DoD Manual 5220.22-M).
- 4. "Technical Review" -- The positions of personnel who design, develop or generate DoD data or applications, or who generate input to an ADP system containing DoD data or applications, shall be designated in a less sensitive position category when (1) such personnel do not have access to ADP systems containing higher sensitivity category data or applications, and (2) when the product or input generated by such personnel is subject to "Technical Review."

The most important consequence of the foregoing is that if we pursue this concept then the need for "trusted" systems, just within Defense, will expand from potentially 27% of our inventory (the subset that processes classified information) of general purpose ADP systems to 100%. With Defense contractors, the requirement is expected to also increase, although there is no basis for anticipating specific numbers.

Executive Branch Implementation

A-71 implementation from an Executive Branch-wide perspective generates a number of problems, particularly when data/application interchange among agencies and departments is considered, and most notably when contractors additionally are involved.

Personnel Security

The first and perhaps the simplest aspect of A-71 implementation, relatively speaking, that was promulgated was in the area of personnel security by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), pursuant to OMB tasking [137]. As might be expected, the OPM criteria and guidelines are primarily keyed to the existing personnel management structure and are oriented on individual personnel positions. The foregoing concepts, however, are oriented on a system basis, and general personnel security requirements as well as other general requirements, may be derived from system security level and system security mode.

Specific requirements in the personnel security area are essentially open ended insofar as the scope of personnel security investigations, the standard which an individual must meet to be eligible for assignment to an ADP position and the adjudicative criteria by which the individual will be judged to determine whether the standard has been met. From an Executive Branch-wide perspective with regard to contractors, such a decentralized approach can result in an uncoordinated effort which (1) may not provide a uniform degree of fairness to the subjects of the investigative/adjudicative processes, (2) would not tend toward mutual and reciprocal acceptance of personnel security determinations among Federal agencies, and (3) cause confusion among firms performing on ADP contracts with more than one Federal agency (also possibly requiring duplicative or repetitive investigation of contractor employees to meet different scope and adjudication criteria).

With these very real and significant concerns in mind, we prepared correspondence for OMB, which the action office for A-71 in DoD has already formally dispatched. We specifically proposed that the majority of the problems cited could be avoided by following the single executive agency concept of the Industrial Security Program, established under the provisions of Executive Order 10865. The Executive Order recognized that conflicts and lack of uniformity would result if each government agency in the classified arena implemented its own industrial security program, and it therefore provided for the extension of the DoD program to include other departments and agencies. As a result, DoD has executive agreements with 16 other Executive Branch agencies to provide an industrial security program on a cost reimbursement basis. Consequently, standardized requirements and procedures have been issued and are uniformly implemented by participating agencies and contractor facilities $\int 147$. Moreover, investigations are conducted in accordance with a standard investigative scope and are adjudicated centrally by the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office under uniform adjudicative criteria. Records of clearances are also centrally maintained. The major benefit,

however, is that industry does not have to contend with 17 different government security programs.

We accordingly recommended that the implementation of the contractor employee personnel security requirements of A-71 be carried out by means of a modification of the Industrial Security Program.

Beyond Personnel Security

As I suggested, the personnel security aspect of A-71 is in many respects the simplest. The logical extension of the foregoing suggest additional possibilities.

For example, the Industrial Security Program does more than the indicated central personnel security clearance function; it also inspects specific contractor facilities and issues and records "contractor facility clearances"* on behalf of the 17 participating Federal Organizations. More to our concern here, for a decade our Industrial Security Representatives have been inspecting and approving contractor ADP systems that process classified information.

It takes little imagination, therefore, to suggest that the same logic that argues for serious consideration of centralized handling of contractor personnel security likewise, or even more so in light of the innate complexity of the total A-71 tasks, suggests equally serious consideration be given to at least uniform handling of contractor ADP systems and related protection of Federal government data and applications pursuant to A-71.

I would further suggest that if two of the notions outlined above were specifically included, the resultant practical framework for a total program implementation, both in and out of government, would be substantially simplified. That is, if: 1. a categorization scheme for data and applications were implemented government-wide and 2. if mode concepts were adopted, then a ready-made policy framework would be rather easily created. It would further provide for substantial effort being directed to the truly difficult issues in A-71, whereas by contrast, the absence of such a framework would generate questions and issues that could be the subject of virtually endless debate, to the detriment of meaningful progress on effectively implementing the other charges of A-71. And if there is one consistent problem throughout the ten-year history of our classified ADP security program, it is a shortage of manpower -- that is, manpower per se; never mind the issue of the qualification of the people.

^{* &}quot;An administrative determination that, from a security viewpoint, a facility is eligble for access to classified information of a certain category (and all lower categories)" /147.

A measure of precedent for a categorization scheme for Federal data and applications exists in the OPM guidelines by virtue of their correlating varying personnel security requirements to those established by Executive Order 10450 for the traditional national security area. Such categorization would provide, unlike the privacy area, discrimination between relative sensitivity and relative allocation of security resources generically.

Addition of the standardized mode concepts, with the above, would substantially simplify the overall risk assessment process at the general level and permit focus on those complex security aspects which are truly installation and system dependent.

Further, at least within Defense and among Industrial Security Program contractors, such an approach would eliminate a substantial portion of learning curve costs for people working with those ADP systems by employing a framework that has been in being for almost a decade. It's not perfect, but it has had a long "debugging" period.

In a phrase, it thus would provide "one face to industry" <u>comprehensively</u>. It would concurrently provide an implementation framework for the handling of intra-government flow of data and applications processed by computer, among Executive Branch agencies and departments, a flow which I understand is not insignificant in volume.

CONCLUSION


In summary, there is a policy framework which has evolved in computer security over a ten-year period that is in effect within the Department of Defense and in the Defense Industrial Security Program. Moreover, on the industrial side, there is an in-being, nation-wide system that has likewise been in operation for about decade. Implementation along the lines suggested above would virtually solve a number of serious potential problems relating to Government interface with the private sector and the intra-government flow of data and applications processed by computer. It would also provide for direct application of the "trusted systems" being developed through the Computer Security Initiative Program.

The mapping of such a proven and rather well accepted policy framework to A-71, particularly commonly accepted and operationally defined notions of "cleared people" and "approved systems," I believe warrants serious consideration and further exploration for the reasons given--I would most appreciate your views on this.

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
COMPUTER SYSTEM MANAGEMENT TRADEOFFS



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
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ADP SECURITY POLICY



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


DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ADP SECURITY POLICY






DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ADP SECURITY POLICY




SYSTEM SECURITY PROCESS, CAPACITYS & CONSIDERATIONS



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6

FISTER CHORITY PROCESS, CAJECTIVE & CONSTIDENATIONS



J-24

THE BASIC ADP SYSTEM RELIABILITY AND INTEGRITY FEATURES

MUST BE AUGMENTED TO ASSURE THAT SYSTEMS WHICH PROCESS,

STORE, OR USE CLASSIFIED DATA AND PRODUCE CLASSIFIED

INFORMATION WILL, WITH REASONABLE DEPENDABILITY, PREVENT:

A. DELIBERATE OR INADVERTENT ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED MATERIAL BY UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS, AND

B. UNAUTHORIZED MANIPULATION OF THE COMPUTER AND ITS ASSOCIATED PERIPHERAL DEVICES.

7

SPECTRUM OF ADP SYSTEM SECURITY MODES REQUIREMENTS AND TRADEOFFS

GENERIC TRADEOFFS.

INCREASING HARDWARE/SOFTWARE SECURITY ODE : INCREASING LEVEL OF RISK AND UNCERTAINT ON ADP SYSTEM UTILIZATION:

"DEDICATED" "SYSTEM HIGH" "CONTROLLED" "MULTILEVEL"

"SYSTEM HIGH" "CONTROLLED" "MULTILEVEL"

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SPECTRUM OF ADP SYSTEM SECURITY MODES REQUIREMENTS AND TRADEOFFS

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"DEDICATED" "SYSTEM HIGH" "CONTROLLED" "MULTI-LEVEL"

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SPECTRUM OF ADP SYSTEM SECURITY MODES REQUIREMENTS AND TRADEOFFS

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REMOTE TERMINAL AREAS	HIGH			VARIABLE
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GENERIC TRADEOFFS.				
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DECREASING CONVENTIONAL SECURITY COST/CONSTRAINT ON ADP SYSTEM UTILIZATION:				

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SPECTRUM OF ADP SYSTEM SECURITY MODES REQUIREMENTS AND TRADEOFFS

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ADP SYSTEM SECURITY MODE:	"DEDICATED"	SYSTEM HIGHT	"CONTROLLED"	"MULTI-LEVEL"
GENERAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.	_			
PHYSICAL AND PERSONNEL.	ĺ			1
CENTRAL COMPUTER FACILITY	HIGH	нісн		HIGH
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COMMUNICATION LINKS.	HIGH	HIGH		VARIABLE
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE SECURITY ROLE.	MIL	NEED-TO-KNOW	CLEARANCE (AUGMENTED) & NEED-TO-KNOW	CLEARANCE AND NEED-TO-KNOW
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DECREASING CONVENTIONAL SECURITY COST/CONSTRAINT ON ADP SYSTEM UTILIZATION:				

SPECTRUM OF ADP SYSTEM SECURITY MODES REQUIREMENTS AND TRADEOFFS

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
SPECTRUM OF ADP SYSTEM SECURITY MODES REQUIREMENTS AND TRADEOFFS

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
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
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SECURE SYSTEMS EVALUATION -- POTENTIAL POLICY INCORPORATION




SYSTEM SECURITY PROCESS, OBJECTIVE & CONSIDERATIONS



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SYSTEM SECURITY ANALYSIS & APPROVAL PROCESS



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NATIONAL LEVEL INTEREST

GAO REPORTS: 1976

- "IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN MANAGING AUTOMATED DECISIONMAKING BY COMPUTERS THROUGHOUT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT" (APR 76)
- "COMPUTER RELATED CRIMES IN FEDERAL PROGRAMS" (APR 76)
- "MANAGERS NEED TO PROVIDE BETTER PROTECTION FOR FEDERAL AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING FACILITIES" (MAY 76)

SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS:

- "COMPUTER ABUSES.-PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY IN FEDERAL PROGRAMS & PRIVATE INDUSTRY" (JUN 76)
 - "COMPUTER SECURITY IN FEDERAL PROGRAMS" (FEB 77)

1977

- J-31
- "SECURITY OF FEDERAL AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS," TRANSMITTAL NO. 1 TO OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-71 DRAFT FOR COORDINATION (SEP 77)

FINAL ISSUANCE (JUL 78)

PRESIDENT: INITIATIVE TO ATTACK FRAUD & WASTE

 DOD STEERING GROUP ON OVERSIGHT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMPUTER FRAUD

GAO REPORTS:

- "AUTOMATED SYSTEMS SECURITY.-FEDERAL AGENCIES SHOULD STRENGTHEN SAFEGUARDS OVER PERSONAL AND OTHER SENSITIVE DATA" (JAN 79) 1979
- GAO LETTER TO SECDEF (MAR 79)

POLICY CONCEPT

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- CATEGORIZE: DATA/APPLICATIONS; SYSTEMS
- INCORPORATE MULTI-DISCIPLINARY, SYSTEMS APPROACH
- SYSTEM SECURITY MODES EMPLOY CURRENT

6

ADP SYSTEMS

DATA & APPLICATIONS

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THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN

CAT I:

- TOP SECRET

CAT I:

- MISSION - LIFE - \$10 M/YR.

- CAT I DATA/APPLICATION

CAT II:

-CAT II DATA/APPL.

CAT III:

- ALL OTHERS

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CAT II:

- SECRET & CONF

– MISSION – PRIVACY – FOIA

- FOIA - \$1 - 10 M/YR.

CAT III:

- ALL OTHERS

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POSITIONS

THE STATE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF TH

CAT I — REQUIRED ACCESS TO: CAT I DATA/APPL OR SYSTEMS CAT II — REQUIRED ACCESS TO: CAT II DATA/APPL OR

SYSTEMS

CAT III - ALL OTHERS

ADJUSTMENTS

- TEMPORARY DEDICATION

- "MLS & CONTROLLED MODE"

- OUTPUT ONLY

- "TECHNICAL REVIEW"

- AGGREGATION



COMPUTER SECURITY AN INTEGRATED, MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH IS REQUIRED

INPUT:

PROCESS:

OUTPUT:

•[60UNTER INTELLIGENCE]
THREAT ANALYSIS

INTEGRATION

• TECHNICAL FUNCTIONAL AREAS:

J-34

PROCEDURAL SECURITY

FORMULATION

PHYSICAL SECURITY

HARDWARE/SOFTWARE

• COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

• EMANATIONS SECURITY

PERSONNEL SECURITY
 PLANNING/PROGRAMMING

SYSTEM DESIGN/R&D

PROMULGATION
MONITOR/INSPECT
IMPLEMENTATION

ADP SECURITY
POLICY
A BALANCED,
INTEGRATED
& COST.
EFFECTIVE
SECURITY
STATURE

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GERMAN AIR FORCE
INFORMATION SYSTEMS DIVISION

ADP-SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

FOR '

EIFEL2

LTCOL CERNY

CONTENTS

- 1. INTRODUCTION
- 2. DESCRIPTION OF EIFEL 2
- 3. ADP-SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
 - A) THE THREAT
 - B) OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
 - c) Experience with EIFEL 1/DISTEL 1
 - D) SECURITY AND PRIVACY REGULATIONS
- 4. CONCLUSION

It is the objective of my presentation, to make you familiar with the ADP-security requirements we have established for our EIFEL 2 system.

IN ORDER TO HELP YOU TO UNDERSTAND THESE REQUIREMENTS, THE FIRST PART OF THIS PRESENTATION WILL BE A SHORT DESCRIPTION OF EIFEL 2 FROM AN OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW AND THE SECOND PART WILL BE USED TO GIVE YOU A CONCISE PRESENTATION OF THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

1. Introduction

THE GERMAN AIR FORCE CURRENTLY DEVELOPS A COMMAND, CONTROL AND INFORMATION SYSTEM, WHICH WILL ASSIST THE MILITARY COMMANDERS IN THE AIR FORCE AT ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND BY SUPPORTING THEIR COMMAND AND CONTROL TASKS WITH MODERN INFORMATION PROCESSING EQUIPMENT.

THIS SYSTEM WILL BE REALIZED IN SEVERAL STAGES, FIRST PARTS ARE SCHEDULED TO BECOME OPERATIONAL IN 1984.

THIS ADP-SUPPORTED CCIS OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE WILL CONSIST OF A BASIC SYSTEM, CALLED EIFEL 2, WHICH ONE MIGHT CALL THE ADP-WORKHORSE OF THE GAF-CCIS AND SEVERAL SOFTWARE-SUBSYSTEMS WHICH WILL BE IMPLEMENTED ON EIFEL 2.

2. DESCRIPTION OF EIFEL 2

EIFEL 2 AS THE BASIC SYSTEM WILL PROVIDE FOR THE FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS:

- COLLECTION, STORAGE, DISTRIBUTION AND DISPLAY OF STATUS IN-FORMATION
- REPORTING SYSTEM FOR ALL GAF-UNITS
- DISTRIBUTION OF ORDERS AND MESSAGES

- DECISION AIDS
- COMMON DATABASE FOR ALL SUBSYSTEMS
- PROCESSING CAPABILITY FOR ALL SUBSYSTEMS
- INTERFACE TO NATIONAL AND NATO SYSTEMS

AT THIS POINT IN TIME, WE ENVISION 3 SUBSYSTEMS:

- ONE SUBSYSTEM TO SUPPORT THE MISSION PLANNING PHASE FOR TACTICAL OFFENSIVE AIR-POWER BY PROVIDING SPECIAL APPLICATION FUNCTIONS.

THIS SUBSYSTEM IS CALLED DISTEL:

- ONE SUBSYSTEM TO SUPPORT THE MISSION PLANNING PHASE FOR TACTICAL AIR-LIFT FORCES BY PROVIDING SPECIAL APPLICATION FUNCTIONS.

THIS SUBSYSTEM IS CALLED SYLT;

- ONE SUBSYSTEM TO SUPPORT THE "MISSION PLANNING PHASE" FOR LOGISTIC FORCES BY PROVIDING SPECIAL APPLICATION FUNCTIONS.

This system is called SUSYLOG;

THIS PHILOSOPHY WITH ONE BASIC SYSTEM AND SEVERAL SUBSYSTEMS WHICH WILL BE IMPLEMENTED ON THAT BASIC SYSTEM IN LINE WITH THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR HIGH AVAILABILITY AND SURVIVABILITY OF THE DATAPROCESSING POWER HAS RESULTED IN A SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE WITH THE FOLLOWING MAIN CHARACTERISTICS:

- EIFEL 2 WILL CONSIST OF ADP-CENTERS, WHICH WILL BE DISTRIBUTED OVER THE TERRITORY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY;
- THERE WILL BE AN INTEGRATED DATABASE, WHICH WILL BE DISTRIBUTED OVER THESE ADP-CENTERS;
- ADP-centers and users will be connected by a packet-switched network;

A SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION OF THE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE SHOWS THAT EIFEL 2 WILL CONSIST OF

- HOST OPERATING CENTERS, TO PERFORM THE DATAPROCESSING TASKS.
- Basic Data Processing Centers, which have in general the same dataprocessing tasks as the HOST operating centers, but are of a smaller size.
- TERMINALS, WHICH WILL BE PLACED DIRECTLY ON THE USERS DESK.
- A NETWORK CONNECTING USERS WITH DATAPROCESSING CENTERS AND USING PACKET-SWITCHING TECHNOLOGY.
- HOST Interface Processors, Terminal Interface Processors and Foreign Systems Interface Processors to Realize the Different Interfaces to the Network.

LET ME GIVE YOU NOW A SHORT LOOK ON THE ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF BASIC HARDWARE COMPONENTS WE THINK WE WILL NEED FOR EIFEL 2:

- 18 HOST OPERATING CENTERS
- 46 Basic Data Processing Centers
- 35 PACKET-SWITCHES
- 240 Terminal Interface Processors and Foreign Systems
 Interface Processors
- 2000 TERMINALS
- 1800 CRYPTO DEVICES
- 50 ALPHANUMERIC LARGE SCREEN DISPLAYS
- 50 GRAPHICAL LARGE SCREEN DISPLAYS

I WILL NOT GO INTO THE DETAILS OF THE SUBSYSTEMS, BECAUSE AS MENTIONED BEFORE, THE SUBSYSTEMS ARE ENVISIONED AS "APPLICATION PACKAGES" WHICH WILL RUN ON EIFEL 2.

FROM THE SECURITY POINT OF VIEW, THEIR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WILL BE REALIZED THROUGH EIFEL 2, THEREFORE IN THE FOLLOWING

PART OF MY PRESENTATION, I WILL ONLY DISCUSS THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR EIFEL 2.

3. ADP-SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

LET ME START WITH OUR DEFINITION OF SECURITY FOR EIFEL 2:

"SECURITY IS THAT CONDITION, WHICH GUARANTEES THE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION FROM EITHER ACCIDENTIAL OR UNAUTHORIZED INTENTIONAL DISCLOSURE, MODIFICATION OR DESTRUCTION AND EXCLUDES ANY INJURY TO THE SYSTEM BY ELEMENTS ENDANGERING ITS SECURITY".

To reach this condition, a well balanced set of security measures has to be developed in the areas of

- PERSONNEL SECURITY
- PHYSICAL SECURITY
- ADMINISTRATIVE SECURITY
- COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY AND LAST BUT NOT LEAST
- ADP-SECURITY

For the discussion to follow, I will concentrate on ADP-Security and only mention shortly the requirements for communications security.

THE EIFEL 2 ADP-SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ARE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING INPUTS:

- AN EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIAL THREATS TO THE SYSTEM
- AN EVALUATION OF THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND THEIR SECURITY IMPACT
- THE EXPERIENCE WITH OUR TESTSYSTEMS EIFEL 1 AND DISTEL 1
- AN EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING SECURITY AND PRIVACY REGULATIONS

THE FORMULATION OF THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS HAS BEEN INFLUENCED

VERY MUCH BY THE WORK DONE BY OUR ADVISORY GROUP IABG AND BY THE USAF/ESD ACTIVITIES (AS FAR AS PUBLISHED IN THE OPEN LITERATURE).

A) THE THREAT

As you can imagine, most of the data which will be stored, processed and distributed in EIFEL 2 are highly sensitive and vital for national command authorities as well as for NATO. Therefore it is certain, that EIFEL 2, respective its components, will be a high priority target for espionage and for sabotage, both in peacetime as well as in war and will be subject to all the well-known threats of adp-systems like

- THEFT
- FORGING OF DATA
- ERASURE OF DATA
- UNAUTHORIZED USE OF SYSTEM RESOURCES
- INTERCEPTION OF RADIATION FROM COMPUTERS, LINES AND TERMINALS
- TAPPING OF COMMUNICATION LINES
- CROSSTALK AND MISROUTING
- JAMMING

But compared to conventional ADP-systems the threat potential for EIFEL 2 is greatly enlarged through two factors:

- ITS ARCHITECTURAL CHARACTERISTICS LIKE
 - + DECENTRALIZED PROCESSING WITH AN EVEN MORE DECENTRALIZED USER POPULATION OF APPROXIMATELY 4000 USERS AT 150 DIFFERENT LOCATIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
 - + DISTRIBUTED DATABASE

- + PACKET-SWITCHED NETWORK
- OUR GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION, WHICH IS CHARACTERIZED BY
 - + A CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE WARSHAW PACT COUNTRIES
 - + A SUPPOSEDLY GREAT NUMBER OF UNDERCOVER AGENTS, WELL TRAINED FOR ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE

THE IMPACT, THESE FACTORS HAVE ON THE RELIABLE AND SECURE OPERATION OF EIFEL 2 JUSTIFIES IN OUR OPINION THE HIGH PRIORITY THAT ADP-SECURITY HAS IN OUR WORK.

B) OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Before talking about the operational requirements and their impact on ADP-security, it has to be determined

- WHICH ARE THE MOST VALUABLE AND CRITICAL RESOURCES OF THE SYSTEM WHICH HAVE TO BE PROTECTED THROUGH ADP-SECURITY MEASURES AND
- WHAT IS THE REQUIRED GRANULARITY OF PROTECTION

 IN A CCIS LIKE EIFEL 2 WHICH HAS TO SUPPORT MILITARY COMMANDERS IN ALL PHASES OF THE COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS,
 THE DATA HAS THE HIGHEST VALUE FOR THE USER. THEREFORE IT
 HAS TO BE PROTECTED
- AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED AND ACCIDENTAL OBSERVATION TO GUARANTEE ITS SECRECY AND
- AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED AND ACCIDENTIAL MODIFICATION AND DESTRUCTION TO RETAIN ITS INITIAL INTEGRITY OR SOUNDNESS THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM,

THERE IS NO DISCUSSION, THAT THE HARDWARE OF THE SYSTEM HAS

TO BE PROTECTED TOO, BUT THE NECESSARY PROTECTION MECHANISMS ARE MAINLY A PART OF THE PROTECTION THROUGH PHYSICAL MEASURES AND NOT PART OF ADP-SECURITY AS DISCUSSED IN THIS PRESENTATION.

BECAUSE EIFEL 2 WILL BE USED PRIMARILY IN AN INTERACTIVE MODE WITH A DIÂLOGUE-LANGUAGE, THE GRANULARITY OF PROTECTION SHOULD GO DOWN TO THE DATA-ITEM LEVEL.

Now, if we look at the list of operational requirements for EIFEL 2, three of them have a very strong impact on the ADP-security functions of the system:

- AVAILABILITY
- TIMELINESS AND
- USER ACCEPTANCE

(1) AVAILABILITY

THE MAIN THRUST FOR THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS COMES FROM THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE A SECURE AND CONTINUOUS SERVICE 24 HOURS A DAY/ 7 DAYS A WEEK. AS A CONSEQUENCE IT MUST BE POSSIBLE

- TO PROCESS DATA, PROGRAMS AND SUBSYSTEMS OF ALL SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS/CATEGORIES SIMULTANEOUSLY
- TO SERVE USERS WITH DIFFERENT SECURITY CLEARANCES SIMULTANEOUSLY
- TO UPDATE DATA ITEMS WITH DIFFERENT SECURITY CLASSIFI-CATIONS/CATEGORIES SIMULTANEOUSLY IF A CHANGE IN THE REAL WORLD HAS OCCURED.

This requires a system, which allows the simultaneous storgae and processing of data with different classifications/categories and the manipulation of these data from remote terminals by users having different security

CLEARANCES.

An operating mode like " dedicated processing" is not acceptable in EIFEL 2 for operational reasons.

(2) <u>Timeliness</u>

The value of a CCIS depends largely on the timeliness of the data it contains. In EIFEL 2 we have the philosophy of the "event-oriented" update. This means, that each time some status in the real world changes, there has to be an immediate update of the respective entry in the database.

BECAUSE SUCH A SITUATION CAN HAPPEN TO DIFFERENT DATA OF DIFFERENT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION/CATEGORIES SIMULTANEOUSLY, THERE AGAIN A MODE OF OPERATION LIKE "DEDICATED PROCESSING" IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.

(3) USER ACCEPTANCE

One of the key factors for the acceptance of the system by the user is the "Ease of use".

EASE OF USE FROM A SECURITY POINT OF VIEW REQUIRES THAT MECHANISMS WHICH ARE USED TO ENFORCE SECURITY MUST BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY, THAT THEY DO NOT OVERBURDEN THE USER. OTHERWISE THERE WILL BE THE DANGER, THAT THE SECURITY MECHANISMS WILL BE IGNORED OR CIRCUMVENTED. (EXAMPLE: A TOO SOPHISTICATED PASSWORD PROCEDURE).

THE ORGANIZATIONAL INCONVENIENCIES FOR THE USER SHOULD BE KEPT AT A MINIMUM. FOR EXAMPLE, IT SHOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO CLEAR USERS FOR OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS/CATEGORIES THAN THEY NEED FOR THEIR WORK.

THEREFORE A MODE OF OPERATION LIKE "SYSTEM HIGH" IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.

By the way, there are additional arguments against a "system high" mode of operation.

FIRST, THE COST TO CLEAR MORE PEOPLE FOR HIGHER SECURITY CLASSIFICATION THAN NECESSARY AND SECOND THE VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF "LEAST PRIVILEGE".

c) Experience with EIFEL 1 and DISTEL 1

When we started with the development of both systems as testsystems in the late sixties, ADP-security was not a primary design goal, nevertheless there are some security features - according to the then available state of the apt - which proofed to be very efficient, especially in the areas of identification, authentication and authorization, But the main experience we gained was not in the area of ADP-security but in the areas of personnel-, physical-, organizational- and communications security.

D) SECURITY AND PRIVACY REGULATIONS

Basis for most part of the security requirements, which will be discussed now, are the existing security regulations of the German Forces and the privacy law of the Federal Republic of Germany.

THE ADP-SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CAN BE ASSOCIATED TO TWO CATEGORIES.

- GENERAL REQUIREMENTS AND
- SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

FROM A USERS POINT OF VIEW, THERE ARE 5 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS,

WHICH WE THINK ARE ESSENTIAL WHEN TRYING TO PROTECT CLASSIFIED/CATEGORIZED INFORMATION:

- A CLEAR DEFINITION OF THE LEVELS OF PROTECTION

EIFEL 2 MUST BE CAPABLE TO PROTECT DATA-ITEMS,

DATA-FILES WHICH HAVE DIFFERENT SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS/

CATEGORIES WHEREBY ONE RECORD CAN CONTAIN DATA-ITEMS OF

DIFFERENT SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS.

THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS RANGE FROM "RESTRICTED" TO "COSMIC TOP SECRET", EXAMPLES OF CATEGORIES TO BE HANDELD IN EIFEL 2 ARE "NATO" OR "CRYPTO". THE FULL SCOPE OF CATEGORIES IS NOT YET FINALLY DETERMINED.

- A DEFINITION OF THE ACCESS RULES

THE BASIS FOR ACCESS PERMISSION IS THE ESTABLISHED NEED-TO-KNOW OF A USER OR HIS PRINCIPAL IN THE SYSTEM DERIVED FROM HIS OPERATIONA' TASKS.

A USER, A PROGRAM OR A SYSTEM RESOURCE SHALL BE GRANTED ACCESS ONLY TO THAT CLASSIFIED/CATEGORIZED INFORMATION FOR WHICH HE HAS AN ESTABLISHED NEED-TO-KNOW AND THE APPROPRIATE ACCESS AUTHORIZATION. THE DEFAULT SITUATION SHALL BE LACK OF ACCESS.

- ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LEAST PRIVILEGE
IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF EIFEL 2 AS WELL AS IN
THE ADP-SYSTEM, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEAST PRIVILEGE MUST BE
ADHERED TO. A USER, A PROGRAM OR A SYSTEM RESOURCE SHALL
BE GRANTED ONLY THE SMALLEST POSSIBLE SET OF PRIVILEGES
NECESSARY TO PERFORM ITS TASK.

- INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

To comply with our security regulations and to allow the detection of breaches of security, it is necessary to have mechanisms to trace the actions of the users in the system. This requires, that every user who is working with classified/categorized information must be made accountable for his actions in the system.

- CONTINUITY OF OPERATION OF THE SECURITY MECHANISMS

THE COMPONENTS OF THE SYSTEM, WHICH FULFILL SECURITY FUNCTIONS MUST BE SWITCHED ON CONTINUOUSLY, THEY MUST BE CAPABLE OF SURVIVING ATTACKS AGAINST THEM. THE SECURE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM AND ITS SECURITY MECHANISMS MUST BE DEMONSTRATED BY THE SYSTEM ITSELF BOTH AT REGULAR INTERVALS AND BY SPOT CHECKS.

Now, LET ME DESCRIBE OUR SPECIAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:

- CHANGE OF CLASSIFICATION/CATEGORY

SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS AND CATEGORIES ARE ASSIGNED TO DATA-ITEMS, DATA-RECORDS AND DATA-FILES WHEN THEY ARE FIRST BROUGHT INTO THE SYSTEM. IT IS REQUIRED, THAT ONLY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL CAN CHANGE OR DELETE THEM, THIS AT ANY TIME WITHOUT INTERRUPTING THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM. EVERY CHANGE OR DELETION MUST BE DOCUMENTED BY THE SYSTEM.

- MARKING OF STORAGE- AND OUTPUT MEDIA

- + STORAGE MEDIA MUST BE MARKED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY REGULATIONS, THE MARKING MUST BE ALSO READABLE BY THE SYSTEM;
- + LISTS, TABLES OR GRAPHIC DISPLAYS, WHICH ARE TO BE

PRINTED OUT BY THE SYSTEM, MUST BE MARKED AUTOMATICALLY BY THE SYSTEM. ADDITIONALLY, THE SYSTEM MUST ATTACH AN UNAMBIGUOUS REGISTRATION NUMBER TO EVERY PRINTOUT:

+ OUTPUTS ON DATA DISPLAY UNITS OR LARGE SCREEN DISPLAYS

MUST BE MARKED BY THE SYSTEM AUTOMATICALLY WITH THE

APPROPRIATE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION/CATEGORY.

- LOG-ON

PRIOR TO GET ACCESS TO THE SYSTEM AND TO THE CLASSIFIED/ CATEGORIZED INFORMATION, A USER MUST GO THROUGH THE FOLLOWING STEPS:

- + IDENTIFICATION
- + AUTHENTICATION
- + AUTORIZATION

There are some additional requirements, which characterize the LOG-ON FUNCTION:

- + THE NUMBER OF ATTEMPTS TO GET A LOG-ON FROM A TERMINAL MUST BE LIMITABLE IN NUMBER AND TIME. ATTEMPTS EXCEEDING THOSE PREDEFINED LIMITS MUST BE RECOGNIZED BY THE SYSTEM AND BROUGHT FORWARD TO A SECURITY OFFICER FOR FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS:
- + BEFORE A USER PUTS CLASSIFIED/CATEGORIZED INFORMATION
 INTO THE SYSTEM BY MEANS OF HIS TERMINAL AND THROUGH THE
 NETWORK, THE ADRESSED COMPUTER OR THE ADRESSED DATABASE
 M UST IDENTIFY ITSELF TO HIM;
- + AFTER A SUCCESSFUL START OF A DIALOGUE, THE SYSTEM IS
 REQUIRED TO CHECK THE USERS AUTHORIZATION FOR ACCESS IN
 INTERVALS WHERE TIME AND SEQUENCE OF THE CHECKS ARE NOT
 PREDETERMINABLE BY THE USER;

- STORAGE OF DATA AND PROGRAMS

THE SYSTEM MUST BE DESIGNED IN A WAY THAT IT HAS THE DEMONSTRABLE CAPABILITY OF ENSURING THAT

- + INFORMATION CLASSIFIED AS "COSMIC TOP SECRET" IS STORED SEPARATELY FROM INFORMATION OF OTHER CLASSIFICATION;
- + NO USER OR PROGRAM MAY COME INTO A POSITION TO GAIN UN-AUTHORIZED INSIGHT OF OR ACCESS TO ANOTHER USERS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND
- + NO USER OR PROGRAM MAY COME INTO A POSITION TO MANIPU-LATE THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OR PROGRAM OF ANOTHER USER.

Information and software, necessary for the implementation of security measures in the system must be stored in such a way that they can definitely not be read, changed or erased by others than those responsible for security matters.

- PROCESSING OF DATA

THE SYSTEM MUST ENSURE, THAT A NOT-PREDETERMINED MIX OF DATA OF ALL SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS/CATEGORIES CAN BE PROCESSED SIMULTANEOUSLY. TO PREVENT SECURITY VIOLATIONS IT MUST BE DEMONSTRATED THAT

- + THE SINGLE SECURITY PROPERTY AND
- + THE # PROPERTY

CAN BE GUARANTEED BY THE SYSTEM.

IF EXTRACTS FROM DATA-FILES ARE REQUIRED AND SUCH EXTRACTS
MAY RECEIVE A LOWER SECURITY CLASSIFICATION THAN THE ORIGINAL
DATA-FILE, SPECIAL SECURITY MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN TO DOWNGRADE THE DATA IN A TRUSTABLE MANNER.

- ADMINISTRATION OF DATA

THE SYSTEM MUST SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATION OF CLASSIFIED/ CATEGORIZED INFORMATION STORED, PROCESSED AND DISTRIBUTED IN THE SYSTEM BY LOGGING

- + ALL INPUTS
- + ALL STATES OF INTERNAL PROCESSING (ACCESSES, CHANGES ETC)
- + ALL OUTPUTS

- OUTPUT

PRIOR TO PASSING CLASSIFIED/CATEGORIZED INFORMATION TO AN OUTPUT UNIT, THE SYSTEM MUST

- + POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE USER AND THE OUTPUT UNIT IN-VOLVED
- + MAKE SURE THAT THE OUTPUT UNIT IS AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE THAT OUTPUT.

THE OUTPUT OF CLASSIFIED/CATEGORIZED INFORMATION TO UN-MANNED TERMINALS IS NOT PERMITTED.

- AUDITING AND SURVEILLANCE

- + ALL INFORMATION REQUIRED TO MONITOR SECURITY MUST BE DIS-PLAYED TO THE SECURITY OFFICER ON A SEPARATE TERMINAL;
- + THE SECURITY OFFICER MUST HAVE THE MECHANISMS TO
 - MONITOR THE ONGOING ACTIVITIES OF ALL TERMINALS
 - MONITOR THE ONGOING ACTIVITIES IN THE DATABASE
 - MONITOR THE HARDWARE;
- + THE SECURITY OFFICER MUST BE ABLE AT ANY TIME TO DENY USERS AND TERMINALS, EITHER SINGLY OR IN GROUPS, ACCESS TO THE SYSTEM AND TO THE DATA;
- + THE SYSTEM MUST HAVE THE MECHANISMS THAT USERS OR TER-MINALS, EITHER SINGLY OR IN GROUPS, CAN BE SWITCHED OFF

AT ANY TIME BY THE SECURITY OFFICER;

- + FOR AUDITING PURPOSES, THE FOLLOWING DATA SHOULD BE LOGGED:
 - EVERY ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED/CATEGORIZED INFORMATION,
 - EVERY MANIPULATION WITH SUCH INFORMATION,
 - EVERY LOG-ON OPERATION WHETHER SUCCESSFUL OR NOT,
 - EVERY LOG-OFF OPERATION,
 - EVERY CHANGE OF ACCESS PARAMETERS AND CLASSIFICATIONS/ CATEGORIES

- PROTECTION OF TECHNICAL COMPONENTS

- + THE SYSTEM MUST ENSURE, THAT NO USER IS ABLE WITHOUT AUTORIZATION, TO DENY OR INTERRUPT THE SERVICES TO ANOTHER USER;
- + THE SECURITY MECHANISMS OF THE SYSTEM SHOULD BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY CANNOT BE BROKEN OR CIRCUMVENTED EVEN IF A PENETRATOR KNOWS HOW THEY WORK;
- + THE SYSTEM MUST AUTOMATICALLY BREAK CONNECTION WITH A TERMINAL IF
 - THE TERMINAL IS SWITCHED OFF,
 - THE POWER SUPPLY OF THE TERMINAL BREAKS DOWN,
 - THE COMMUNICATION LINE BREAKS DOWN,
 - WHEN, AFTER A SUCCESSFUL LOG-ON, THE TERMINAL RESTS UNUSED FOR A PREDETERMINED TIMEPERIOD,
 - THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT GOES OUT OF OPERATION,
 - THE NUMBER OF UNSUCCESSFUL LOG-ONS FROM A TERMINAL EX-CEEDS A PREDETERMINED LIMIT,
- + IF NECESSARY, A PROCEDURE FOR TERMINATION OF THE DIALOGUE
 MUST ERASE ANY CLASSIFIED/CATEGORIZED INFORMATION THAT
 MAY BE AVAILABLE IN THE USER TERMINAL,
- + ALL DEVICES AND COMMUNICATION LINKS MUST BE DESIGNED

IN A WAY THAT THEY

- + DO NOT EMIT INFORMATION OF A COMPREHENSIBLE NATURE
- + ARE INSENSITIVE TO JAMMING.

Now let me finish the listing of ADP-security requirements and let me add some requirements from the communication security area.

- TRANSMISSION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION MUST BE EITER EN-CIPHERED OR - WHERE PERMISSABLE - THROUGH APPROVED CIRCUITS;
- THE FLOW OF INFORMATION OVER THE COMMUNICATION LINES MUST NOT ALLOW ANY INFERENCE ON THE TRUE NATURE OF THE TRAFFIC ON THE LINE:
- No classified information may appear in clear language in the switching centers;
- EVERYCOMPUTER IN THE SYSTEM MUST VERIFY THE AUTHORIZATION
 OF A USER ON ITS OWN INSTEAD OF RELYING ON THE VERIFICATION
 MADE BY ANOTHER COMPUTER.

4. CONCLUSION

I GAVE YOU A PRESENTATION OF THE ADP-SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR EIFEL 2. I MUST ADMIT, THAT THIS IS A RATHER PRETENTIOUS CATALOGUE OF REQUIREMENTS. WHEN WE DEVELOPED THIS CATALOGUE BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE CONCEPTUAL PHASE OF EIFEL 2, OUR MAIN GOAL WAS TO GIVE INDUSTRY A BASIS TO REALIZE MOST OF THE REQUIREMENTS THROUGH TECHNICAL MEASURES IN ORDER TO KEEP MEASURES IN THE AREAS OF PERSONNEL, INFRASTRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION LOW.

NOW AT THE END OF THE CONCEPTUAL PHASE HOWEVER, WE FIND THAT THERE ARE PROBLEMS IN THE TECHNICAL AREA WHICH WILL FORCE US THOSE REQUIREMENTS THROUGH PERSONNEL, PHYSICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL

MEASURES.

WE HOPE THAT A RISK-ASSESSMENT WE WILL START AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR WILL LEAD US TO A WELL BALANCED SECURITY CONCEPT FOR EIFEL 2 IN THE FIRST STAGE AND FOR THE STAGES TO FOLLOW.

THANK YOU.




German Air Force Information Systems Division

Stand:

EIFEL-2

ADP - SECURITY

REQUIREMENTS





UNCLASSIFIED

FUNCTIONS

- O COLLECTION, STORAGE, DISTRIBUTION AND DISPLAY OF STATUS INFORMATION
- O REPORTING SYSTEM FOR ALL GAF UNITS
- O DISTRIBUTION OF ORDERS AND MESSAGES
- O DECISION AIDS
- O COMMON DATABASE FOR ALL SUBSYSTEMS
- O PROCESSING CAPABILITIES FOR ALL SUBSYSTEMS
- O INTERFACE TO NATIONAL AND NATO SYSTEMS



UNCLASSIFIED

GAF CCIS

Stand:

BASIC SYSTEM

o EIFEL

SUPPORTS THE COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS IN THE GAF BY PROVIDING BASIC DATAPROCESSING FUNCTIONS AND DATA IN ALL PHASES TO USERS AND SUBSYSTEMS

SUBSYSTEMS

o DISTEL

SUPPORTS THE MISSION PLANNING PHASE FOR OFFENSIVE
ARR - FORCES BY PROVIDING SPECIAL APPLICATION FUNCTIONS

o SYLT

SUPPORTS THE MISSION PLANNING PHASE FOR TACTICAL AIR-LIFT FORCES BY PROVIDING SPECIAL APPLICATION FUNCTIONS

SUSYLOG

SUPPORTS THE MISSION PLANNING PHASE FOR LOGISTIC FORCES BY PROVIDING SPECIAL APPLICATION FUNCTIONS



ARCHITECTURAL CHARACTERISTICS


UNCLASSIFIED

Stand:

DECENTRALIZED PROCESSING

DISTRIBUTED DATABASE

PACKET SWITCHED NETWORK





SECURITY DEFINITION


UNCLASSIFIED

Stand:

SECURITY IS THAT CONDITION WHICH

- O GUARANTEES THE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
 IN EIFEL 2
- O EXCLUDES ANY INJURY TO EIFEL 2 BY ELEMENTS ENDANGERING

 ITS SECURITY





BASIS FOR ADP-SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED

- O POTENTIAL THREATS
- O OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
- O EXPERIENCE EIFEL 1 / DISTEL 1
- O SECURITY / PRIVACY REGULATIONS



UNCLASSIFIED

Stand:

THREAT EXAMPLES

- O THEFT
- O FORGING OF DATA
 - O ERASURE OF DATA
 - O UNAUTHORIZED USE OF SYSTEM RESOURCES
- O INTERCEPTION OF RADIATION
- O TAPPING OF COMMUNICATION LINES
- O CROSSTALK / MISROUTING
- O JAMMING



OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED

- O AVAILABILITY
- O SURVIVABILITY
- O AUTONOMOUS MODE OF OPERATION
- O TIMELINESS
- O SECURITY
- 0 FLEXIBILITY
- O MOBILITY
- O USER ACCEPTANCE



SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED

- O CHANGE OF CLASSIFICATION/CATEGORY
- D MARKING OF STORAGE- AND OUTPUT-MEDIA
- O LOG ON
- O STORAGE OF DATA AND PROGRAMS
- O PROCESSING OF DATA
- O ADMINISTRATION OF DATA
- O OUTPUT
- O AUDITING AND SURVEILLANCE
- O PROTECTION OF TECHNICAL COMPONENTS



UNCLASSIFIED

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

- O LEVELS OF PROTECTION
- O CONTROLLED ACCESS
- O LEAST PRIVILEGE
- O INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY
- O CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

Security Requirements, Design, and the Use of Trusted Software in a High Integrity Commercial Network

Dr. Thomas A. Berson SYTEK, Inc. Sunnyvale, CA

SYTEK EXPERIENCE WITH TRUSTED SYSTEMS

- MITRE Kernel I, II
- MULTICS, GUARDIAN
- SCOMP
- . SATIN IV, SACDIN
- KSOS
- PSOS
- TACEXEC
- · Other special programs

NETWORK CHARACTERIZATION

- · Commercial, value added
- TDM, TDMA channels
- Packet switched

SECURITY MOTIVATION

- 1. Network self protection
- 2. Subscriber data protection
- 3. Government regulations (e.g. NSC-24)

SECURITY POLICY

"The network shall not misdeliver messages"

VULNERABILITIES & COUNTERMEASURES

- Design and implementation errors

 Trusted software—isolation and construction
- Active and passive channel tapping Link encryption
- Alteration of network environment Physical and personnel security
- Theft of network services
 Access control—authentication and authorization

TECHNIQUES FOR INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN SOFTWARE


ABCDEF Personnel integrity CDEF Configuration control DEF Formal statement of reliability criteria **BCDEF** Careful hierarchical design Formal mathematical specification of design Peer and management inspection of design CDEF Proof that design conforms to desired criteria Choice of appropriate programming language **BCDEF** Careful implementation of (proven) design BCDEF CDEF Peer and management review of implementation Proof that implementation conforms to (proven) design BCDEF Testing of system CDEF Controlled maintenance

CONCLUSION

- 1. Trusted software techniques can contribute to contemporary system design and construction.
- 2. More data is needed on the costs and benefits of trusted software techniques.

CURRENT STATUS OF COMPUTER SECURITY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY AND RESULTS OF AN EVALUATION OF SPECIAL, KSOS, AND PSOS

Dr. Hans vor der Brück
Industrieanlagen- Betriebsgesellschaft mbH (IABG)
Ottobrunn b. Munich



Current status of the security research and development in the Federal Republic of Germany

Requirements:

- Requirements of the German Air Force
- Requirements by the german privacy act
 - * Secure Identification
 - * Secure Authorisation
 - * Unforgeable Access Control
 - * Secure Protocol Functions
 - * Secure Data Transmission

Current projects

Universities:

Karlsruhe:

- Investigations on abstract

models

Implementation of a System without formal Specifications, but with Security as a main

design goal

Berlin:

 Formal Specifications of the protocols of the ISO Reference Model (Extension of Special)

- Two other groups are working on Specification Languages

Stuttgart:

- EPOS: A Specification and Design

Technique for Real-time automation

systems

Current projects

SIEMENS

Decision to build an operating system with security as one of its basic design issues.

The concept phase has started

Nothing is known about the underlying philosophy

IABG

- Since 1976 investigations in the area of computer security
- Lecturing problem awareness
- Penetrations of EDP-Systems
- Evaluation of security and audit software packages
- Monitoring status, progress and trends of computer security
- Technical advice in computer and communications security technology
- Development of requirements for the hardware and the software structure
- Proposals for the security concept of EIFEL II
- Investigations of Special and the Specifications of KSOS and PSOS

SPEC IAL

Advantages:

- Formal specifications are an important step to provable secure systems
- A Special specification is relatively easy to convert into a program
- Special is relatively easy to learn
- Nonprocedural specification
- Strong typing

SPECIAL

Desirable Modifications and Improvements

- Clear definition of the relationship between the exceptions and effects
- Possibility to change V-functions only in the module in which they are defined
- Possibility of an exceptions-paragraph in hidden functions
- Expressions for the definition of sequencing and time conditions
- Hidden O- and OV-functions

Some results of the KSOS and PSOS investigations

The aim of the investigations was:

To get some experience with Special specifications and the power of the tools.

Results:

a) Formal mistakes, which had to be found by the described tools:

- PSOS

- * Hidden functions are referenced in other than their defining moduls
- * The Exceptions-part of V-, O- and OVfunctions is frequently omitted
- * There are inconsistencies between the interface definitions and the references made from modules of a higher level to functions of a lower level

Formal mistakes, which had to be found by the described tools:

KS0S

- * There are inconsistencies between the EXTERNALREFS paragraph of the module KER and the modules in which the types and functions are defined.
- * The EXCEPTIONS part of V-, O- and OVfunctions is often omitted
- * Hidden V-functions are referenced in other than the defining module
- * Variables of different types were equated or functions are called with parameters of the wrong type

Mistakes in the specifications, which couldn't be found by the tools:

- PSOS:

- * In some functions the examination of the exception conditions is incomplete
- * At creation time the user gets a wrong security level
- Loop indices are wrong at many places.
 At least one of these mistakes is critical to security
- * Functions are called with wrong parameters

Mistakes in the specifications, which couldn't be found by the tools:

- KSOS:

- * Inconsistencies between the verbal and the formal specifications
- * The function for the examination of the security rules is wrong
- * Sometimes functions are called with wrong parameters
- * Some important examinations of exception conditions are omitted

Our conclusions:

- * Formal specifications should be used for the development of secure operating systems
- * Special with some changes seems to be a proper tool
- * The tools for Special have to be improved
- * A formal specification with tools for the checking of the syntactical and some semantical properties does not guarantee a correct specification
- * Until more advanced and sophisticated tools become available, we have more confidence in systems based on a security kernel than in systems like PSOS

The Trusted Computing Base

P. S. TASKER
THE MITTE CORPORATION

Plan of Talk

TCBs and operating systems
Defining the protection policy
Developing TCB software
TCB function & structure
Evaluation Implications

How Does a TCB Relate to an Operating System?


Operating system basis


Supervisory and control services


Extended machine

Protection environment


Policy Mechanism







Computer System Organization in Terms of a TCB



Hardware Support

Memory protection

Virtual memory

Tagged memory

Process control

1:0

Privileged states/domains

Three-Domain System

USER S	OFTWARE	OS UTILITIES	TCB UTILITIES	USER Domain
OS SOFTWAR	RE NOT PROTECTI	ON-RELATED		SUPERVISOR DOMAIN
1	ТСВ			KERNEL DOMAIN
	HARDWAR	NE.	1	

Plan of Talk

TCBs and operating systems

Defining the protection policy Distinguishing features

Models

TCB function & structure

Evaluation implications

Protection Policy Elements

Subjects

User

Process

Objects

Physical/logical disk

Directory

File

Segment Page

Record/field

Access rules

Denial of service

Security


Integrity

Security Policy

Protection against unauthorized disclosure

Second-order concern:

Confinement channels



Confinement Problems

Untrusted program invoked to serve you (e.g., editor)

Direct

- 0. Collect data for its owner (if it has memory)
- 1. Copy information into file in owner's directory
- 2. Create temporary file granting owner access
- 3. Send message to owner
- 4. Encode information in owner's copy of bill to customer

Indirect ("Covert")

- 5. Use interlocks on files shared with owner to
 - pass encoded information
- 6. Broadcast encoded information by varying

 A. Shared system control variables
 - B. Shared resources (CPU use, paging)

Integrity Policy

Protection against unauthorized modification

Directly related to security


Policy Enforcement Strategy

Focus on security policy


Access control - protects containers

Flow control - protects contents of the containers


Access Control Model - Access Matrix



Example of a Set Theoretical Flow



Example of a Linear X Set Lattice - Military Policy



Flow Control Model -**Security Model**

Subjects and objects are assigned security levels - SL()

Axioms:

Simple security condition: A subject can read an object iff SL(subject) . SL(object)

A subject can write an object iff SL(object) SL(subject) * - Property:

Activity:


Only objects that are active can be accessed.

Tranquility:

The SL of active objects cannot change. Erasure: When an object becomes inactive

its contents must be erased.

Model Implications: Trojan Horse



Plan of Talk

TCBs and Operating Systems

Defining the protection policy

TCB function & structure

Evaluation implications

TCB Functions

Establish a secure state

Control state transitions

Bind secure system to external environment

Establish a Secure State

Program Loaders

Initialization

Control State Transitions

Processes

Create/delete

Swap

Send/receive IPC message

Get set status

Storage

Create, delete

Grant/revoke ownership/access

Read write data

Get set status

1.0

Create/delete

Grant revoke ownership access

Read, write device

Get set status

Bind Secure System to External Environment

Operations interface

Device configuration control

Extension of policy

Facility dependent services

User space definition

Secure user interface

Preservation of secure state across discontinuities

Properties Of Trusted Software

May enforce a protection policy


May deliberately, selectively override policy implemented by other trusted software

May perform functions that could indirectly enable a policy to be violated

Kernelized System

PROCESS BOUNDARY OS TRUSTED UTILITIES PROCESSES USER SOFTWARE OS SVC OS SOFTWARE NOT PROTECTION-RELATED KERNEL SVC KERNEL HARDWARE

Formal Specification in Software **Development**



Summary

TCBs and operating systems

Provides a verifiable protection base for an operating system

Defining a protection policy

Acts according to a precisely stated protection policy

TCB functions & structure

Carries out certain relevant operating system functions

Designed in methodical steps

May be organized as a kernel and other trusted software

Evaluation Implications

TCB Specification:

Generic mechanism

description requirements

Evaluation Criteria:

Policy options


Mechanism features

Construction environment (assurance)


Levels of TCB Protection

- 0. No protection
- 1. Limited controlled sharing
- 2. Extensive mandatory sharing
- 3. Structured protection mechanism
- 4. Design correspondence
- 5. implementation correspondence
- ò. Object code analysis

Documents Provide Focus



- Proposal
- Source selection
- G.P. product development consistent assessment



The Trusted Computing Base

G. H. Nibaldi

The MITRE Corporation

Reference Monitor Concept

SUBJECT — REFERENCE — OBJECT MONITOR — O

GOALS: COMPLETENESS ISOLATION VERIFIABILITY

Plan of Talk

TCBs and operating systems
Defining the protection policy
Developing the TCB software

Computer System Organization

PROCESS GOURDARY . HUMAN
EDITOR COMPILER USER OTHER MTERPACE
APPLICATION UTILITIES SVC.
HYERFACE
OPERATING SYSTEM

MARDWARE MTERPACE

How Does a TCB Relate to an Operating System?

Operating system basis
Supervisory and control services
Extended machine
Protection environment
Policy
Machanism

Computer System Organization in Terms of a TCB

	PROCESS SOUNDARY		_	- HUMAN
	USER SOFTWARE	OS UTILITIES	TCB UTILITIES	NYERFACE
05 8	SOFTWARE NOT PROTECTION	HAELATED	4444-	OS SYC INTERPACE
F	rce		-	TCS SVC INTERFACE
	HARDWARE			
	SCOPE OF PUNCTION EXCLUDES NON-ESI COMPONENTS HARDWARE AND SC	BENTIAL S		

Hardware Support

Mamon, aresection

Virtual memory

Tagged memory

Process control

I/O

Privileged states/domains

Protection Policy Elements

Subject

User

Process

Xbjects .

Directe

Secretar

Page

. .

Desired of source

Security

Three-Domain System

USER SOFTWARE	OS UTILITIES	TCB UTILITIES	USER DOMAIN
OS SOFTWARE NOT PROTEC	TION RELATED		SUPERVISOI DOMAIN
TCS			KERNEL

Denial of Service Policy

Protection against unauthorized disruption of service due to:

Delav

Crash

Consumption of resources

Maguerading Informatic

Masquerading services

Plan of Talk

TCBs and operating systems
Defining the protection policy
Distinguishing features
Models
Developing the TCB software

Security Policy

Protection against unauthorized disclosure

Second-order concern: Confinement channels Confinement

Direct channels

Access Control Model - Access Matrix

			CB	JECIS	
*		0,	02	ο,	ON
Ŭ	8,		X	X	
	82	X	X	~	_
E C T	53	x	x	×	-
T 8	•	ļ			
•	:				
	SM	-	×		-

Integrity Policy

Directly related to security


Flow Control Model - Lattice Model




Policy Enforcement Strategy

Flow control - protects contents of the containers

Example of a Set Theoretical Flow



Example of a Linear X Set Lattice - Military Policy



TCB Functions

Establish a secure state

Control state transitions

Bind secure system to external enviro

Flow Control Model -Security Model

Subjects and objects are assigned security levels — SL()

Simple security condition:

• - Property:

A subject can read an object iff SL(subject) SL(object) A subject can write an object iff SL(object) SL(subject) Only objects that are active can be accessed.

The SL of active objects cannot change.

Activity:

Tranquility: Erasure:

When an object becomes inactive its contents must be erased.

Establish a Secure State

Plan of Talk

TCBs and Operating Systems

Defining the protection policy

Developing the TCB software

Functions Design Methodology

Control State Transitions

Processes

Crease delese

Swap
Send/receive IPC message

Get/set status

Storage

Crease delete

Grant revoke ownership/access

Get-set status

10

Create delete

Grant revoke ow

The second second

Read write device Get set status

Bind Secure System to External Environment

Device configuration control Expansion of policy

User space definition

Secure user interface

A STATE OF THE STA

THE RESERVE

Kernelized System PROCESS BOUNDARY PROCESS SOUNDARY OL TRUSTED USER SOFTWARE OS SVC MITERFACE KERMEL

Properties Of Trusted Software

May enforce a protection policy

May deliberately, selectively violate policy implemented by other trusted software

May perform functions that could indirectly enable a policy to be violated

Formal Verification of Trusted Software CORRESPONDENCE PROOF CHAIN POLICY (MODEL) DESIGN VERIFICATION DESIGN (SPECIFICATION) CODE VERIFICATION MPLEMENTATION (SOURCE CODE)


MACHINE (OBJECT CODE)

OBJECT CODE AND

Trusted Software Organization: Security Kernel Approach

Includes a kernel and other trusted software

Remot acts as a primitive OS



Summary

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Provides a verifiable protection base for an operating system

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Developing TCB software

Carries out certain refevant operating system functions.

Designed in methodical steps.

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TCB Design Lectures

Software interface function

Human interface functions

Software Interface Functions

John P. L. Woodward

The MITRE Corporation

TCB Software Interface Functions

TLS, verification, and types of channels

Major functional areas

General Design Constraints

The state of the s

General Purpose Timesharing OS

At least one per user Some have extraordinary

Directory organization Disk resident

I/O devices

Terminals

Line printers

General Purpose Timesharing OS

Lattice model applied to subjects and obj Subjects Objects Objects Users Files (directories, a Processes I/O devices Processes

General Purpose Timesharing OS


A subject can read an object iff SL(subject) > SL(object)

A subject can write an object iff SL(object) 2 SL(subject)

Activity Only objects that are active (that exist) can be accessed.

The SL of active objects cannot change

When an object becomes inactive (is delete contents must be erased



Non-Procedural Specs

O-function exchange (A. B

Hects

'A • 8

B . A

Information Flow Security Verification

- 1. Identify objects and "assign" security levels
- 2. Identify information flow and generate condition tables
- 3. Generate security inequalities (LEMMAS)
- 4. Prove that LEMMAS are satisfied

Flow Table for IPC-Send

True Parameters IPC-MSG(raceher) SL(sender) SL(receher)	Condition	Flow From	Flow To
	True		IPC-MSG(receiver) SL(receiver)
mmes:	mmes:		

Example Top Level Specification

O-Function IPC-Send(receiver, msg) [sender Effects IPC-MSG(receiver) = msg

Object	Security Level
Parameters IPC-MSG(receiver)	SL(sender) SL(receiver)

Secure IPC-Send Specification

O-Function IPC-Send(receiver, mag)[sender]

-SL(ender) - SL(receiver)

'IPC-MSG(receiver) = meg

Object	Security Level
Parameters	SL(sender)
IPC-MSG(receiver)	SL(receiver)
Exception-Status	SL(sender)
SL(sender)	Low

New IPC-Send Specification

O-Function IPC-Sendtreceiver, magijsender]
Exceptions
- SLicender) - SLireceiver)
- IPC-MSG(receiver) = NULL
Effects
- 'IPC-MSG(receiver) = mag

Object Security Level

Parameters SL(sender)

IPC-MSG(receiver) SL(sender)

Exception-Status SL(sender)

SL(sender) Low

SL(receiver) Low

NULL Low

Flow Table for Secure IPC-Send

Condition	Flow From	Flow To
SL(sender) 'SL(receiver)	Parameters SL(sender)	Exception-Status SL(sender)
	SL(sender)	1
	Low SL(receiver)	1

Lemmas: SL(sender) · SL(sender) Low · SL(sender)

Flow Table for Secure IPC-Send

Condition	Flow From	Flow to
SL(sender) · SL (receiver)	Parameters SL(sender) SL(sender) Low SL(receiver) Low	Exception-Status SL/sender) IPC-MSG(receiver SL(receiver)

Lemmas:
SL(sender): SL(sender)
SL(sender): SL(receiver)
Low SL(sender)
Low SL(sender)

Flow Table for New IPC-Send

Condition	Flow From	Flow To
SL(sender) SL(receiver) and IPC-MSG(receiver) a NULL	Parameters SLisender) SLisender) Low SLireceiver) Low NULL Low	Exception-Status SL(sender)
	IPC-MSG(receiver)	
emmas	SLireceiver)	
SL(sender) SL(sender)		
Low SL(sender)		

Solutions to IPC-Send Insecurity

Allow sending messages only to processes at the same level Build 2nd exception into an IF statement in EFFECTS:

O-Function IPC-Sendtreceiver, megi[sender]
Exceptions

~ SL(sender)

SL(sender)

~ SLisender) ± SLirecenver)

if IPC-MSG (receiver) =NULL then IPC-MSG (receiver)

. mag
Block caller until mag can be sent

Acknowledge channel
Delay before returning and audit

Major Functional Areas

Process managemen

File management

Device management

Miscellaneous functions

Trusted OS Developments

MITRE brassboard 11:45 kernel

MITRE/Honeywell secure MULTICS (Project Guardian)

UCLA data secure UNIX prototype

MITRE Secure UNIX prototype

SDC KVM-370

FACC KSOS 11

Honeywell KSOS/6 (SCOMP)

Typical TCB Domain Architecture

UNTRUSTED PROCESSES PROCESSES
USER PROGRAM
DOM/IN
DO SEMULATOR
DOMAIN
KERNEL
DOMAIN
HARDWARE

Basic TCB Architecture Options

Internally multiprogrammed kernel

Internally multiprogrammed kernel and

Non-interruptible kernel and trusted processes

Major Functional Areas

Process management

File management

Device management

Miscellaneous functions

Process Management

Creates the abstraction of processes

Supports the object type: process

Types of processes Unprivileged Privileged

Types of operations on processes
Process creation deletion status
Process virtual memory management
Process switching scheduling
Inter-process communication (IPC)

Process Privilege

Example

Violate security model rules Call certain TCB functions Change certain object attributes Set time-of-day clock Grant and revoke privileges

Principle of least privilege

Privilege = > trust = - verification

Process Management

Process creation / deletion / etatus
Process-create (context, privileges, level) - process-name

Procese-delete (procese-name) Process-set-attributes (process-name, privileges, level, other)

Process-get-attributes (process-name) - (privileges, level, other)

Process virtual memory management

Process switching scheduling

Inter-process communication (IPC)

Process Attributes

Level

Others: Timer, etc

Process-Create: Initial Context, Privileges, Level

Context	Privileges	Level
Same as creator	Subset of creator	Creator
Arbitrary, specified by creator	Subset of creator	Creator
Established: chosen by creator	Any (securely) associated with established context	Creator

Process-Create: **Example Specification**

O-Function process-create(context, privileges, level)(caller) - process-nat

Exceptions
-level 'PT(caller) level
-privileges 'PT(caller) privileges
#-of-processes = max-#-of-processes

Effect
For some & such that 'PT(x).exists = false

'process-name = x 'PT(x).exists = TRUE 'PT(x).level = level

PT(x).privileges u privileges

PT(x).context = context

"-of-processes = "-of-processes - I

The Name Space Problem

SECRET SECRET NAME: 3

UNCLASS UNCLASS NAME: 2 CREATES NAME: 4

Kernel Vs. TP Tradeoffs

Option 1 Support fixed *
Process Bodies Option 2 Handles Create
Delete w / Fixed
Maximum # Process N A

Process Management

Process creation deletion status

Process virtual memory management Sogment-create (level, size, type) - segment-name Sogment-deleta (sogment-name)
Sogment-set-attributes (sogment-name, level, pize, type) Segment-get-attributes (segment-name) — { level, else, type} Segment-map (segment-name, address, mode) Segment-anmap (address)

Process switching scheduling

Inter-process communication (IPC)

Process Management

Process creation/deletion/status

Process virtual memory management

Process switching/scheduling When to switch Who to switch to Mechanics of switching

Inter-process communication (IPC)

Segments

Process address space pieces

Fixed or variable sized

Attributes

Level

Size
Type: sharable, locked, wired

Kernel Vs. TP Options

π. Kernel Determines X, cali: ernei Option1 Supports "switch to process X" function Support complex Algorithm
Option 2 to determine who Option 2 to determine who to watch to Supports simple scheduling Petinon ally sets parameters (e.g. Advisory priorities)

Segments: Implementation Issues

Swapping versus paging

Memory swapping device management

Variable versus fixed sized memory allocation Swapping process as a unit: precludes sharing invisible page fault handling Page migration

Process Management

Process creation/deletion status

Process virtual memory n snagement

Process switching/schedulin-

nter-process communication (IPC) Mesonge vine Speed of communication Security lesses

Inter-Process Communication Functions

Message functions IPC-Send(process, msg) | Send message to another process | PPC-Receive() = | PPC-Wall | Mark for a message | Walt for

Software interrupt function (IPC-Interrupt(channel)

Software interrupt functions IPC-Interruptichannel' |
IPC-Allow(channel) |
IPC-Receive(channel) |
IPC-Receive(channel) |
Sharing portions of virtual memory among processes |
Segment interions - set up shared memory |
Above functions - supchronization

Major Functional Areas

Process management

Device management

File Management

OS goal: directories of files

Security policy options


TCB Goal: protect info in files

TCB versus non-TCB options

Kernel versus TP options

Example functions

Directories of Files



File Management

ecurity policy options Granularity of protec

Physical/logical dish

Directory

File

Places of files

Records / fields

TCB goal: protect info in files TCB versus non-TCB options

Kernel versus TP options

File Management

Security policy options

TCB versus non-TCB options

Kernel versus TP options

Example functions

File Management

OS goal: directories of files

Security policy options

TCB goal: protect info in files

TCB versus sou-TCB options

Kernel versus TP options

Example functions

Files in TCB: Kernel Vs. TP Options

Option 1

ĺ

Support protected N/A flat file system

Support unprote

ed Support prote dat file system

TP

TCB Vs. Non-TCB Options

	Inside TCB	Outside ICB
Option 1	Support protected directories of files: caller specifies pathname to access	N/A
	files	
Option 2	Support protected flat file system; caller specifies filename to access	Support directories
Option 3	Support protected pieces of files:	Support files and directories

File Management

OS goal: directories of files

Security policy options

TCB ye. non-TCB options

Kernel vs. TP options

Example functions

File-create (level) - Rie-same

File-rand (file-descriptor, addr. amount) -- data File-write (file-descriptor, addr. amount, data)

File-write (file-descriptor, addr, amount, deta)
File-set-attributes (file-descriptor, level, times)

File-get-attributes (file-descriptor) - ; level, times

File Management

OS goal: directories of files

jecurity policy options

TCB goal: protect info in files

TCB versus non-TCB options

Kernel versus TP options

vamnie functions

File Attributes

Name

_.

Times: last read; last modified

File-Open: Example Specification

O-Function file-open (file-name, mode)[caller] -- file-descriptor

Exceptions F1(file-name), exists w false $(F1(file-name), exists w false (F1(file-name), level <math>\le F1(faller), evel$) and read $\le mode - (PT(caller), level <math>\le F1(file-name), evel)$ and write $\le mode$

Effects
(Assign new file descriptor that associates the given file with the requested access mode)

Role of TCB in I/O

lf hardware provides...

The TCB must...

Non-DMA

No I 'O access control

DMA Interpret all I/O

Access control to devices

Interpret all I/O Interpret all I/O

Setup initial binding between process and device

Access control to devices and control of device's access to memory

Setup initial binding between process and device

Major Functional Areas

Device management

Miscellaneous functions

Device Management

Kernel vs. TP vs. Untrusted software opti

Example functions

Specific 1.0 device issues

Device Management

Kernel versus TP versus untrusted software options

Example functions

Specific 1/O device issues

Kernel Vs. TP Vs. Untrusted **Software Options**

	Kernel	TP	Untrusted Process
Option 1	Starts I. O; Interrupts TP when done	Contains bulk of Driver Logic; uses Kernel to do 1. O	N-A
Option 2	Contains bulk of driver logic: fields interrupts	N/A	N·A
Option 3	Binds device to Process, reflects interrupts to process	N A	Contains bulk of driver logic; does I 'O directly with no Kernel interpretation

Device Management

Kernel versus TP versus untri

Example functions
IO-read (device, amount) — data
IO-write (device, amount, data)
IO-function (device, function, data
IO-set-attributes (device) — level
IO-set-attributes (device) — leve

Or trant devices as files Specific I/O device issues

Device Management

Kernel versus TP versus untrusted software options

Example functions

Specific 1/O device issues Disk Tape Terminal Line printer

Tape I/O

Drive level changing

Drive assignment

TCB support straightforward

Terminal I/O

Terminal level changing

Terminal assignment

Trusted path
Trusted communication: human — trusted software
Untrusted software: no access
Human request via special key on terminal

Line Printer 1/0

Security requirements:
1. Files - printer
2. Level of files unspoolably marked

Major Functional Areas

Miscellaneous funct Clock/timer I/O Auditing

Miscellaneous Functions

Clock/timer I/O
Not necessarily security relevant
Virtualized by TCS as I/O devices
Provided as part of process status
Separate TCS calls

Auditing

Miscellaneous Functions

Clock/timer 1/O

Auditing

TCB records certain events
Logins/logouts
Confinement violations
Accesses that fail
Other security-critical events

Problem: how record with least mechanism

Solution: audit notification -- special process

TCB Software Interface Functions

General design constraints
Context: General purpose timesharing OS
TLS, verification, and types of channels
Major functional areas

Process management File management

Device Management

Miscellaneous functions

Review of Major Issues

Principle of least privilege

Association between context and privilege

Argument validation

Object names

Exception return channels

Resource exhaustion: quotas

Human Interface Functions

G. H. Nibaldi

The MITRE Corporation

TCB Organization

OS TCB UTILITIES UTILITIES

OS SOFTWARE NOT PROTECTION RELATED

TCB SVC INTERPACE

HARDWARE

TCB Functionality

Establishos a socure state

Controls state transitions

Binds secure system to external environment

Human Interface Functions

User services

Change user protection
Change object protection

yatam escurity administration

User control
Process privilege control

Process privilege control

lystom operations

Startup

To system maintenance

File system consistency checking/repair Backup/restore

Human Interface Functions

User Services
Login Logout
Change user protection
Change object protection

System Security Administration


System Operations

System Maintenance

Login

House to and proper area to be a made

Spriems
After defaults for \$1000 information
Authorite door method
Descent of over solerth com-



hange the prot	ection attributes o	f an object	
FORM	FUNCTION	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
Kernel	Change	Efficiency	Complexity
Untrusted Process	Upgrade	Verification	Very restrictive Violates integrity
тр	Change	Flexibility	Privilege to change stat May require viewing Synchronization

Unbind i	users and processes		•
FORM	FUNCTION	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
Kernel	Stop processes Remove access to try	Efficiency	Complexity
TP	Stop processes Remove access to tty	Flexibility	Needs process ids Must be able to kill processes Must change owner of thy

Human Interface Functions
User Services
System Security Administration User control Process privilege control
System Operations
System Maintenance

Change	the security level	of a user	
FORM	FUNCTION	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
Kernel	Change user to new level	Efficiency	Complexity
TP	Change user to new level	Flexibility	Needs access to nuthentication data Needs privilege to chang attributes Tranquility

uthorize #	ystem users		
FORM	FUNCTION	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
Kernel	Users specified at load time	Efficiency	Data base created off-line
TP	User control editor	Flexibility	Complexity of an editor Access to data base
Untrusted process	User control editor	Verification	Requires confirmation Needs access to data base

Process Privilege Control

Associate process privileges with programs

FORM	FUNCTION	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
Kernel	Fix privileges at load time	Simplicity	Lacks flexibility
TP	Privilege control editor	Flexibility	Flexibility Needs privilege to set privileges Must access control data
Untrusted process	Privilege control editor	Verification	Requires confirmation Must access control data

Human Interface Functions

System Security Administration

em Operations Startup Shutdown

System Maintenance

Startup

Establish the initial secure state for TCB

FORM	FUNCTION	ADVANTAGE 5	DISADVANTAGES
Boot	Intrialize TCB	Efficiency	Complexity
Stand-alone Program	Initialize TCB	Simplicity	
Kernel	Initialize	Efficiency	Complexity

Shutdown

FORM	FUNCTION	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
Kernel	Stop processes Sync filesystem	Efficiency	Complexity
TP	Stop processes Sync filesystem	Flexibility	Needs process ids Needs privilege to sync filesystems

Options
May preserve checkpoint data

Human Interface Functions

System Operations

System Maintenance File System Consistency Checking / Repair Backup / Restore

File System Consistency Checking/Repair

Enable checkout and repair of ailing filesystems

FORM	FUNCTION	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
Stand-alone	Check Repair	Dedicated machine No sync problems	Dedicated machine Separate drivers Separate interface
Kernel	Check Repair	Efficiency	Complexity
ΤP	Check Repair	Kernell O	Needs kernel object for filesystem
2 TP+	Check Repair	Flexibility and simplicity	Same as above

Backup/Restore

| State | Company | Compan 2 TPs Backup Sample us Restore

Human Interface Functions

User services
Login logout
Change user protection
Change object protection
System security administr
User control
Process privilege control

File system maintenance
File system consistency checking repair
Backup restore

KSOS: AN EXAMPLE OF A TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE

THE R. P. McCauses

Evri Necuspace & Comministrations Completion

KSOS DESIGN CHOICES

Sie fest bereiten & Companyon

KSOS STATUS

- Primitive kernel operational
- Skeletal emulator running on simulated kernel
- Support NKSR operational

The state of the s

- New kernel and NKSH formal spec
- Advanced concepts in festing.

You have required

KSOS DESIGN CHOICES

- 4 Larger more monolithic Kernel
- Swapping vs. Demand Paging
- Secure Path, Secure Server
- Type Extension
- Protection Domain Modification
- Network Interface Architecture
- Auditing

TOPICS

- KSOS Design Choices
- KSOS Security Assurance
- Insights into TCB Design and Implementation
- Hindsight

Mag beragen bit unter

KSOS Kernel Objects

Processes

Pro

Portions of virtual memor of a princess

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Linear array of data block

Devices

Special type of Me

Subtypes

Encapsulation Inc

And Person Assessment & Comparation Comparation

Kernel Objects

A Name (Secure Entity (Swritter "SEID".)

Security classification (e.g. TOP SECRET)

Security compertment set (e.g. NOFORN, caveats)

Integrity classification

integrity compartment set (now always null)

Discretionary access information

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KSOS Kernel Process

- May be privileged. K_invoke. K_spawn.
- K_fort 'cloning'
- Inter Process Communication

messages shared segments

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KSOS Kernel Files and Devices

- e "Flat" name spece
- e Linear Array of data blocks
- Single Ne up to 300 Mbytes (8007 12007)
- e Mountable volumes fully protected

Sir feet Amagasa & Communication Communication

SWAPPING VS DEMAND PAGING

- PDP 11 Memory 55 or agement Unit Limitations
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 Most programs are very small, working set is all of their pages.

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KSOS Kernel Process Segments

- Clenitezyous with shared segments by names
- a Options for system designer


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KSOS Secure Terminal Interface

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



PROTECTION DOMAIN MODIFICATION


- Fortusted process issues & invoke or & spawn Kernel car:
- Rendezvous with trusted intermediars code segment, privileges set from those of this segment.
- Control transferred to intermediary segment.
- Intermediars program afters protection environment initializes segments
 Sets security level, privileges, etc.
- Control transferred to fixed location in aftered) environment.

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


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
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SCHEMA FOR CONSTRUCTION OF PROVABLE SYSTEMS



INSIGHTS INTO TCB DESIGN

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INSIGHTS INTO TCB DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

- If can be done?
- Need for consistency between different languages: care in their use
- Utility and benefits of formal specifications
- Code proofs are not yet practical except for demonstrations. However, being ready to do them is of great benefit.
- Need for additional tools and concepts

Six foregraphical constitutions

WHAT TO ASK FOR

- Verification plan (P+O system security plan?)
- Suples of Alispec
 Incorporate matternatical models
 Desirate minimum implementation standards
- Development specs (BS)
 Major interfaces
 Formal specs for trusted components.
- Product specs of Scores and Scores and Scores and design.

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WHAT THE IMPLEMENTOR SHOULD HAVE

- Furnish specificals
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- Verhable language + language supportin
 ACCENCA
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- Mathematically inclined personnel and understanding management.
- Discubited implementation environs
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 Design language
 System builder
- A SOS itself uses PWB/UNIX (+tim) tools for system generation

No feetings

HINDSIGHT

HINDSIGHT - WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN DONE BETTER

- Better integration of segment and file systems.
- More insight into consistency between multiple representations.
- Better implementation language
- Simpler secure path mechanism
- Alternate Emulator structure

HINDSIGHT - THINGS THAT WORKED

- Success of disciplined methodology
- Value of formal specifications for unexpected purposes
- integrated devalopment environment worked wall
- Personnel accepted formal methods sasily
- Although occasionally annoying MIL-SPEC documentation was useful
- Having a model to work against very helpful

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si çaş connunteations processor Scorp-c REPRESENTED SERVICE OPERATION YETEM

CHARLES M. BOANEAU
HEMEYMELL, INC.
ST. PETERSBURG, FLORITA - 55735

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SYSTEM CHOICES

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VISIBLE FUNCTIONS

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DEVICES

• CREATE SEVICE • REMOVE SEVICE

KERNEL INTERNAL FUNCTIONS

- RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
 - SCHEDULER MEMORY MANAGEMENT
- . "RAF MANAGERENT
- . STERRUPT MANAGEMENT

KERNEL TRUSTED SOFTWARE INTERFACES

- . SECURE INITIATOR
- . SECURE AUDITOR

. OPERATOR INTERFACE

KERNEL ARCHITECTURE

• DISTRIBUTED

NO CONTEXT SWITCH TO PERFORM KERNEL FUNCTION

- LARGE VIRTUAL ADDRESS SPACE
- . KERNEL PROCESSES
 - PROC 0 SCHEDULER: SERVICE KILL PROCESS SIGNALS
 - PROC 1 AUDITOR GENERATE AUDIT SEGMENTS
 - PROC 2 SEGMENT RELEASER: RELEASE INACTIVE SEGMENTS
 - PROC 3 SYSTEM SYNC SYNC ALL MOUNTED FILESYSTEMS

KSOS STRUCTURE

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USER PROGRAMS

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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












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



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ABBREVIATED COMPUTER SECURITY BIBLIOGRAPHY 8 January 1980

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COMPUTER SECURITY TECHNOLOGY GLOSSARY

Access Level

The combination of the security level and the integrity level of a subject or object.

Activity

The security model rule that states that only active objects can be accessed. Once an object is made inactive, it cannot be accessed unless it is made active again.

Access Control

A strategy for protecting objects from unauthorized access.

Address Space

The virtual memory that can be addressed by a process. The maximum size of a process's address space is usually a function of the underlying hardware.

Attention Character

In TCB design, a character that, if entered from a terminal, tells the TCB that the user wants a secure communications path from the terminal to some trusted code to provide some type of secure service for the user, such as logging in or logging out. Contains authorization information defining how the object may be used (e.g., read, write).

Category Set

State of the state

A category set, part of a security level, is a list of information categories applicable to an object or subject. Categories correspond roughly to the topic area of the information. A subject must be cleared for all categories on an object to read the object. (See compartment.)

Channel

A means of transferring information from one object to another object.

Classification

An access token usually associated with an information repository, or object, though sometimes associated with subjects also. The classification of a subject or object, along with a category set, makes up the security level of an object.

Clearance

An authorization allowing a person (or his surrogate within a computer, a process) access to classified information. A clearance is represented as a classification in a security level.

Compartment

Compartments are a mutually exclusive way to assign categories. If an object is compartmented, then it generally has only one category, called a compartment. Compartments are used mostly in the intelligence community. They are implemented in a kernel-based system using categories.

Concurrency

The occurrence of two or more operations at the same time. A kernel is said to have concurrency if interrupts are enabled to allow interruption of the execution of kernel operations. Concurrency in a kernel has an adverse effect on the ease of verification of the kernel, but increases the functionality of the kernel.

Confinement

A condition where a process is unable to leak information illegitimately. Because processes must share computer resources, confinement channels are difficult to avoid. Such channels can be exploited to allow unauthorized read access to information. (See channels, legitimate, illegitimate, covert, storage, and timing channels.)

Covert Channel

A confinement channel involving colluding processes. It results from the shared use of common limited computer resources.

Denial of Service

The prevention of authorized access to a computer system.

Discretionary Security

The aspect of security policy policy implementing the "need to know" requirement for access to information.

DoD Security Policy

The complete body of law, regulations and policy concerning the safeguarding of Defense sensitive information. DoD security policy includes all the Espionage laws, the DoD regulations and DoD authorized commercial classification, for handling and access to information concerning national defense. The basic policy set four levels and several categories of non-discretionary information control and requires that anyone accessing classified information have the need to know the particular information in question. A representative description of the policy can be found in AFR 205-1.

Domain

Domains allow hardware features to be restricted or subsetted. For example, DEC PDP 11/45 or 11/70 has three execution domains: kernel, supervisor, and user. The kernel domain is the most privileged, and allows access to all hardware features including memory maps and I/O; the other domains do not allow these privileges, but allow access as controlled by the kernel domain).

Emulator

That portion of a secure, kernel-based system that creates an operating system compatible environment out of the environment provided by the kernel. In the case of KSOS, the emulator maps the kernel environment into the UNIX environment.

Erasure

The security model rules that states that an object must be "erased" before being activated. This means that all objects have a precise, pre-defined value when created (e.g., all zeros).

Euclid

A Pascal-based higher order language designed to facilitate verification.

Finite State Machine

An abstract concept on which a number of protection models are based. In theory, by starting with a secure initial state and following the model rules for all changes, then all states of the machine are secure.

Flow Control

A strategy for protecting the contents of information objects from being transferred to objects at improper access levels.

Formal specifications

See Top-Level Specification.

Granularity

Granularity of protection refers to the size of the smallest protectable unit of information. In a kernelbased system, this would be the size of the smallest protectable file or portion of virtual memory.

GYPSY

A formal program specification language and a verifiable high order language, developed by the University of Texas, designed in conjunction with a complete verification system. Higher Order Language (HOL)

A computer language which is syntactically and semantically much richer than assembler level languages. HOL's are translated by a compiler or processed by an interpreter to produce executable code or direct execution (interpreter) on most machines, although some machines have hardware interpreters for a specific HOL.

Human Interface Function

A TCB operation that requires human intervention or judgment. Untrusted processes would not be able to invoke them. (See Software Interface Functions.)

Illegitimate Channel

A confinement channel whose presence was not intended. (See legitimate channel, confinement.)

Integrity

The mathematical dual of security that provides protection against unauthorized modification of information (as opposed to unauthorized reading). Whereas higher levels of security restrict the dissemination of information to smaller sets of users, higher levels of integrity restrict the access to commands and capabilities to smaller sets of users.

Integrity Level

The combination of an integrity classification and a set of integrity categories.

Integrity *-property

A rule of the MITRE integrity model that controls reading of information. The integrity level of a subject must be less than or equal to that of an object to read the object.

Inter-Process Communication (IPC)

Communication between two different processes.

Legitimate Channel

A confinement channel whose presence was not intended. (See confinement, covert channel.)

Machine language

The actual sequence of (usually) binary bits which are interpreted by the hardware of a computer to perform a program.

Mandatory Security

The same as non-discretionary security below.

Modula

A Pascal-based higher order language designed to facilitate verification. Used by FACC for KSOS.

Module

A collection of functions which perform operations on and give state information on one component of an abstract machine.

NKSR

Non-Kernel Security-Related software is software that, although related to the security of the overall system, is more convenient to execute in the environment provided by the kernel, as opposed to running as part of the kernel itself. NKSR software usually needs privileges to violate some of the kernel-enforced security rules. (See privileged process)

Non-discretionary Security

The aspect of DoD security policy which deals with security levels. A security level is comprised of a security classification and one or more categories of access restriction. Classifications are totally ordered while categories are partially ordered. To access a piece of information, a user must have a classification greater than or equal to the classification of the information, and at least all the categories of access restriction of the information. The classification and categories of information and users are seldom changed and the accessibility of information by users is easily checked mathematically, without discretion.

Object

Pascal

Privileged Process

Process

The mathematical model abstraction of a repository of information in a computer system.

A popular higher level language for which compilers exist on several machines. While Pascal was designed on a general purpose language for ease of writing correct programs, there have been improvements and extensions, especially for system programming, developed for several machines.

See Trusted Process.

A process consists of a unique address space containing its accessible program code and data, a program location for the currently executing instruction, and periodic access to the processor in order to continue. Unlike a program, which is a static entity, a process is dynamic for it can change the programs in its address space.

Reference Monitor

A concept of control within an abstract machine that limits the access by subjects to objects.

A security kernel is an implementation of a reference monitor for a given hardware base.

Secure Path

See Trusted Path.

Security Kernel

A mechanism dithin a computer system, comprised of hardware and software, that controls the access of users (and processes executing on their behalf) to repositories of information resident in or connected to the system. TCBs have been implemented using security kernels along with trusted processes.

Security Level

The combination of a classification and a set of categories that controls non-discretionary (mandatory) access to information, (i.e., unauthorized (read) access vs. unauthorized modification (write).

Security #-property

The security model rule that prohibits a subject from writing an object of lower security level.

Security Violation

The infringement or breach of a security rule.

Simple Integrity Condition

An integrity rule that controls writing of information. A subject must have an integrity level greater than or equal to that of an object to write the object.

Simple Security Condition

The security model rule that prohibits the access by a subject to information of greater security level than that of the subject. Software Interface Function

A TCB operation that can be invoked by software, as opposed a person at a terminal. (See Human Interface Function.)

Storage Channel

A channel implemented in software that does not exploit the concurrent execution of two or more processes. A direct storage channel uses the storage associated with a kernel protected information repository (object). An indirect storage channel uses other information associated with kernel objects, such as control information.

Subject

The mathematical model abstraction of a person, process, or other user of information in a computer system.

System High

The highest level in a system, used as in "system high security level" or "system high integrity level".

System Low

The lowest level in a system, used as in "system low security level" or "system low integrity level".

System Utility

Any software, not part of the verified operating system, used to perform various functions that are not directly part of the applications. Examples are compilers, debuggers, editors, and loaders.

Timing Channel

A channel implemented in software that exploits the concurrent execution of two or more processes.

Top-Level Specification (TLS)

A description of the externally observable behavior of a system devoid of implementation detail. The top-level specification of a security kernel precisely defines the behavior of the security kernel observable outside the kernel domain (at the kernel interface). For some verification methodologies, it is an unambiguous description of a finite state machine, written in a machine processable language with a well-defined syntax and semantics. Computer readability of the specifications allows for automation of various phases of verification. It is also called formal specification.

Tranquility

The security model rule that states that the security level of an active object cannot change.

Trusted Computing Base (TCB)

The totality of protection mechanisms for an operating system. It provides both a basic protection environment plus additional user services required for a trustworthy turnkey system. TCBs have been implemented as a security kernel and trusted processes.

Trusted Path

A connection between a user at a terminal and some verified (secure) code that is maintained only by secure code. Use of a secure path assures a user that the intended function will faithfully be presented to the code that executes the function. A secure path is achieved by the user by striking the attention character at a terminal. Also called secure path.

Trusted Process

A process that must be "trusted" to execute as specified if system security is to be maintained. A process is best afforded this "trust" through verification. Trusted processes are sometimes used to execute NKSR software. They are also often endowed with "privileges" to violate kernel-enforced rules.

Verification

The process of mathematically proving that a mechanism behaves in a specified manner. In this context, verification is taken to mean the mathematical proof of correctness of a software system (e.g., the security kernel).

Virtual Space

See Address Space.

UNIX

A general-purpose time-sharing computer system designed to provide a good environment for a user to develop and operate information processing and computation systems. UNIX is a trade/service mark of Western Electric.

Untrusted Process

A process whose incorrect or malicious execution cannot effect system security. (One that has not been subjected to verification.)

-Property

The second second

See Security *-Property, Integrity *-Property.

